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Full-Text Articles in Law

Controlling The Jury-Teaching Function, Richard D. Friedman Apr 2018

Controlling The Jury-Teaching Function, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

When evidence with a scientific basis is offered, two fundamental questions arise. First, should it be admitted? Second, if so, how should it be assessed? There are numerous participants who might play a role in deciding these questions—the jury (on the second question only), the parties (through counsel), expert witnesses on each side, the trial court, the forces controlling the judicial system (which include, but are not limited to, the appellate courts), and the scientific establishment. In this Article, I will suggest that together, the last two—the forces controlling the judicial system and the scientific establishment—have a large role to …


Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1997

Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

If I understand them correctly, several leading Bayesioskeptics (Allen, Callen, Stein) acknowledge - with varying degrees of specificity and varying degrees of grudgingness - that standard probability theory can be useful as an analytical tool in considering evidentiary doctrines and the probative value of evidentiary items.


Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1997

Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In recent years, some scholars of evidence, myself among them, have made active use of subjective probability theory - what is sometimes referred to as Bayesianism - in thinking about issues and problems related to the law of evidence. But, at the same time, this use has been challenged to various degrees and in various ways by scholars to whom I shall apply the collective, if somewhat misleading, label of Bayesioskeptics. I present this brief paper to defend this use of probability theory, and to discuss what I believe is its proper role in discourse about evidentiary issues.


Probability And Proof In State V. Skipper: An Internet Exchange, Ronald J. Allen, David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard D. Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry Larue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, Alexander Stein Jan 1995

Probability And Proof In State V. Skipper: An Internet Exchange, Ronald J. Allen, David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard D. Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry Larue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, Alexander Stein

Articles

This is not a conventional article. It is an edited version of messages sent to an Internet discussion list. The listings begin with the mention of a recent opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, parts of which are reproduced below. The listings soon move to broader issues concerning probability and other formal systems, their limitations, and their uses either in court or as devices for understanding legal proof.


Standards Of Persuasion And The Distinction Between Fact And Law, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1992

Standards Of Persuasion And The Distinction Between Fact And Law, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The invitation to respond in these pages to Gary Lawson's very interesting article, Proving the Law, was tempting enough. But what made it irresistible was Professor Lawson's comment that he is "addressing, with a brevity that borders on the irresponsible, subjects well beyond [his] depth." Now, that's the kind of debate I really like. Let me jump right in. A principal question raised by Lawson, which I find quite interesting, may be phrased in general, and purposefully ambiguous, terms as follows: Before an actor treats a proposition as a valid2 proposition of law, what standard of persuasion should that proposition …


Webs Of Things In The Mind: A New Science Of Evidence, Peter Tillers May 1989

Webs Of Things In The Mind: A New Science Of Evidence, Peter Tillers

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst by David Schum


Loss Of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification And Proof Of Guilt, Samuel R. Gross Jan 1987

Loss Of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification And Proof Of Guilt, Samuel R. Gross

Articles

It is no news that eyewitness identification in criminal cases is a problem; it is an old and famous problem. Judges and lawyers have long known that the identification of strangers is a chancy matter, and nearly a century of psychological research has confirmed this skeptical view. In 1967 the Supreme Court attempted to mitigate the problem by regulating the use of eyewitness identification evidence in criminal trials; since then it has retreated part way from that effort. Legal scholars have written a small library of books and articles on this problem, the courts' response to it, and various proposed …


The Numbers Game: Statistical Inference In Discrimination Cases, David H. Kaye Mar 1982

The Numbers Game: Statistical Inference In Discrimination Cases, David H. Kaye

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Statistical Proof of Discrimination by David Baldus and James Cole


Parent-Child Incest: Proof At Trial Without Testimony In Court By The Victim, Dustin P. Ordway Oct 1981

Parent-Child Incest: Proof At Trial Without Testimony In Court By The Victim, Dustin P. Ordway

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that the incest victim should not testify personally at trial. Rather, the child's testimony should be replaced with tape-recorded pretrial examinations of the victim by an expert, supplemented by the in-court testimony of the examining expert. Part I discusses how the present system of requiring in-court testimony by the victim harms the child, fails to correct the incest problem, and produces unreliable evidence. Part II outlines and discusses the merits of the proposed reform. Part ill examines the proposed reform in light of the defendant's constitutional rights to due process and to confront witnesses against him. The …


The Future Of Evidence Law: Or, Some Prophecies About Proof, John W. Reed Jan 1977

The Future Of Evidence Law: Or, Some Prophecies About Proof, John W. Reed

Other Publications

I am honored to participate in this seminar that is part of the celebration surrounding the dedication of Colorado's new State Judicial Building. But that feeling of honor is tempered by an awareness of the responsibility and perils of the role I have been asked to play. With the assignment, "The Future of Evidence Law," I have been asked to play the prophet, to be a seer of sorts, and to suggest what rules and principles will govern proof at trials at some date in the future. Exactly what date was not specified in the invitation-a decade, perhaps? A generation? …


Evidence Problems In Criminal Cases, John W. Reed Jan 1977

Evidence Problems In Criminal Cases, John W. Reed

Book Chapters

The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by Congress, became effective on July 1, 1975. Ten states have adopted state versions of the Federal Rules to govern trials in their courts, and about half the remaining states are considering whether to follow suit. Michigan is one of these latter states. Early in 1977 a committee appointed by the Supreme Court of Michigan proposed rules of evidence for Michigan closely patterned on the Federal Rules, and, if all goes well, the Court will promulgate rules for the Michigan courts to become effective in 1977 or soon thereafter. Michigan lawyers should be aware …