Law Commons^™

Dualism And Doctrine, Alex Stein, Dov Fox

Alex Stein

What kinds of harm among those that tortfeasors inflict are worthy of compensation? Which forms of self-incriminating evidence are privileged against government compulsion? What sorts of facts constitute a criminal defendant’s intent? Existing doctrine pins the answer to all of these questions on whether the injury, facts, or evidence at stake are “mental” or “physical.” The assumption that operations of the mind are meaningfully distinct from those of the body animates fundamental rules in our law.

A tort victim cannot recover for mental harm on its own because the law presumes that he is able to unfeel any suffering arising …

Bubbles (Or, Some Reflections On The Basic Laws Of Human Relations), Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Blameworthiness, Intent And Cultural Dissonance, Nancy Kim

Nancy Kim

Criminal law assumes that the judge and jury share the same cultural and experiential framework as the defendant; accordingly, crimes are defined with this assumption as an underlying premise. In this article, I will explain how the determination of mens rea often fails to reflect culpability because the definition of crimes fail to account for the cultural dissonance that often exists between the judge/juror and the accused. In this Article, I propose an analysis and reconceptualization of intent that bridges gaps in perception and understanding attributable to cultural dissonance.

What Is An Accident?, Daniel B. Yeager

Daniel B. Yeager

Please consider for publication my attached 5000-word, 28-page, lightly annotated (39 footnotes) Essay, entitled “What Is an Accident?”

Here I attempt to decode the most frequently proferred excuse in and out of law. Surprisingly, as central as accidents are to questions of responsibility, their criteria have received almost no attention at all. From what I can tell, mine is the first sustained attempt to identify the grammar of accidents, an endeavor that follows up on similar efforts to do the same with the excuse of mistake in my book J.L. Austin and the Law: Exculpation and the Explication of Responsibility …

Constructing Autonomy: A Kantian Framework, Bailey H. Kuklin

Bailey H. Kuklin

No abstract provided.

Second Thoughts On Damages For Wrongful Convictions, Lawrence Rosenthal

Lawrence Rosenthal

After the DNA-inspired wave of exonerations of recent years, there has been widespread support for expanding the damages remedies available to those who have been wrongfully accused or convicted. This article argues that the case for providing such compensation is deeply problematic under the justificatory theories usually advanced in support of either no-fault or fault-based liability. Although a regime of strict liability is sometimes thought justifiable to as a means of creating an economic incentive to scale back conduct thought highly likely to produce social losses, it is far from clear that the risk of error is so high in …

What's Reasonable?: Self-Defense And Mistake In Criminal And Tort Law, Caroline Forell

Caroline A Forell

In this Article, Professor Forell examines the criminal and tort mistake-as-to-self-defense doctrines. She uses the State v. Peairs criminal and Hattori v. Peairs tort mistaken self-defense cases to illustrate why application of the reasonable person standard to the same set of facts in two areas of law can lead to different outcomes. She also uses these cases to highlight how fundamentally different the perception of what is reasonable can be in different cultures. She then questions whether both criminal and tort law should continue to treat a reasonably mistaken belief that deadly force is necessary as justifiable self-defense. Based on …