Law Commons^™

Slides: Shale And Air Quality: The View From The Other Side, Jeremy Nichols

Shale Plays in the Intermountain West: Legal and Policy Issues (November 12)

Presenter: Jeremy Nichols, Climate & Energy Program Director, WildEarth Guardians, Denver, CO

18 slides

Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy L. Meyer

Scholarly Works

Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs - which promote the stability of legal rules - have distributional …

Early Experience With The Kyoto Compliance System: Possible Lessons For Mea Compliance System Design, Meinhard Doelle, Meinhard Doelle

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

Regardless of the future of the Kyoto compliance system, much of its work will continue to be important both for the climate change regime and for other MEAs. While it is impossible to make accurate predictions about the substance of the climate change regime after 2012, it is nevertheless important to reflect on the experience with the Kyoto compliance system to date for MEA compliance generally. Adjustments to the Kyoto compliance system necessitated by post 2012 changes to the substantive obligations can, of course, only be considered once those changes are known. The central question posed in this article is …

Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy Meyer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs - which promote the stability of legal rules - have distributional …