Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Corporations (3)
- Economics (3)
- Regulated Industries (2)
- Securities Law (2)
- Antitrust (1)
-
- Constitutional law (1)
- Consumer Protection Law (1)
- Contracting (1)
- Contracts (1)
- Contracts versus Norms (1)
- Corporate Finance (1)
- Corporate personality (1)
- Cost-benefit analysis (1)
- Discursive dilemma and corporate law (1)
- Doctrinal paradox (1)
- Enforcement Mechanisms (1)
- Environmental Law (1)
- Equity (1)
- Hurricane Katrina (1)
- International Trade (1)
- Labor Market (1)
- Law and Society (1)
- Natural disasters (1)
- Natural hazards (1)
- Politics (1)
- Public Law (1)
- Risk (1)
- Taxation-Transnational (1)
- Telecommunications and Regulated Industries (1)
- Union versus Non Union (1)
Articles 1 - 15 of 15
Full-Text Articles in Law
Equity Analysis And Natural Hazards Policy, Matthew D. Adler
Equity Analysis And Natural Hazards Policy, Matthew D. Adler
All Faculty Scholarship
What is an “equitable” policy for mitigating the impacts of hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and other natural hazards? Economists tend to see “equity” or “distribution” as irreducibly political and subjective. But, in truth, equity analysis and cost-benefit analysis are on a par. Both require a normative justification. Moreover, normative argument can help us structure equity analysis, just as it can cost-benefit analysis. This chapter, written for a forthcoming book on natural hazards policy after Katrina, argues that equity is a normative consideration distinct from efficiency or overall well-being. It then argues that equity is individualistic, not group-based; ex post, not ex …
The Corporate Form As A Solution To A Discursive Dilemma, Edward B. Rock
The Corporate Form As A Solution To A Discursive Dilemma, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
I examine the connection between the discursive dilemma and corporate law. The discursive dilemma (or doctrinal paradox) is a distinctive social choice problem that was first identified by Kornhauser and Sager and later used as the basis for a theory of organizational personality by Pettit. I examine the ways in which the corporate form prevents the emergence of the discursive dilemma in the firm context and the extent to which the presence of the discursive dilemma can provide the foundation for a theory of corporate personality.
Theories Of The Employment Relationship: Choosing Between Norms And Contracts, Michael L. Wachter
Theories Of The Employment Relationship: Choosing Between Norms And Contracts, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
In this paper, I analyze three types of labor market relationships that are prevalent in the economy - the external labor market that exists outside of firms, and the union and nonunion employment relationships that exist inside firms. The parties' relationships in each of these markets are markedly different from one another with respect to their use of contracts versus norms, their enforcement mechanisms, and their reliance on external competitive market pressures. Why do these very distinct forms exist? This paper provides an answer to this question. To be successful, each of the structures has to resolve problems of match-specific …
Interview With Timothy J. Carson, David Spiegel, Timothy J. Carson, Legal Oral History Project, University Of Pennsylvania Carey Law School
Interview With Timothy J. Carson, David Spiegel, Timothy J. Carson, Legal Oral History Project, University Of Pennsylvania Carey Law School
Legal Oral History Project
For transcript, click the Download button above. For video index, click the link below.
TImothy J. Carson (W '70) has practiced in Philadelphia for forty years in the field of public sector law, especially public finance. He is currently a partner at Dilworth Paxson LLP. He is an elected Fellow of the American College of Bond Counsel.
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, A. C. Pritchard
All Faculty Scholarship
When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel’s compensation.
Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors—pension funds, mutual …
Beyond Network Neutrality, Christopher S. Yoo
Beyond Network Neutrality, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Article, Professor Yoo takes issue with the emerging scholarly consensus in favor of ""network neutrality,"" which would prohibit network owners from employing proprietary protocols or entering into exclusivity agreements with content providers that would reduce the transparency of the Internet. Economic theory suggests that network neutrality advocates are focusing on the wrong policy problem. Rather than directing attention on the market for Internet content and applications, the segments of the industry that are the most competitive and the most likely to remain that way, communications policy would be better served if the focus were placed on the segment …
Wealth, Utility, And The Human Dimension, Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi
Wealth, Utility, And The Human Dimension, Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi
All Faculty Scholarship
Functional law and economics, which draws its influence from the public choice school of economic thought, stands in stark contrast to both the Chicago and Yale schools of law and economics. While the Chicago school emphasizes the inherent efficiency of legal rules, and the Yale school views law as a solution to market failure and distributional inequality, functional law and economics recognizes the possibility for both market and legal failure. That is, while there are economic forces that lead to failures in the market, there are also structural forces that limit the law’s ability to remedy those failures on an …
Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, And The Ordinary Meaning Of The Text Of The Gatt, Howard F. Chang
Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, And The Ordinary Meaning Of The Text Of The Gatt, Howard F. Chang
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch
Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Comment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Microfoundations Of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination Vs. Behavioral Bias, Jonathan Klick
The Microfoundations Of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination Vs. Behavioral Bias, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
Standard form contracts, or contracts of adhesion, appear to provide contradictory evidence for the operation of bargaining in the markets where they are common. Non-negotiated contract terms that seemingly benefit sellers to the detriment of buyers call into question the efficiency implications of the Coase Theorem, which forms the foundation of positive law and economics. Proponents of the behavioral school of law and economics have suggested that behavioral biases, observed in experimental contexts, provide the most plausible explanation for standard form contracts. However, price discrimination might provide a more parsimonious explanation for abusive terms in contracts. If there is heterogeneity …
On The Regulation Of Networks As Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
On The Regulation Of Networks As Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
The dominant approach to regulating communications networks treats each network component as if it existed in isolation. In so doing, the current approach fails to capture one of the essential characteristics of networks, which is the complex manner in which components interact with one another when combined into an integrated system. In this Essay, Professors Daniel Spulber and Christopher Yoo propose a new regulatory framework based on the discipline of mathematics known as graph theory, which better captures the extent to which networks represent complex systems. They then apply the insights provided by this framework to a number of current …
Redesigning The International Lender Of Last Resort, Patrick Bolton, David A. Skeel Jr.
Redesigning The International Lender Of Last Resort, Patrick Bolton, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton
The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Architectural Censorship And The Fcc, Christopher S. Yoo
Architectural Censorship And The Fcc, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
Most First Amendment analyses of U.S. media policy have focused predominantly on “behavioral” regulation, which either prohibits the transmission of disfavored content (such as indecent programming) or mandates the dissemination of preferred content (such as children’s educational programming and political speech). In so doing, commentators have largely overlooked how program content is also affected by “structural” regulation, which focuses primarily on increasing the economic competitiveness of media industries. In this Article, Professor Christopher Yoo employs economic analysis to demonstrate how structural regulation can constitute a form of “architectural censorship” that has the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and …
How Do Corporations Play Politics? The Fedex Story, Jill E. Fisch
How Do Corporations Play Politics? The Fedex Story, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
Corporate political activity has been the subject of federal regulation since 1907, and the restrictions on corporate campaign contributions and other political expenditures continue to increase. Most recently, Congress banned soft money donations in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), a ban upheld by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC. Significantly, although the omnibus BCRA clearly was not directed exclusively at corporations, the Supreme Court began its lengthy opinion in McConnell by referencing and endorsing the efforts of Elihu Root, more than a century ago, to prohibit corporate political contributions. Repeatedly, within the broad context of campaign …