Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Economics

Selected Works

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Antitrust, Industrial Organization, and Competition Policy

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Airline Network Effects And Consumer Welfare, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Mark Israel, Bryan Keating, Bobby Willig Oct 2013

Airline Network Effects And Consumer Welfare, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Mark Israel, Bryan Keating, Bobby Willig

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

In this paper we develop a methodology to quantify the value to consumers of the non-price characteristics of airline networks. Our research demonstrates that analyses that ignore the quality effects associated with expanded airline networks generate incorrect findings and thus should not form the basis for policy decisions regarding airline transactions. Appropriately incorporating quality effects into quality-adjusted fares reverses the conclusion that hub airports yield lower consumer welfare due to generally higher fares than other airports. From the perspective of consumer welfare in this industry, to evaluate potential airline mergers, alliances, slot swaps or other transactions, one should not focus …


The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld May 2005

The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

No abstract provided.


Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld Sep 2004

Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.