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When Should A Mistake Of Fact Excuse?, Stephen P. Garvey
When Should A Mistake Of Fact Excuse?, Stephen P. Garvey
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This symposium contribution advances two claims. First, a mistake (or ignorance) of fact should matter in the criminal law only insofar as it causes an actor to be ignorant of the law. Mistakes of fact should have exculpatory force if and only if they cause ignorance of the law, which ignorance ought to be an excuse to criminal liability. Second, an actor who should otherwise be excused because he is ignorant of the law, which ignorance is in turn the result of some mistake of fact, should not lose that excuse just because the underlying mistake of fact can in …
Every Juror Wants A Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt And The Right To Present A Defense, John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson, Emily C. Paavola
Every Juror Wants A Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt And The Right To Present A Defense, John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson, Emily C. Paavola
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
On occasion, criminal defendants hope to convince a jury that the state has not met its burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by offering evidence that someone else (a third party) committed the crime. Currently, state and federal courts assess the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt using a variety of standards. In general, however, there are two basic approaches. Many state courts require a defendant to proffer evidence of some sort of direct link or connection between a specific third-party and the crime. A second group of state courts, as well as federal courts, admit evidence …
Public Opinion Of Forensic Psychiatry Following The Hinckley Verdict, Dan Slater, Valerie P. Hans
Public Opinion Of Forensic Psychiatry Following The Hinckley Verdict, Dan Slater, Valerie P. Hans
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The authors obtained opinions of forensic psychiatry in a community survey following the not guilty by reason of insanity verdict in the Hinckley trial. A majority of respondents expressed little or no confidence in the specific psychiatric testimony in the Hinckley trial and only modest faith in the general ability of psychiatrists to determine legal insanity. Respondents' general and specific attitudes were strongly related. Younger people and women were more positive in their views of psychiatry in the courtroom.