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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel
The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel
Michigan Law Review
The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …
Separation Of Powers Crisis: The Case Of Argentina, Manuel José J. García-Mansilla
Separation Of Powers Crisis: The Case Of Argentina, Manuel José J. García-Mansilla
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Judicial Independence And Social Welfare, Michael D. Gilbert
Judicial Independence And Social Welfare, Michael D. Gilbert
Michigan Law Review
Judicial independence is a cornerstone of American constitutionalism. It empowers judges to check the other branches of government and resolve cases impartially and in accordance with law. Yet independence comes with a hazard. Precisely because they are independent, judges can ignore law and pursue private agendas. For two centuries, scholars have debated those ideas and the underlying tradeoff: independence versus accountability. They have achieved little consensus, in part because independence raises difficult antecedent questions. We cannot decide how independent to make a judge until we agree on what a judge is supposed to do. That depends on one’s views about …
The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker
The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
When a court concludes that an agency’s decision is erroneous, the ordinary rule is to remand to the agency to consider the issue anew (as opposed to the court deciding the issue itself). Despite that the Supreme Court first articulated this ordinary remand rule in the 1940s and has rearticulated it repeatedly over the years, little work has been done to understand how the rule works in practice, much less whether it promotes the separation-of-powers values that motivate the rule. This Article is the first to conduct such an investigation—focusing on judicial review of agency immigration adjudications and reviewing the …
The Death Of Tax Court Exceptionalism, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker
The Death Of Tax Court Exceptionalism, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
Tax exceptionalism—the view that tax law does not have to play by the administrative law rules that govern the rest of the regulatory state—has come under attack in recent years. In 2011, the Supreme Court rejected such exceptionalism by holding that judicial review of the Treasury Department’s interpretations of the tax code is subject to the same Chevron deference regime that applies throughout the administrative state. The D.C. Circuit followed suit by rejecting the IRS’s position that its notices are not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This Article calls for the demise of another instance …
The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar
The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett
To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
The U.S. Constitution imposes three key limits on the design of federal agencies. It constrains how agency officers are appointed, the extent of their independence from the President, and the range of issues that they can decide. Scholars have trumpeted the importance of these safeguards with soaring rhetoric. And the Supreme Court has permitted regulated parties to vindicate these safeguards through implied private rights of action under the Constitution. Regulated parties, for their part, have been successfully challenging agency structure with increased frequency. At the same time, regulated parties, courts, and scholars have largely ignored the practical question of “structural …