Law Commons^™

“Any”, James J. Brudney, Ethan J. Leib

BYU Law Review

Our statute books use the word “any” ubiquitously in coverage and exclusion provisions. As any reader of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation docket would know, a large number of cases turn on the contested application of this so-called universal quantifier. It is hard to make sense of the jurisprudence of “any.” And any effort to offer a unified approach—knowing precisely when its scope is expansive (along the “literal-meaning” lines of “every” and “all”) or confining (having a contained domain related to properties provided by contextual cues)—is likely to fail. This Article examines legislative drafting manuals, surveys centuries of Court decisions, …

Twenty-First Century Split: Partisan, Racial, And Gender Differences In Circuit Judges Following Earlier Opinions, Stuart Minor Benjamin, Kevin M. Quinn, Byungkoo Kim

BYU Law Review

Judges shape the law with their votes and the reasoning in their opinions. An important element of the latter is which opinions they follow, and thus elevate, and which they cast doubt on, and thus diminish. Using a unique and comprehensive dataset containing the substantive Shepard’s treatments of all circuit court published and unpublished majority opinions issued between 1974 and 2017, we examine the relationship between judges’ substantive treatments of earlier appellate cases and their party, race, and gender. Are judges more likely to follow opinions written by colleagues of the same party, race, or gender? What we find is …

A Juror’S Religious Freedom Bill Of Rights, Antony Barone Kolenc

BYU Law Review

The prosecution of Democrat Congresswoman Corrine Brown for campaign corruption was perhaps the most significant and dramatic political trial ever to hit Northeast Florida—and that was before the Holy Spirit showed up and spoke to Juror 13 during deliberations. The Brown case is the springboard for the article’s focus on a juror’s right to religious liberty, one of the nation’s most precious constitutional rights. The Article addresses first principles behind the process of jury selection in the United States, as well as the importance and safeguarding of religious liberty in the U.S. Constitution. It then proposes six tenets to be …

The Unconstitutional Assertion Of Inherent Powers In Multidistrict Litigations, Robert J. Pushaw, Charles Silver

BYU Law Review

This Article examines the constitutional basis of the federal courts’ independent exercise of “inherent powers” (IPs) that Congress has not specifically authorized. Our analysis illuminates the grave constitutional problems raised by the freewheeling assertion of IPs in multidistrict litigations (MDLs), which comprise over half of all pending federal cases.

The Supreme Court has rhetorically acknowledged that the Constitution allows resort to IPs only when doing so is absolutely necessary to enable Article III courts to exercise their “judicial power,” but has then sustained virtually all exercises of IP, whether essential or not. The Court’s excessive deference has emboldened trial judges …

Remand Without Vacatur And The Ab Initio Invalidity Of Unlawful Regulations In Administrative Law, John Harrison

BYU Law Review

An important administrative law doctrine developed by the lower federal courts called remand without vacatur rests on a mistaken premise. Courts that embrace the doctrine maintain that when they find that a federal agency regulation is unlawful, they have discretion to remand the regulation without vacating it. The remand gives the regulatory agency an opportunity to correct the flaws that render the regulation unlawful. When a regulation is remanded but not vacated, the courts assume the regulation binds regulated parties despite its illegality. Unlawful regulations, however, are in general void ab initio, just as unconstitutional statutory rules are void ab …

Searches Without Suspicion: Avoiding A Four Million Person Underclass, Tonja Jacobi, Addie Maguire

BYU Law Review

In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court upheld warrantless, suspicionless searches for parolees. That determination was controversial both because suspicionless searches are, by definition, anathema to the Fourth Amendment, and because they arguably undermine parolees’ rehabilitation. Less attention has been given to the fact that the implications of the case were not limited to parolees. The opinion in Samson included half a sentence of dicta that seemingly swept probationers into its analysis, implicating the rights of millions of additional people in the United States. Not only is analogizing parolees and probationers not logically sound because the two groups differ in …

The Constitutional Model Of Mootness, Tyler B. Lindley

BYU Law Review

Article III limits the federal courts to deciding cases and controversies, and this limitation has given rise to the black-letter law of standing, ripeness, and mootness. But the law of mootness presents a puzzle: Over time, the Court has recognized various "exceptions" to ordinary mootness rules, allowing federal courts to hear arguably moot cases. On one hand, the Court consistently asserts that mootness doctrine, including its exceptions, is compelled by the original understanding of Article III. On the other hand, the scholarly consensus is that these exceptions are logically inconsistent with the Court s claims about Article III and that …

Good Representatives, Bad Objectors, And Restitution In Class Settlements, Jay Tidmarsh, Tladi Marumo

BYU Law Review

This Article uses two recent decisions — one prohibiting incentive awards to class representatives and one permitting disgorgement of side payments to class objectors — to explore deeper connections between class action settlements and the law of restitution. The failure to correctly apply the law of restitution led both courts astray. First, courts can approve incentive awards, as long as an award properly reflects the benefit that the representative's efforts bestowed on the class. Second, restitution provides a basis to disgorge improper side payments to objectors, but only under conditions different from those that the court described. More broadly, attention …

Saying What The Law Should Be, F. Andrew Hessick

BYU Law Review

Recent years have seen a resurgence of the view that the role of the federal courts is to declare what the law is, not what the law should be. Scholars and judges, including a majority of the current U.S. Supreme Court justices, have expressed this view that the law is fixed at its creation and the function of courts is to declare its meaning. But this view is inaccurate. Descriptively, federal courts often say what the law should be. Judges fashion common law, inject their views into interpretations, and issue opinions that do not merely describe the law but have …