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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Poverty Tourism, Justice And Policy, Kevin Outterson, Evan Selinger, Kyle Whyte
Poverty Tourism, Justice And Policy, Kevin Outterson, Evan Selinger, Kyle Whyte
Faculty Scholarship
Based on moral grounds, should poverty tourism be subject to specific policy constraints? This article responds by testing poverty tourism against the ethical guideposts of compensation justice, participative justice, and recognition justice, and two case descriptions, favela tours in Rocinha and garbage dump tours in Mazatlan. The argument advanced is that the complexity of the social relationships involved those tours requires policy-relevant research and solutions.
Moral Limits Of Dworkin's Theory Of Law And Legal Interpretation, David B. Lyons
Moral Limits Of Dworkin's Theory Of Law And Legal Interpretation, David B. Lyons
Faculty Scholarship
At the foundation of Justice for Hedgehogs is a commitment to moral objectivity – the doctrine that there are right answers to moral questions. This nicely complements Dworkin’s legal theory, which holds that right answers to legal questions depend on right answers to moral questions. Without the doctrine of moral objectivity, Dworkin could not reasonably maintain, as he does, that law provides determinate answers to legal questions.
Rethinking "Original Intent", David B. Lyons
Rethinking "Original Intent", David B. Lyons
Faculty Scholarship
Although Dred Scott v. Sandford is one of the Supreme Court's most controversial decisions, it is not often taught or read. But its approach to constitutional interpretation is by no means outdated, and its historical importance has not diminished. So it seems a good example to consider.
The Connection Between Law And Morality: Comments On Dworkin, David B. Lyons
The Connection Between Law And Morality: Comments On Dworkin, David B. Lyons
Faculty Scholarship
Our discussions yesterday seemed haunted by a contrast--never quite formulated--between Natural Law and Legal Positivism. The standard interpretation turns on the idea of a "necessary connection" between law and morality. Positivism has often been understood to hold, and Natural Law to deny, that there can be unjust laws.
The Nature Of The Contract Argument, David B. Lyons
The Nature Of The Contract Argument, David B. Lyons
Faculty Scholarship
As truth is the first virtue of belief, so justice is of social institutions. That is John Rawls's view, and it seems true, at any rate, of the law. Official acts, laws, and legal arrangements generally are characterized as just or unjust, while other moral categories are much less frequently invoked. Justice seems inseparable from good law. It is therefore striking and important that justice has recently been regarded by prominent legal theorists as rationally disreputable--as, in Kelsen's words, "an irrational idea." Many divergent conceptions of social justice have been propounded, and it is held that there is no rational …
On Formal Justice, David B. Lyons
On Formal Justice, David B. Lyons
Faculty Scholarship
A number of legal and political theorists have suggested that public officials who fail to act within the law that they administer act unjustly. This does not mean that injustice is always likely to be done merely because it often happens to be done when officials depart from the law. Some writers have held that injustice is done whenever an official fails to act within the law, regardless of the circumstances. I shall call this type of view "formal justice."