Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Incitement And Social Media-Algorithmic Speech: Redefining Brandenburg For A Different Kind Of Speech, Anna Rhoads Nov 2022

Incitement And Social Media-Algorithmic Speech: Redefining Brandenburg For A Different Kind Of Speech, Anna Rhoads

William & Mary Law Review

Assuming that these scholars are correct and that social media algorithms’ decisions qualify as speech to which the First Amendment applies (social media-algorithmic speech), this Note proposes a legal solution to the increasing problem of violence stemming from social media. This Note asserts that the incitement standard for social media-algorithmic speech should be less stringent because the Brandenburg standard does not apply well to new media, social media-algorithmic speech is much more likely than other speech to actually produce lawless action, and the traditional First Amendment justifications do not apply to social media algorithms’ speech. Therefore, the Supreme Court should …


Fighting Words Today, R. George Wright Jun 2022

Fighting Words Today, R. George Wright

Pepperdine Law Review

For some time, the familiar free speech exception known as the “fighting words” doctrine has been subject to severe judicial and scholarly critique. It turns out, though, that the fighting words doctrine, in general, is neither obsolete nor in need of radical limitation. The traditionally neglected “inflict injury” prong of the fighting words doctrine can and should be vitalized, with only a minimal loss, if not an actual net gain, in promoting the basic purposes of freedom of speech in the first place. And the “reactive violence” prong can and should be relieved of its historic biases and dubious assumptions. …


Republication Liability On The Web, Jeffrey Standen Apr 2022

Republication Liability On The Web, Jeffrey Standen

Marquette Law Review

The tort of defamation evolved in an era where defamatory speech was published in books, magazines, newspapers, or other printed documents. The doctrines that are antecedent to the tort, such as publication, fault, defamation per se, presumed damages, and republication liability, similarly presumed that most defamation would appear in written form in a published work. Similarly, the significant limitations on defamation liability that were produced by a succession of Supreme Court constitutional precedent, including restrictions on prior restraint, heightened fault standards, expanded “public” classes, the “fact/opinion” dichotomy, and the “truth/substantial truth” burden shifting, also were based on a publishing world …


The Coddling Of The American Worker's Mind: The Anti-Free Speech Nature Of Popular Labor Law Reforms, Daniel V. Johns Mar 2022

The Coddling Of The American Worker's Mind: The Anti-Free Speech Nature Of Popular Labor Law Reforms, Daniel V. Johns

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

As the nation enters an era in which a new presidential administration will likely push such labor law reforms, it is worth considering whether transparently anti-free speech reform measures make sense for the future of labor policy and law. This Article argues that they do not. Because employee free choice is furthered, not diminished, by hearing both sides of an issue, American workers should have the opportunity to hear and evaluate employer speech in the course of union campaigns. Only then can employees make an informed decision about their workplace future. In the end, freedom of speech furthers employee freedom …


Searching For Truth In The First Amendment's True Threat Doctrine, Renee Griffin Feb 2022

Searching For Truth In The First Amendment's True Threat Doctrine, Renee Griffin

Michigan Law Review

Threats of violence, even when not actually carried out, can inflict real damage. As such, state and federal laws criminalize threats in a wide range of circumstances. But threats are also speech, and free speech is broadly protected by the First Amendment. The criminalization of threats is nonetheless possible because of Supreme Court precedents denying First Amendment protection to “true threats.” Yet a crucial question remains unanswered: What counts as a true threat?

This Note examines courts’ attempts to answer this question and identifies the many ambiguities that have resulted from those attempts. In particular, this piece highlights three frontiers …