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Full-Text Articles in Law

Cabining Judicial Discretion Over Forensic Evidence With A New Special Relevance Rule, Emma F.E. Shoucair Jan 2018

Cabining Judicial Discretion Over Forensic Evidence With A New Special Relevance Rule, Emma F.E. Shoucair

Michigan Law Review

Modern forensic evidence suffers from a number of flaws, including insufficient scientific grounding, exaggerated testimony, lack of uniform best practices, and an inefficacious standard for admission that regularly allows judges to admit scientifically unsound evidence. This Note discusses these problems, lays out the current landscape of forensic science reform, and suggests the addition of a new special relevance rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence (and similar rules in state evidence codes). This proposed rule would cabin judicial discretion to admit non-DNA forensic evidence by barring prosecutorial introduction of such evidence in criminal trials absent a competing defense expert or …


Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders Apr 2014

Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase punishment based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about several categories of uncharged, dismissed, or otherwise unproven criminal conduct. Denying defendants an opportunity to cross-examine these categories of sentencing evidence undermines a core principle of natural law as adopted in the Sixth Amendment: those accused of felony crimes have the right to confront adversarial witnesses. This Article contributes to the scholarship surrounding confrontation rights at felony sentencing by cautioning against continued adherence to the most historic Supreme Court case on this issue, Williams v. New York. This Article does so for reasons beyond the unacknowledged …


Party's Over: Admissibility Of Post-Trial Juror Testimony Should Depend On The Nature Of The Conduct, Justin Gillett Jan 2012

Party's Over: Admissibility Of Post-Trial Juror Testimony Should Depend On The Nature Of The Conduct, Justin Gillett

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat

What do you call a weeklong period in which you and a handful of acquaintances drink alcohol every day at lunch, sleep though the afternoons, smoke marijuana and ingest a couple lines of cocaine on occasion? You call it the time when a jury convicted Anthony Tanner and William Conover of conspiracy to defraud the United States and commit various acts of mail fraud. Under a current rule of evidence, which precludes juror testimony to impeach a verdict except on extraneous prejudicial information, juror intoxication is not an external influence about which jurors may testify. A new test for the …


Pain, Love, And Voice: The Role Of Domestic Violence Victims In Sentencing, Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, Dana Pugach Jan 2012

Pain, Love, And Voice: The Role Of Domestic Violence Victims In Sentencing, Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, Dana Pugach

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

Criminal law systems throughout the world have evolved to a stage where they no longer ask, "What is the appropriate role of the victim in a criminal trial?" The questions now relate to the scope of the victim's rights, in which procedures she has independent standing, and at what stage she should be heard. The process of the "prosecution stepping into the victim's shoes," whereby the state controls the entire criminal process, seemingly on behalf of the victim, has been replaced by the recognition that the interests of the prosecution (the State) are not always consistent with those of the …


Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon Jan 2011

Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

Close to five million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults are perpetrated against women in the United States annually. Domestic violence accounts for twenty percent of all non-fatal crime experienced by women in this county. Despite these statistics, many have argued that in the past six years the Supreme Court has "put a target on [the] back" of the domestic violence victim, has "significantly eroded offender accountability in domestic violence prosecutions," and has directly instigated a substantial decline in domestic violence prosecutions. The asserted cause is the Court's complete and groundbreaking re-conceptualization of the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal …


Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger Jan 2006

Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …


Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin Jan 2006

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …


Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier Jan 2006

Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …


Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles Jan 2006

Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …


Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller Jan 2006

Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.


Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine Jan 2006

Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …


Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland Jun 2002

Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Although the Supreme Court has declined, for now, to endorse the Judicial Conference proposal to add a Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit live video testimony under limited circumstances, I agree with Professor Friedman that the matter is far from over. This is both because the potential benefits to be realized from the use of remote video testimony are too large to ignore and because, on closer inspection, any Confrontation Clause concerns that might underlie the Court's hesitation to adopt the proposal are not warranted. My purpose in writing is to summarize some of the …


Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda Mar 1999

Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda

Michigan Law Review

Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …


Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, Paula E. Hill, Samuel M. Hill Feb 1987

Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, Paula E. Hill, Samuel M. Hill

Michigan Law Review

Increases in the number of reported incidents of child abuse and sexual molestation have resulted in more and younger children becoming courtroom participants. Some courts refuse to consider the special needs of the child in this adversarial environment. Relying on questionable precedent, these courts hold that the defendant's right to directly confront the child, as well as strict compliance with evidentiary rules, overrides that child's interest in freedom from embarrassment or psychological trauma. This Note focuses on pressures felt by the testifying child and the ways in which these pressures affect her testimony; it then proposes using videotaped testimony as …


I Cannot Tell A Lie: The Standard For New Trial In False Testimony Cases, Daniel Wolf Aug 1985

I Cannot Tell A Lie: The Standard For New Trial In False Testimony Cases, Daniel Wolf

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the question of what standard should be used for granting a new trial when a defendant's conviction is alleged to have been based, at least in part, on false testimony. Part I demonstrates the failure of the existing standards to strike a satisfactory balance between defendants' rights and the efficient administration of the criminal justice system. Part II argues that motions for retrial based upon false testimony should be governed by a standard drawn not only from newly discovered evidence cases generally, but also from cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, Part III suggests that the proper test …


The Admissibility Of Prior Silence To Impeach The Testimony Of Criminal Defendants, Rex A. Sharp Apr 1985

The Admissibility Of Prior Silence To Impeach The Testimony Of Criminal Defendants, Rex A. Sharp

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note focuses on whether a defendant who was called as a witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant and refused to testify by invoking the fifth amendment can subsequently be impeached by this silence at his own trial. In addition to the obvious implications this issue has for severed criminal trials, the factors considered when deciding whether impeachment by silence should be allowed generally are in sharpest focus in this factual setting. Thus, the analysis of the constitutional and evidentiary questions this Note enlists to argue that impeachment by silence in this context is permissible applies as …


Griffin V. California: Still Viable After All These Years, Craig M. Bradley May 1981

Griffin V. California: Still Viable After All These Years, Craig M. Bradley

Michigan Law Review

In a recent article in the Michigan Law Review, Donald Ayer levels a series of attacks on the Griffin decision. Specifically, he maintains that the decision is at once too broad, because it requires "almost automatic reversal where there are any remarks explicitly focused on the defendant's silence and the inference of guilt to be drawn from it" regardless of the strength of the prosecution's case, and too narrow, because it fails to prevent the natural prejudice against the nontestifying defendant that may arise in the minds of the jurors without any encouragement from prosecutor or judge. Ayer also …


Reflections On Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege And Fair Trial", Peter Westen Apr 1981

Reflections On Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege And Fair Trial", Peter Westen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

I have learned a great deal from "Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial"-as I always do from Professor Hill's work. Indeed, he has changed my way of thinking in this area in several important respects. At the same time, I come to rather different conclusions than he regarding each of his three major topics. Part I of this article examines the problem of finding a "remedy" for testimonial privileges that violate a defendant's right to a fair trial. Part II discusses the problem of determining when a defendant is entitled to assert that the "right" has been violated. Finally, Part III …


The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen May 1979

The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found …


Compulsory Process Ii, Peter Westen Dec 1975

Compulsory Process Ii, Peter Westen

Michigan Law Review

This Article examines the validity of the conventional wisdom. It draws support for its analysis from the constitutional principles of compulsory process, and, in their absence, from related doctrine in the areas of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and his right to a fair trial. Part I of the article defines the constitutional standard that governs the simple case of a nonindigent defendant who makes a timely application to produce a witness from within the territory of the jurisdiction. Parts II through IV, in turn, examine that standard in the light of complicating factors such as the …


The Compulsory Process Clause, Peter Westen Nov 1974

The Compulsory Process Clause, Peter Westen

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this article traces the history of compulsory process, from its origin in the English transition from an inquisitional to an adversary system of procedure to its eventual adoption in the American Bill of Rights. Part II examines the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Washington v. Texas, which recognized after a century and a half of silence that the compulsory process clause was designed to enable the defendant not only to produce witnesses, but to put them on the stand and have them heard. Part III studies the implications of compulsory process for the defendant's case, from the …


The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Ruminations And Speculations, Bernard L. Diamond, David W. Louisell Jun 1965

The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Ruminations And Speculations, Bernard L. Diamond, David W. Louisell

Michigan Law Review

Consider the difference between the expert testimony of an orthopedic surgeon in a personal injury suit and the testimony of a psychiatrist in a murder trial in which some elements of the mens rea are at issue. In both instances an expert opinion is received in evidence, providing the trier of fact with technical, specialized information which must, or should, be available in order to permit a rational decision-making process. Well-established rules govern the nature of expert evidence and its mode of presentation. In legal theory, the orthopedic surgeon and the psychiatrist are both experts-physicians-who perform comparable functions in the …


Grand Jury Secrecy, Richard M. Calkins Jan 1965

Grand Jury Secrecy, Richard M. Calkins

Michigan Law Review

When a leading state such as Illinois enacts "reform" legislation, an impact on the legislatures of other jurisdictions may be anticipated. Accordingly, a need exists for an examination of this legislation in the light of the common-law background of grand jury secrecy and for a further analysis of it in the face of the growing trend toward more liberalized discovery of grand jury minutes in other jurisdictions. It is the contention of the author that such an empirical study will demonstrate that this legislation adopted by Illinois is contrary to all modern judicial thinking and is, in fact, a retrogressive …


