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Full-Text Articles in Law
Do We Know How To Punish?, Benjamin L. Apt
Do We Know How To Punish?, Benjamin L. Apt
Benjamin L. Apt
A number of current theories attempt to explain the purpose and need for criminal punishment. All of them depend on some sort of normative basis in justifying why the state may penalize people found guilty of crimes. Yet each of these theories lacks an epistemological foundation; none of them explains how we can know what form punishments should take. The article analyses the epistemological gaps in the predominant theories of punishment: retributivism, including limited-retributivism; and consequentialism in its various versions, ranging from deterrence to the reparative theories such as restorative justice and rehabilitation. It demonstrates that the common putative epistemological …
Unreasonable Doubt: Warren Hill, Aedpa, And The Unconstitutionality Of Georgia's Reasonable Doubt Standard, Adam Lamparello
Unreasonable Doubt: Warren Hill, Aedpa, And The Unconstitutionality Of Georgia's Reasonable Doubt Standard, Adam Lamparello
Adam Lamparello
Georgia’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for determining intellectual disability has led to an absurd—and arbitrary—result. A Georgia state court held that defendant Warren Hill was intellectually disabled, yet still sentenced Hill to death. Seven experts—and the court—deemed Hill disabled under a preponderance of the evidence standard. He remains on death row, however, because Georgia’s “preposterous burden of proof” requires that intellectual disability be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard experts have said is nearly impossible to satisfy. It “effectively limits the constitutional right protected in Atkins,” and creates a conditional, not categorical, ban.
Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further The Interests Of Finality, Andrew Chongseh Kim
Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further The Interests Of Finality, Andrew Chongseh Kim
Andrew Chongseh Kim
Courts and scholars commonly assume that granting convicted defendants more liberal rights to challenge their judgments would harm society’s interests in “finality.” According to conventional wisdom, finality in criminal judgments is necessary to conserve resources, encourage efficient behavior by defense counsel, and deter crime. Thus, under the common analysis, the extent to which convicted defendants should be allowed to challenge their judgments depends on how much society is willing to sacrifice to validate defendants’ rights. This Article argues that expanding defendants’ rights on post-conviction review does not always harm these interests. Rather, more liberal review can often conserve state resources, …
Partially Concurrent Sentences, Statutory Interpretation, And Legislative Intent: Amicus Brief Filed In State V. Bryant Wilson (Indiana Supreme Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean
Partially Concurrent Sentences, Statutory Interpretation, And Legislative Intent: Amicus Brief Filed In State V. Bryant Wilson (Indiana Supreme Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean
Adam Lamparello
Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2 states that terms of imprisonment “shall be served concurrently or consecutively.” The Code’s plain language does not authorize courts to impose partially consecutive, blended, or “split sentences. Partially consecutive sentences would impermissibly read into the Code a third sentencing option, thus contradicting Indiana’s well-settled jurisprudence and undermining the goal of reasonable uniformity in sentencing. The decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals should therefore be reversed.