Law Commons^™

Cell Phones Are Orwell's Telescreen: The Need For Fourth Amendment Protection In Real-Time Cell Phone Location Information, Matthew Devoy Jones

Cleveland State Law Review

Courts are divided as to whether law enforcement can collect cell phone location information in real-time without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. This Article argues that Carpenter v. United States requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment prior to law enforcement’s collection of real-time cell phone location information. Courts that have required a warrant prior to the government’s collection of real-time cell phone location information have considered the length of surveillance. This should not be a factor. The growing prevalence and usage of cell phones and cell phone technology, the original intent of the Fourth Amendment, and United States …

Incarcerating The Accused: Reforming Bail For The Pretrial Detention Of Juveniles And Youths Aged Eighteen To Twenty-One, Leigha A. Weiss

Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development

(Excerpt)

This note addresses the injustice of pretrial detention on juveniles, minors, and youths aged eighteen to twenty-one, in New York State. This note will address juveniles, aged eighteen to twenty-one, who are subject to criminal proceedings in adult criminal court and incarceration in adult criminal facilities as well as juveniles or minors below the age of criminal responsibility who are subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings and incarceration in juvenile detention facilities. So many youths are in unnecessary detentions under horrific conditions in adults and juvenile correctional facilities across the country. Serious bail reform is long overdue to provide humane …

County Court, Westchester County, People V. Gant, Albert V. Messina Jr.

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Anatomy Of A Search: Intrusiveness And The Fourth Amendment, Renée Mcdonald Hutchins

University of Richmond Law Review

In this essay, I contend that when evaluating the constitutionality of enhanced surveillance devices, the existing test for assessing the occurrence of a Fourth Amendment search should be modified. Specifically, I suggest that intrusiveness should be unambiguously adopted by the Court as the benchmark for assessing and defining the existence of a search under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, intrusiveness should be clearly defined to require an examination of two factors: the functionality of a challenged form of surveillance and the potential for disclosure created by the device.