Criminal Law-Reiterated Contempt Of Court, Robert C. Bonges Apr 1964

Criminal Law-Reiterated Contempt Of Court, Robert C. Bonges

Michigan Law Review

The defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt of court in a civil proceeding for giving "don't remember" answers, after having been granted immunity from prosecution, to questions concerning his activities, asked during a grand jury investigation of an attempted homicide. For his refusal to testify, the defendant was given the maximum penalty provided for criminal contempt under the applicable statute. After paying the fine and serving the sentence, the defendant was brought before the same grand jury thirty-five days later and was asked the same questions. The defendant repeated the "don't remember" answers and was again fined and incarcerated. …


Constitutional Law - Due Process And Right Of Confrontation- Jencks Act, Robert J. Margolin S.Ed. Apr 1960

Constitutional Law - Due Process And Right Of Confrontation- Jencks Act, Robert J. Margolin S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The Jencks Act like the rule it purportedly reaffirmed, was designed to insure "justice." Although the stated purpose of the act was to preserve the rights of any defendant under due process of law, the question remains unresolved whether, in articulating the rule in terms of "justice," the Court in Jencks v. United States incorporated it into the requirements of due process. To be sure, the underlying intent of both the Court and Congress is unclear, but of far more concern than the intent is whether the Jencks Act, in fact, violates the constitutional mandates of the Fifth and Sixth …


Constitutional Law - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination - Danger Of Prosecution In Other Jurisdictions, George R. Haydon, Jr. Apr 1958

Constitutional Law - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination - Danger Of Prosecution In Other Jurisdictions, George R. Haydon, Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Defendant, a witness called by the New Hampshire attorney general in an investigation of subversive activities, was granted statutory immunity in New Hampshire from criminal prosecution which might arise from his testimony and was ordered to testify. Since any disclosures would create serious danger of prosecution by the United States and Massachusetts, whose agencies were also investigating his activities, defendant refused to testify despite the grant of immunity, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the state constitution. He was found guilty of contempt, subject to his exceptions regarding the constitutionality of the immunity statute. On hearing before the state …


Legislation - Federal Criminal Procedure - Modification Of Jencks Decision, Raymond J. Dittrich, Jr. S.Ed. Jan 1957

Legislation - Federal Criminal Procedure - Modification Of Jencks Decision, Raymond J. Dittrich, Jr. S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Defendant was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001. During the trial, the court denied defendant's motion to order the government to produce for defendant's inspection reports submitted by government witnesses to government agents. The reports dealt with the same subject about which these witnesses later testified. The court of appeals affirmed the decision. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, one justice dissenting. The government has a privilege to refuse to surrender statements made by its prospective witnesses, but it may claim the privilege only at the expense of a dismissal of its case …


Constitutional Law - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination -Effect Of Immunity Statute, Paul A. Heinen S.Ed. Dec 1956

Constitutional Law - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination -Effect Of Immunity Statute, Paul A. Heinen S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Petitioner was brought before a federal grand jury and questioned as to his and other persons' membership in the Communist Party. After petitioner refused to answer the questions on the ground that the answers would be self-incriminating and therefore his refusal was privileged under the Fifth Amendment, the United States attorney, proceeding under the provisions of the Immunity Act of 1954, filed an application in the United States district court requesting that petitioner be required to answer the questions. The district court, upholding the constitutionality of the act, ordered petitioner to answer the questions, and petitioner's appeal from this order …


Witnesses--Competence Of Defendant's Spouse As Witness For The Prosecution, William R. Worth S.Ed. Jun 1950

Witnesses--Competence Of Defendant's Spouse As Witness For The Prosecution, William R. Worth S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Defendant, on trial for the offense of transporting across state lines a sum of money exceeding $5,000 feloniously obtained by fraud, was convicted largely through the testimony of his victim. The fraud charged consisted of a lightning courtship and hasty marriage, closely followed by the disappearance of the new husband along with the entire estate of the too-gullible bride. Over the objection of the defendant, his wife was permitted to testify to the swindle practiced upon her. After conviction, he filed a motion for a new trial, contending that it was error to permit a wife to testify against her …


Witnesses-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Effect Of Incorrect Decision By Trial Judge In Compelling Answer When Privilege Asserted Jun 1943

Witnesses-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Effect Of Incorrect Decision By Trial Judge In Compelling Answer When Privilege Asserted

Michigan Law Review

ln a judicial proceeding, a question is asked of a witness, which question he declines to answer, claiming that the answer will tend to incriminate him. The judge orders him to answer. He does so and the answer does incriminate him. What happens?