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Criminal Procedure

Death penalty

Michigan Law Review

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Rethinking The Timing Of Capital Clemency , Adam M. Gershowitz Oct 2014

Rethinking The Timing Of Capital Clemency , Adam M. Gershowitz

Michigan Law Review

This Article reviews every capital clemency over the last four decades. It demonstrates that in the majority of cases, the reason for commutation was known at the conclusion of direct appeals—years or even decades before the habeas process ended. Yet when governors or pardon boards actually commuted the death sentences, they typically waited until the eve of execution, with only days or hours to spare. Leaving clemency until the last minute sometimes leads to many years of unnecessary state and federal habeas corpus litigation, and this Article documents nearly 300 years of wasted habeas corpus review. Additionally, last-minute commutations harm …


The Court Of Life And Death: The Two Tracks Of Constitutional Sentencing Law And The Case For Uniformity, Rachel E. Barkow May 2009

The Court Of Life And Death: The Two Tracks Of Constitutional Sentencing Law And The Case For Uniformity, Rachel E. Barkow

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court takes two very different approaches to substantive sentencing law. Whereas its review of capital sentences is robust, its oversight of noncapital sentences is virtually nonexistent. Under the Court's reading of the Constitution, states must draft death penalty statutes with enough guidance to avoid death sentences being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner Mandatory death sentences are disallowed, and the sentencing authority must have the opportunity to consider mitigating evidence. The Court will scrutinize whether the death sentence is proportionate to the crime and the defendant, and it has frequently exempted certain crimes and certain offenders from …


Some Effects Of Identity-Based Social Movements On Constitutional Law In The Twentieth Century, William N. Eskridge Jr. Aug 2002

Some Effects Of Identity-Based Social Movements On Constitutional Law In The Twentieth Century, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Michigan Law Review

What motivated big changes in constitutional law doctrine during the twentieth century? Rarely did important constitutional doctrine or theory change because of formal amendments to the document's text, and rarer still because scholars or judges "discovered" new information about the Constitution's original meaning. Precedent and common law reasoning were the mechanisms by which changes occurred rather than their driving force. My thesis is that most twentieth century changes in the constitutional protection of individual rights were driven by or in response to the great identity-based social movements ("IBSMs") of the twentieth century. Race, sex, and sexual orientation were markers of …


Casting New Light On An Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism For A New Millennium, Wayne A. Logan May 2002

Casting New Light On An Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism For A New Millennium, Wayne A. Logan

Michigan Law Review

For opponents of capital punishment, these would appear promising times. Not since 1972, when the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty as then administered, has there been such palpable concern over its use, reflected in the lowest levels of public opinion support evidenced in some time. This concern is mirrored in the American Bar Association's recently recommended moratorium on use of the death penalty, the consideration of or actual imposition of moratoria in several states, and even increasing doubts voiced by high-profile political conservatives. An array of troubling empirical realities has accompanied this shift: persistent evidence of racial bias in …


The Racial Origins Of Modern Criminal Procedure, Michael J. Klarman Oct 2000

The Racial Origins Of Modern Criminal Procedure, Michael J. Klarman

Michigan Law Review

The constitutional law of state criminal procedure was born between the First and Second World Wars. Prior to 1920, the Supreme Court had upset the results of the state criminal justice system in just a handful of cases, all involving race discrimination in jury selection. By 1940, however, the Court had interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate state criminal convictions in a wide variety of settings: mob-dominated trials, violation of the right to counsel, coerced confessions, financially-biased judges, and knowingly perjured testimony by prosecution witnesses. In addition, the Court had broadened its earlier decisions forbidding …


The Breath Of The Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations And Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Capital Litigation, Albert L. Vreeland Ii Dec 1991

The Breath Of The Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations And Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Capital Litigation, Albert L. Vreeland Ii

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that fee limitations deprive indigent defendants of their right to effective assistance of counsel. Part I of this Note reviews state court decisions that address Sixth Amendment challenges to fee limitations, yet fail to address the broader concerns about the appointed counsel system. Part II considers the inherent disincentives and burdens fee limitations impose on attorneys and suggests that the limits threaten the indigent accused's right to effective assistance of counsel. A comparison of the fee limitations and the time required to prepare and try a capital case reveals the gross inadequacy of statutory fee provisions. In …


Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices In Capital Cases: An Empirical Study And A Constitutional Analysis, Bruce J. Winick Nov 1982

Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices In Capital Cases: An Empirical Study And A Constitutional Analysis, Bruce J. Winick

Michigan Law Review

As presently construed, the Constitution does not prohibit the death penalty. The states and the federal government may punish the commission of certain crimes with death, so long as the extreme penalty is not imposed on a mandatory basis and so long as the procedures used in imposing a death sentence meet constitutional scrutiny.

A demonstration that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenge in the manner described in a single case probably would be insufficient to support a constitutional challenge in the federal courts and in the vast majority of state courts. In these courts a prosecutor's use of the …


Constitutional Law-Due Process-Right Of Condemned Prisoner To A Hearing On Claim Of Supervening Insanity, Robert P. Griffin S.Ed. Jun 1950

Constitutional Law-Due Process-Right Of Condemned Prisoner To A Hearing On Claim Of Supervening Insanity, Robert P. Griffin S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Petitioner was convicted of murder in a Georgia court and sentenced to die by electrocution. He made application to the governor to postpone execution on the ground that he had become insane after conviction. The governor, acting under authority of a state statute, appointed three physicians who conducted an examination of petitioner and found him sane. Thereupon, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a state court contending that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled him to a hearing on his insanity claim before a judicial or administrative tribunal at which he could …


Criminal Law And Procedure - Inexperience Of Defense Attorney As Denial Of Fair Trial Jan 1935

Criminal Law And Procedure - Inexperience Of Defense Attorney As Denial Of Fair Trial

Michigan Law Review

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to be electrocuted. He now claims he was denied a fair trial as the attorney appointed by the circuit court to defend him was inexperienced, having practiced only thirteen months. Held, that inasmuch as the nature and extent of the attorney's practice was not shown and the record showed the defense was carried on in a highly creditable manner, the inexperience of defendant's attorney was not a denial of a fair trial. McGuire v. State, ( Ark. 1934) 74 S. w. (2d) 235.