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Full-Text Articles in Law
True To Character: Honoring The Intellectual Foundations Of The Character Evidence Rule In Domestic Violence Prosecutions, Andrew King-Ries
True To Character: Honoring The Intellectual Foundations Of The Character Evidence Rule In Domestic Violence Prosecutions, Andrew King-Ries
Faculty Law Review Articles
This article calls for a new character evidence rule allowing the admission of prior acts of abuse within the context of a current domestic violence prosecution. Section II discusses the history of domestic violence in America and explores the three ways that the law has condoned domestic violence, including implicit sanction through the effect of the character evidence rule. Section III examines the intellectual background of the character evidence ban. This section also explores the conflict between the character evidence rule and the law's recognition of domestic violence. Further, Section III demonstrates how the character evidence ban violates its underlying …
Questions Of Fact In The Practice Of Law: A Response To Allen & Pardo's Facts In Law, Facts Of Law, Paul F. Kirgis
Questions Of Fact In The Practice Of Law: A Response To Allen & Pardo's Facts In Law, Facts Of Law, Paul F. Kirgis
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings
In an article in this journal, Professor Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo critiqued efforts to explain the fact-law distinction on ontological, epistemological or analytical grounds. Finding those efforts unavailing, the authors concluded that decisions to label an issue 'legal' or 'factual' rest on purely functional considerations turning on a complex set of variables including the conventional meanings of the terms, structural relationships among potential decision-makers, and a distinction between matters of general and specific import. In this response, it is argued that Allen and Pardo's critique is accurate to the extent it addresses the fact-law distinction from a general jurisprudential …
A Legisprudential Analysis Of Evidence Codification: Why Most Evidence Rules Should Not Be Codified—But Privilege Law Should Be, Paul F. Kirgis
A Legisprudential Analysis Of Evidence Codification: Why Most Evidence Rules Should Not Be Codified—But Privilege Law Should Be, Paul F. Kirgis
Faculty Law Review Articles
In this article, I will suggest standards for use in assessing a proposed codification. Although the standards I will identify are useful for evaluating a proposed codification of privilege law, they are also more generally applicable. Indeed, I will use them to examine the codification of evidence law in general. First, I will ask whether, as a normative matter, the law of evidence should be codified. I will then focus on the individual rules of evidence, most notably the privilege rules, to draw conclusions about whether those standards are met.