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Criminal Procedure

California Western School of Law

Faculty Scholarship

Privacy

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Overcoming Hiddenness: The Role Of Intentions In Fourth Amendment Analysis, Daniel B. Yeager Jan 2004

Overcoming Hiddenness: The Role Of Intentions In Fourth Amendment Analysis, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

This Article rehearses a response to the problems posed to and by the Supreme Court's attempts to work out the meaning and operation of the word "search." After commencing Part II by meditating on the notion of privacy, I take up its relation to the antecedent suspicion or knowledge that Fourth-Amendment law requires as a justification for all privacy invasions. From there, I look specifically at that uneasy relation in Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has come to privilege privacy over property as a Fourth Amendment value. From there, Part III reviews the sources or bases that can tell us what …


Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager Jan 2003

Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

This Article will reflect on (1) how the Whren v. United States failure to acknowledge what counts as a pretext accounts for the residual confusion as to whether or not Whren really has killed off the pretext argument in constitutional criminal procedure, and (2) the extent to which the Court in Sullivan compounded that failure, which I hope to lightly correct here by distinguishing motives from intentions and then by elaborating the role that each plays, or at least should play, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.


Does Privacy Really Have A Problem In The Law Of Criminal Procedure?, Daniel B. Yeager Jan 1997

Does Privacy Really Have A Problem In The Law Of Criminal Procedure?, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

Agreeing with William Stuntz's conclusion that privacy retains a significant position in the law of criminal procedure, the author defends a privacy-oriented procedural regime that can .be reconciled with an activist regulatory state. Part One of this Article suggests that the comparatively light judicial supervision of police coercion owes more to the conditions under which force is used than to what Stuntz views as the Court's indifference to what police do to us, or to its "obsession" over what police can see and hear. By redescribing questions of privacy, or questions of privacy and coercion, merely as questions of coercion, …