Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Case Note: Civil Procedure—The Forest For The Trees: The Minnesota Supreme Court Considers The Collateral Estoppel Effect Of Criminal Convictions In Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. V. Reed, Charles Delbridge
William Mitchell Law Review
This Note first examines the goals and history of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, including the great changes the doctrine has undergone of late. It then examines the facts of the Reed case, details the procedural history of the case, and outlines the analysis of the courts in deciding the case. This Note then analyzes both the successes and the failures of the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Reed opinion. Finally, this Note concludes that the Reed decision is correct in its privity and due process analyses, but falls short by failing to clarify what collateral estoppel effect a criminal …
Case Note: Criminal Law—Dangerous, Not Deadly: Possession Of A Firearm Distinguished From Use Under The Felony-Murder Rule—State V. Anderson, Michael C. Gregerson
Case Note: Criminal Law—Dangerous, Not Deadly: Possession Of A Firearm Distinguished From Use Under The Felony-Murder Rule—State V. Anderson, Michael C. Gregerson
William Mitchell Law Review
This Note first briefly examines the history of the felony-murder doctrine both generally and in Minnesota. Second, this Note describes the decision and analysis in State v. Anderson, the latest case in Minnesota to deal with the felony-murder doctrine. Third, this Note concludes that in an effort to reach the right result, the court misapplied its previous precedent and left the lower courts with no clear standard for guidance in the future. Finally, this Note suggests that a workable standard might be found in limiting the application of the rule to deaths that occur in furtherance of the felony.
Windfall Justice: Sentences At The Mercy Of Hypertechnicality, Jack Nordby
Windfall Justice: Sentences At The Mercy Of Hypertechnicality, Jack Nordby
William Mitchell Law Review
Once upon a time (a time not so remote as to be beyond the memories of many of us who still toil in the vineyards of justice), the severity of a criminal sentence was determined largely at the whim of the trial judge, who was guided only by vague considerations of suitability. Non-premeditated murder, for example, might be punished by anything from probation to forty years in prison. A parole board exercised a similarly subjective power to temper the term with early release. Then, about a quarter century ago, the legislature created a commission to establish sentencing “guidelines,” said to …