Law Commons^™

"Sweet Childish Days": Using Developmental Psychology Research In Evaluating The Admissibility Of Out-Of-Court Statements By Young Children, Lynn Mclain

Maine Law Review

Young children are frequently precluded from testifying at trial on the grounds of incompetency because they cannot answer questions about abstract concepts regarding “truth” and “lies.” In this situation, should the child’s earlier, out-of-court statements disclosing the abuse and identifying the abuser also be inadmissible? The stakes are huge. If young children cannot testify, and their out-of-court statements are precluded, they simply become safe prey, unprotected by the judicial system. The pivotal question becomes, are there procedures that can ensure fairness both to children and to their alleged abusers? This article argues that a child’s testimonial incapacity at trial ought …

Miranda’S Near Death Experience: Reflections On The Occasion Of Miranda’S Fiftieth Anniversary, Eugene R. Milhizer

Catholic University Law Review

Miranda v. Arizona is widely regarded as one of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions in U.S. history. Shortly after the case was decided, Gallop Polls indicated that 63% of the public felt the Supreme Court was too soft on criminals. But despite its controversy, Miranda has become so widely accepted in popular culture that most people cannot imagine a criminal justice system without it. This wide spread acceptance, however, is more of a recent phenomenon in the landmark case’s history.

This article discusses Miranda’s tumultuous past; its harsh criticism from the legal community, academics, and the public at …

Law Enforcement And Criminal Law Decisions, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.

Manipulation Of Suspects And Unrecorded Questioning, Christopher Slobogin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Fifty years after Miranda, courts still do not have clear guidance on the types oftechniques police may use during interrogation. While first-generation tactics (a.k.a. the third degree) are banned, second-generation tactics such as those found in the famous Reid Manual continue to be used by interrogators. The Supreme Court has sent only vague signals as to which of these second- generation techniques, if any, are impermissible, and has made no mention of newly developed third-generation tactics that are much less reliant on manipulation. This Article divides second-generation techniques into four categories: impersonation, rationalization, fabrication, and negotiation. After concluding, based on …

Disentangling Miranda And Massiah: How To Revive The Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel As A Tool For Regulating Confession Law, Eve Brensike Primus

Articles

Fifty years after Miranda v. Arizona, many have lamented the ways in which the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have cut back on Miranda's protections. One underappreciated a spect of Miranda's demise is the way it has affected the development of the pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel guaranteed by Massiah v. United States. Much of the case law diluting suspects' Fifth Amendment Miranda rights has bled over into the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases without consideration of whether the animating purposes of the Massiah pretrial right to counsel would support such an importation. This development is unfortunate …

Resurrecting Miranda's Right To Counsel, David Rossman

Faculty Scholarship

The regime created by Miranda v. Arizona is at this point in its history bankrupt both intellectually and in terms of practical effect. Justices who have joined the Court after Miranda have cut back its scope by stingy interpretations of the doctrine’s reach and effect. In practice, few suspects actually benefit from the way Miranda is now implemented in police stations and courtrooms. Given the failure of Miranda’s promise, can we envision an alternative? Here is one that may be politically palatable and doctrinally feasible, largely adopted from English practice:

1. Police would give the same Miranda warnings that they …

The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, Yale Kamisar

Articles

A decade after the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, Geoffrey Stone took a close look at the eleven decisions the Court had handed down “concerning the scope and application of Miranda.” As Stone observed, “[i]n ten of these cases, the Court interpreted Miranda so as not to exclude the challenged evidence.” In the eleventh case, the Court excluded the evidence on other grounds. Thus, Stone noted, ten years after the Court decided the case, “the Court ha[d] not held a single item of evidence inadmissible on the authority of Miranda.” Not a single item. To use …

State V. Lovejoy: Should Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence Be Admissible During The State's Case-In-Chief As Substantive Evidence Of Guilt?, Mark A. Rucci

Maine Law Review

Article 1, section 6 of Maine Constitution reads in part that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself or herself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, property, or privileges . . . .” Further, the Law Court has held that “the State constitutional protection against self-incrimination is the equivalent of the Fifth Amendment." However, as with most provisions of the Constitution, the protection against self-incrimination is open to interpretation. While the Supreme Court has answered some questions surrounding the Fifth Amendment’s protections, it has left many decisions regarding its scope largely within the purview of the …