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The Pragmatism Of Interpretation: A Review Of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary, Amul R. Thapar, Benjamin Beaton Apr 2018

The Pragmatism Of Interpretation: A Review Of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary, Amul R. Thapar, Benjamin Beaton

Michigan Law Review

A review of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary.


High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler Feb 2018

High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler

Michigan Law Review

Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be “unambiguous” suddenly becomes “less than clear.” This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize “clear” or “unambiguous” meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.

This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to “know” what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …


More Than Just A Potted Plant: A Court's Authority To Review Deferred Prosecution Agreements Under The Speedy Trial Act And Under Its Inherent Supervisory Power, Mary Miller Jan 2016

More Than Just A Potted Plant: A Court's Authority To Review Deferred Prosecution Agreements Under The Speedy Trial Act And Under Its Inherent Supervisory Power, Mary Miller

Michigan Law Review

In the last decade, the Department of Justice has increasingly relied on pretrial diversion agreements as a means of resolving corporate criminal cases short of prosecution. These pretrial diversion agreements—non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements—include substantive terms that a company must abide by for the duration of the agreement in order to avoid prosecution. When entering a deferred prosecution agreement, the Department of Justice files charges against the defendant corporation as well as an agreement outlining the variety of terms with which the company must comply. This delay in prosecution is permitted under the Speedy Trial Act, which provides an exception …


Defining Corruption And Constitutionalizing Democracy, Deborah Hellman Jun 2013

Defining Corruption And Constitutionalizing Democracy, Deborah Hellman

Michigan Law Review

The central front in the battle over campaign finance laws is the definition of corruption. The Supreme Court has allowed restrictions on the giving and spending of money in connection with elections only when they serve to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption. The constitutionality of such laws, therefore, depends on how the Court defines corruption. Over the years, campaign finance cases have conceived of corruption in both broad and narrow terms, with the most recent cases defining it especially narrowly. While supporters and critics of campaign finance laws have argued for and against these different formulations, both sides …


Preemption And Choice-Of-Law Coordination, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Larry E. Ribstein Mar 2013

Preemption And Choice-Of-Law Coordination, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Larry E. Ribstein

Michigan Law Review

The doctrine treating federal preemption of state law has been plagued by uncertainty and confusion. Part of the problem is that courts purport to interpret congressional intent when often Congress has never considered the particular preemption question at issue. This Article suggests that courts deciding preemption cases should take seriously a commonly articulated rationale for the federalization of law: the need to coordinate applicable legal standards in order to facilitate a national market or to otherwise provide clear guidance to parties regarding the laws that apply to their conduct. In situations where federal law can serve a coordinating function but …


Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack Dec 2012

Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack

Michigan Law Review

The age of statutes has given way to an era of regulations, but our jurisprudence has fallen behind. Despite the centrality of regulations to law, courts have no intelligible approach to regulatory interpretation. The neglect of regulatory interpretation is not only a shortcoming in interpretive theory but also a practical problem for administrative law. Canonical doctrines of administrative law - Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Accardi - involve interpreting regulations, and yet courts lack a consistent approach. This Article develops a method for interpreting regulations and, more generally, situates regulatory interpretation within debates over legal interpretation. It argues that a purposive …


Assessing Divisibility In The Armed Career Criminal Act, Ted Koehler Jun 2012

Assessing Divisibility In The Armed Career Criminal Act, Ted Koehler

Michigan Law Review

When courts analyze whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act's "residual clause," they use a "categorical approach," looking only to the statutory language of the prior offense, rather than the facts disclosed by the record of conviction. But when a defendant is convicted under a "divisible" statute, which encompasses a broader range of conduct, only some of which would qualify as a predicate offense, courts may employ the "modified categorical approach." This approach allows courts to view additional documents to determine whether the jury convicted the defendant of the Armed Career …


The Justiciability Of Fair Balance Under The Federal Advisory Committee Act: Toward A Deliberative Process Approach, Daniel E. Walters Jan 2012

The Justiciability Of Fair Balance Under The Federal Advisory Committee Act: Toward A Deliberative Process Approach, Daniel E. Walters

Michigan Law Review

The Federal Advisory Committee Act's requirement that advisory committees be "fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed" is generally considered either nonjusticiable under the Administrative Procedure Act or justiciable but subject to highly deferential review. These approaches stem from courts' purported inability to discern from the text of the statute any meaningful legal standards for policing representational balance. Thus, the Federal Advisory Committee Act's most important substantive limitation on institutional pathologies such as committee "capture" or domination is generally unused despite the ubiquity of federal advisory committees in the modern regulatory …


Super Deference, The Science Obsession, And Judicial Review As Translation Of Agency Science, Emily Hammond Meazell Jan 2011

Super Deference, The Science Obsession, And Judicial Review As Translation Of Agency Science, Emily Hammond Meazell

Michigan Law Review

This Article explores what happens to longstanding remedies for past racial discrimination as conditions change. It shows that Congress and the Supreme Court have responded quite differently to changed conditions when they evaluate such remedies. Congress has generally opted to stay the course, while the Court has been more inclined to view change as cause to terminate a remedy. The Article argues that these very different responses share a defining flaw, namely, they treat existing remedies as fixed until they are terminated. As a result, remedies are either scrapped prematurely or left stagnant despite dramatically changed conditions. The Article seeks …


Falling Through The Crack: How Courts Have Struggled To Apply The Crack Amendment To Nominal Career And Plea Bargain Defendants, Maxwell Arlie Halpern Kosman Jan 2011

Falling Through The Crack: How Courts Have Struggled To Apply The Crack Amendment To Nominal Career And Plea Bargain Defendants, Maxwell Arlie Halpern Kosman

Michigan Law Review

Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is normally obligated to attend all of the proceedings against her. However Rule 43(b)(2) carves out an exception for organizational defendants, stating that they "need not be present" if represented by an attorney. But on its face, the language of 43(b)(2) is ambiguous: is it the defendant or the judge who has the discretion to decide whether the defendant appears? That is, may a judge compel the presence of an organizational defendant? This Note addresses the ambiguity in the context of the plea colloquy, considering the text of several of the …


Pleading With Congress To Resist The Urge To Overrule Twombly And Iqbal, Michael R. Huston Jan 2010

Pleading With Congress To Resist The Urge To Overrule Twombly And Iqbal, Michael R. Huston

Michigan Law Review

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court changed the rhetoric of the federal pleading system. Those decisions have been decried by members of the bar, scholars, and legislators as judicial activism and a rewriting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such criticism has led members of both houses of Congress to introduce legislation to overrule the decisions and return to some variation of the "notice pleading" regime that existed before Twombly. This Note argues that both of the current proposals to overrule Twombly and Iqbal should be rejected. Although the bills take different …


Free Speech Federalism, Adam Winkler Nov 2009

Free Speech Federalism, Adam Winkler

Michigan Law Review

For decades, constitutional doctrine has held that the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech applies equally to laws adopted by the federal, state, and local governments. Nevertheless, the identity of the government actor behind a law may be a significant, if unrecognized, factor in free speech cases. This Article reports the results of a comprehensive study of core free speech cases decided by the federal courts over a 14-year period. The study finds that speech-restrictive laws adopted by the federal government are far more likely to be upheld than similar laws adopted by state and local governments. Courts applying strict …


The Era Of Deference: Courts, Expertise, And The Emergence Of New Deal Administrative Law, Reuel E. Schiller Dec 2007

The Era Of Deference: Courts, Expertise, And The Emergence Of New Deal Administrative Law, Reuel E. Schiller

Michigan Law Review

The first two terms of Franklin Roosevelt's presidency (1933-1941) were periods of great administrative innovation. Responding to the Great Depression, Congress created scores of new administrative agencies charged with overseeing economic policy and implementing novel social welfare programs. The story of the constitutional difficulties that some of these policy innovations encountered is a staple of both New Deal historiography and the constitutional history of twentieth-century America. There has been very little writing, however, about how courts and the New Deal-era administrative state interacted after these constitutional battles ended. Having overcome constitutional hurdles, these administrative agencies still had to interact with …


Scrutinizing The Second Amendment, Adam Winkler Feb 2007

Scrutinizing The Second Amendment, Adam Winkler

Michigan Law Review

One overlooked issue in the voluminous literature on the Second Amendment is what standard of review should apply to gun control if the Amendment is read to protect an individual right to bear arms. This lack of attention may be due to the assumption that strict scrutiny would necessarily apply because the right would be "fundamental" or because the right is located in the Bill of Rights. In this Article, Professor Winkler challenges that assumption and considers the arguments for a contrary conclusion: that the Second Amendment's individual right to bear arms is appropriately governed by a deferential, reasonableness review …


The Irrepressible Myth Of Marbury, Michael Stokes Paulsen Aug 2003

The Irrepressible Myth Of Marbury, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Michigan Law Review

Nearly all of American constitutional law today rests on a myth. The myth, presented as standard history both in junior high civics texts and in advanced law school courses on constitutional law, runs something like this: A long, long time ago - 1803, if the storyteller is trying to be precise - in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court of the United States created the doctrine of "judicial review." Judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to decide the meaning of the Constitution and to strike down laws that the Court finds unconstitutional. As …


Judging The Next Emergency: Judicial Review And Individual Rights In Times Of Crisis, David Cole Aug 2003

Judging The Next Emergency: Judicial Review And Individual Rights In Times Of Crisis, David Cole

Michigan Law Review

As virtually every law student who studies Marbury v. Madison learns, Chief Justice John Marshall's tactical genius was to establish judicial review in a case where the result could not be challenged. As a technical matter, Marbury lost, and the executive branch won. As furious as President Jefferson reportedly was with the decision, there was nothing he could do about it, for there was no mandate to defy. The Court's decision offered no remedy for Marbury himself, whose rights were directly at issue, and whose rights the Court found had indeed been violated. But over time, it became clear that …


Legislating Chevron, Elizabeth Garrett Aug 2003

Legislating Chevron, Elizabeth Garrett

Michigan Law Review

One of the most significant administrative law cases, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, lnc., is routinely referred to as the "counter-Marbury." The reference suggests that Chevron's command to courts to defer to certain reasonable agency interpretations of statutes is superficially an uneasy fit with the declaration in Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." According to the consensus view, Chevron deference is consistent with Marbury, as long as Congress has delegated to agencies the power to make policy by interpreting ambiguous statutory language or filling …


Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark Tushnet Aug 2003

Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark Tushnet

Michigan Law Review

The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States has strong-form judicial review. Strong- and weak-form systems operate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their characteristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate at the next lower level. Here legislatures …


Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?, Erwin Chemerinsky May 2000

Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?, Erwin Chemerinsky

Michigan Law Review

In the last decade, it has become increasingly trendy to question whether the Supreme Court and constitutional judicial review really can make a difference. Gerald Rosenberg, for example, in The Hollow Hope, expressly questions whether judicial review achieves effective social change. Similarly, Michael Klarman explores whether the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions were effective, except insofar as they produced a right-wing backlash that induced action to desegregate. In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Mark Tushnet approvingly invokes these arguments (pp. 137, 145), but he goes much further. Professor Tushnet contends that, on balance, constitutional judicial review is harmful. He …


Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure Of American Constitutional Law, Matthew D. Adler Oct 1998

Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure Of American Constitutional Law, Matthew D. Adler

Michigan Law Review

The Bill of Rights, by means of open-ended terms such as "freedom of speech," "equal protection," or "due process," refers to moral criteria, which take on constitutional status by virtue of being thus referenced. We can disagree about whether the proper methodology for judicial application of these criteria is originalist or nonoriginalist. The originalist looks, not to the true content of the moral criteria named by the Constitution, but to the framers' beliefs about that content; the nonoriginalist tries to determine what the criteria truly require, and ignores or gives less weight to the framers' views. Bracketing this disagreement, however, …


The Path To Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D)(1), Sharad Sushil Khandelwal Nov 1997

The Path To Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D)(1), Sharad Sushil Khandelwal

Michigan Law Review

The enforcement of the U.S. Constitution within the criminal justice system is an odd subspecies of constitutional law. In areas other than criminal law, federal courts act as the ultimate guarantors of constitutional rights by providing remedies whenever violations occur. Criminal law, however, is different by necessity; the bulk of criminal justice occurs in state courthouses, leaving constitutional compliance largely to state judges. The U.S. Supreme Court, of course, may review these decisions if it chooses, but a writ of certiorari can be elusive, especially given the Court's shrinking docket. After World War II, however, this feature of criminal constitutional …


Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney Oct 1994

Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney

Michigan Law Review

There are two principal aspects of my thesis. First, it is desirable to consider seriously these legislative signals of approval and disapproval, because a blanket rejection, or even systematic hostility, imposes significant opportunity costs on Congress. If the judiciary refuses to consider these signals, Congress will have to expend extra resources to achieve the same ends. That expense will diminish the institution's ability to enact other laws and in some cases will alter the character of the other laws that it is able to enact. The consequent diminution or depletion of Congress's legislative authority is unhealthy from a democratic perspective …


Dialogue And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman Feb 1993

Dialogue And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that most normative legal scholarship regarding the role of judicial review rests upon a descriptively inaccurate foundation. The goal of this article is to redescribe the landscape of American constitutionalism in a manner vastly different than most normative scholarship. At times this article slips across the line into prescription, but by and large the task is descriptive. The idea is to clear the way so that later normative work can proceed against the backdrop of a far more accurate understanding of the system of American constitutionalism.

This article proceeds in three separate parts. Parts I and II …


The Federal Courts In The Political Order: Judicial Jurisdiction And American Political Theory, James Hopenfeld May 1992

The Federal Courts In The Political Order: Judicial Jurisdiction And American Political Theory, James Hopenfeld

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Federal Courts in the Political Order: Judicial Jurisdiction and American Political Theory by Martin H. Redish


Interpreting Codes, Bruce W. Frier Aug 1991

Interpreting Codes, Bruce W. Frier

Michigan Law Review

Large systematically codified bodies of law, such as the European codes or the UCC, gradually effect, or at least encourage, a different kind of legal culture, in which, as such codes are integrated within a national legal heritage, general clauses and principles become more salient within an expanded interpretive community. Because of the open texture of their rules, codes foster an altered legal posture; ancient judicial vigilance against the intrusive legislation may give way to a new ethos of cooperation in the development of law. To be sure, it remains uncertain whether the resulting law will be, in fact, "better," …


The First Word: The President's Place In "Legislative History", Kathryn Marie Dessayer Nov 1990

The First Word: The President's Place In "Legislative History", Kathryn Marie Dessayer

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the extent to which courts interpreting statutes should consider presidential participation in the legislative process. Part I concludes that courts should afford presidential input greater weight in statutory interpretation given the constitutional foundations and the empirical reality of the President's involvement in the lawmaking process. This conclusion follows from an examination of the President's authority to propose legislation and his power to review legislation via the presentment clause. To demonstrate the advantages of using presidential documents, Part II considers a series of cases in which courts used executive documents in the statutory interpretation process. Although federal courts …


Outlaw Blues, Suzanna Sherry May 1989

Outlaw Blues, Suzanna Sherry

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law by Mark Tushnet


Judicial Review And American Democracy, Stanley S. Sokul May 1989

Judicial Review And American Democracy, Stanley S. Sokul

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Judicial Review and American Democracy by Albert P. Melone and George Mace


Timeliness Of Petitions For Judicial Review Under Section 106(A) Of The Immigration And Nationality Act, Marilyn Mann Apr 1988

Timeliness Of Petitions For Judicial Review Under Section 106(A) Of The Immigration And Nationality Act, Marilyn Mann

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that courts should adopt a "good faith approach" to the section 106 timeliness issue. This approach would be similar to that suggested by the District of Columbia and Second Circuits. Part I discusses the statute, the relevant regulations, and the history of Supreme Court interpretation of section 106. Part II reviews the various approaches to the timeliness question developed by the courts of appeals. Part III argues that although the statutory langμage and legislative history are ambiguous on the section 106(a) timeliness question, the good faith approach would best achieve the goals of section 106: judicial economy, …


Citizen Suits And Civil Penalties Under The Clean Water Act, James L. Thompson Jun 1987

Citizen Suits And Civil Penalties Under The Clean Water Act, James L. Thompson

Michigan Law Review

Part I briefly describes the division that currently exists between the Fourth, Fifth, and First Circuits. Part II analyzes the arguments relating to statutory construction, focusing on statutory language and structure as illuminated by legislative history. Part III examines the broader policy considerations arising when courts decide questions of citizen suit jurisdiction under section 505. Resolution of this issue has usually entailed an extreme interpretation of section 505, either very rarely allowing suits for past violations or allowing them in all cases. Parts II and III argue that the most appropriate response to this problem is actually the less frequently …