Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Tax Injunction Act And Federal Jurisdiction: Reasoning From The Underlying Goals Of Federalism And Comity, David Fautsch
The Tax Injunction Act And Federal Jurisdiction: Reasoning From The Underlying Goals Of Federalism And Comity, David Fautsch
Michigan Law Review
States routinely contest federal jurisdiction when a state tax is challenged in federal district court on federal constitutional grounds. States argue that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), bars jurisdiction and, even if the Tax Injunction Act does not apply, the principals of federalism and comity require abstention. The United States Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the scope of federalism and comity in relation to the Tax Injunction Act, and federal courts of appeal are split. In the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, federalism and comity require federal district courts to abstain even where the Tax Injunction …
"Objection: Your Honor Is Being Unreasonable!"--Law And Policy Opposing The Federal Sentencing Order Objection Requirement, Benjamin K. Raybin
"Objection: Your Honor Is Being Unreasonable!"--Law And Policy Opposing The Federal Sentencing Order Objection Requirement, Benjamin K. Raybin
Vanderbilt Law Review
"I think you ought to object, counselor," boomed the judge.' One could not help but to be taken aback: this instruction was not directed towards a pro se defendant, nor was it addressing an action by an opposing party. Instead, the judge had actually suggested-with a straight face and a hint of irony-that an attorney object to the sentence the judge had just imposed. Unlike the attorney, the judge had been following the development of a quirk in the circuit's sentencing law. In United States v. Vonner, the Sixth Circuit had recently held that a party must object to a …
Structure And Precedent, Jeffrey C. Dobbins
Structure And Precedent, Jeffrey C. Dobbins
Michigan Law Review
The standard model of vertical precedent is part of the deep structure of our legal system. Under this model, we rarely struggle with whether a given decision of a court within a particular hierarchy is potentially binding at all. When Congress or the courts alter the standard structure and process offederal appellate review, however, that standard model of precedent breaks down. This Article examines several of these unusual appellate structures and highlights the difficulties associated with evaluating the precedential effect of decisions issued within them. For instance, when Congress consolidates challenges to agency decision making in a single federal circuit, …