Law Commons^™

When Is An Agency A Court? A Modified Functional Approach To State Agency Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Nicholas Jackson

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that courts should interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which permits removal from state court to federal court, to allow removal from state administrative agencies when the agency performs “court-like functions.” Circuits that apply a literal interpretation of the statute and forbid removal from state agencies should adopt this “functional” approach. The functional approach, which this Note calls the McCullion-Floeter test, should be modified to comport with legislative intent and public policy considerations: first, state agency adjudications should not be removable when the adjudication requires technical expertise, which federal courts cannot obtain because they adjudicate cases in a …

Federalism, Federal Courts, And Victims' Rights, Michael E. Solimine, Kathryn Elvey

Catholic University Law Review

One of the most striking developments in American criminal law and procedure in the past four decades has been the widespread establishment of victims’ rights at both the federal and state levels. A conspicuous exception to the success of the victims’ rights movement has been the failure of Congress to pass a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would uniformly establish such rights in all federal and state courts. Advanced by both private organizations and state officials, and with bipartisan support in Congress, bills establishing a Victims’ Rights Amendment (VRA) have been introduced several times in the past three …

Strategic Behavior And Variation In The Supreme Court’S Caseload Over Time, Kenneth W. Moffett, Forrest Maltzman, Karen Miranda, Charles R. Shipan

SIUE Faculty Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activity

Over the past sixty years, the size of the Supreme Court’s docket has varied tremendously, growing at some points in time and shrinking at others. What accounts for this variation in the size of the docket? We focus on two key strategic factors – the predictability of outcomes within the Court, and whether justices consider the potential actions of other political institutions – and assess whether these factors help to explain the variation in docket size over time. We discover that uncertainty and institutional constraints prevent the Court from choosing cases with complete freedom, even after accounting for other potential …

Silent Similarity, Jessica D. Litman

Articles

From 1909 to 1930, U.S. courts grappled with claims by authors of prose works claiming that works in a new art form—silent movies—had infringed their copyrights. These cases laid the groundwork for much of modern copyright law, from their broad expansion of the reproduction right, to their puzzled grappling with the question how to compare works in dissimilar media, to their confusion over what sort of evidence should be relevant to show copyrightability, copying and infringement. Some of those cases—in particular, Nichols v. Universal Pictures—are canonical today. They are not, however, well-understood. In particular, the problem at the heart of …

Judicial Selection In Congress' Lame Duck Session, Carl W. Tobias

Law Faculty Publications

This Article first scrutinizes the Obama Administration confirmation and nomination processes. It then critically explores selection and concludes that Republican obstruction instigated the most open positions the longest time. Because this deficiency undermines swift, economical, and fair case resolution, the Article suggests ideas to promptly decrease the remaining unoccupied judgeships after the session commences.

A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan R. Nash

Faculty Articles

The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-of-powers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors.

Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …

Choosing A Court To Review The Executive, Joseph Mead, Nicholas Fromherz

All Maxine Goodman Levin School of Urban Affairs Publications

For more than one hundred years, Congress has experimented with review of agency action by single-judge district courts, multiple-judge district courts, and direct review by circuit courts. This tinkering has not given way to a stable design. Rather than settling on a uniform scheme—or at least a scheme with a discernible organizing principle—Congress has left litigants with a jurisdictional maze that varies unpredictably across and within statutes and agencies.In this Article, we offer a fresh look at the theoretical and empirical factors that ought to inform the allocation of the judicial power between district and circuit courts in suits challenging …

Choosing A Court To Review The Executive, Joseph Mead, Nicholas Fromherz

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

For more than one hundred years, Congress has experimented with review of agency action by single-judge district courts, multiple-judge district courts, and direct review by circuit courts. This tinkering has not given way to a stable design. Rather than settling on a uniform scheme—or at least a scheme with a discernible organizing principle— Congress has left litigants with a jurisdictional maze that varies unpredictably across and within statutes and agencies.

In this Article, we offer a fresh look at the theoretical and empirical factors that ought to inform the allocation of the judicial power between district and circuit courts in …

A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …