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Full-Text Articles in Law
Voter Equality & Other Canadian Values: Finding The Right Balance, Sujit Choudhry, Matthew Mendelsohn
Voter Equality & Other Canadian Values: Finding The Right Balance, Sujit Choudhry, Matthew Mendelsohn
Sujit Choudhry
Representation by population (rep-by-pop) was one of the principal forces behind the creation of Canada and is a key pillar of democracy. The principle that all votes have equal weight reflects the democratic norm that all citizens should have an equal say in who will be elected, who will raise issues in Parliament and who will have the right to use the legitimate power of the state to make decisions on our behalf. Although some deviations from the norm of voter equality are acceptable, they should be grounded in principles that are widely accepted and viewed as legitimate. Canada’s federal …
The Intellectual Forebears Of Citizens United, Ronald Rotunda
The Intellectual Forebears Of Citizens United, Ronald Rotunda
Ronald D. Rotunda
No abstract provided.
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …