Law Commons^™

The law of foreign sovereign immunity changed dramatically over the course of the 20th century. The United States abandoned the doctrine of absolute immunity and opened its courts to lawsuits by private claimants against foreign governments. It also pursued a range of other policies designed to shift such disputes into litigation or arbitration (and thus relieve political actors of pressure to intervene on behalf of disappointed creditors). This article uses a unique data set of sovereign bonds to explore how international financial contracts responded to these legal and policy initiatives. The article makes three novel empirical and analytical contributions. The …

The conventional wisdom is that sovereigns repay their debts not because they fear litigation but because they wish to preserve their reputation in the capital markets or because they have some other incentive to repay. The ongoing case of NML Capital v. Argentina has the potential to shatter this consensus. A panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has approved a novel injunction, which requires Argentina to make full payment to holdouts who declined to participate in its post-2001 debt restructuring if the country intends to pay restructuring participants. The decision has caused market turmoil and …

In response to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, policymakers have initiated a range of reforms falling at both poles of the “hard”/“soft” law continuum. One of the most ambitious is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s initiative to identify what it calls “Principles of Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing.” The Principles aim to transform attitudes about sovereign lending in general, and sovereign loan contracts in particular, through consensus-building, promulgating model contract terms, and other soft law approaches. Principle 15, for example, envisions the use of collective action clauses (CACs) to ensure that debt restructurings occur “promptly, efficiently, and …

Most models of contracting behavior assume that contract terms are meant to be enforced, whether through legal or relational means. That assumption extends to dispute resolution terms like arbitration clauses. According to theory, contracting parties adopt arbitration clauses because they want to arbitrate disputes and because they believe that a counter-party who has agreed to arbitrate will keep that promise rather than incur the resulting legal or extra-legal sanction. In this article, I describe how this standard account cannot explain the origins of arbitration clauses in sovereign bond contracts. Drawing on original archival research and secondary sources, the article traces …