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Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy Meyer
Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy Meyer
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs - which promote the stability of legal rules - have distributional …
Regulatory Traffic Jams, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman, Kai-Sheng Song
Regulatory Traffic Jams, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman, Kai-Sheng Song
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Notwithstanding the tremendous amount of attention environmental agencies, policy analysts, and scholars have paid to "regulatory reinvention," it has been pitched primarily as a refinement of the sanction and facilitation models, and thus intended to be channeled through the firm-specific behavioral responses predicted under the rational polluter and good-apple models. Little attention has been paid to the systems level question. The relevant question under the systems model is whether there is a component of noncompliance that does not respond to sanction and facilitation policies that are intended to illicit firm-specific behavioral responses. To answer this will require (1) identifying instances …