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Inertia And Preference In Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power Of Default Rules And Form Terms, Russell Korobkin
Inertia And Preference In Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power Of Default Rules And Form Terms, Russell Korobkin
Vanderbilt Law Review
In The Problem of Social Cost,' the foundational article of the law and economics movement, Ronald Coase suggested that when transaction costs are zero, the initial allocation of a legal entitlement is irrelevant to its eventual ownership. Assuming no transaction costs, the Coase Theorem predicts that if party A values an entitlement more than does party B, A will keep the entitlement if it is initially allocated to him, and he will buy it if it is originally allocated to B. This powerful insight depends on the behavioral assumption that an individual's valuation of entitlements does not depend on ownership; …
Restrictions On Forum-Selection Clauses In Franchise Agreements And The Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?, James Zimmerman
Restrictions On Forum-Selection Clauses In Franchise Agreements And The Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?, James Zimmerman
Vanderbilt Law Review
The use of forum-selection clauses in contracts continues to increase. Emboldened by the Supreme Court's endorsement of forum- selection clauses, large companies now frequently use these clauses in a variety of contracts. Contracting parties use these clauses in part to ensure that the parties can resolve any dispute in a convenient forum. Often, however, a party inserts a forum-selection clause to limit liability by increasing the barriers to litigation or arbitration. Typically, the party inserting the forum-selection clause has superior bargaining power and inserts into the contract a clause designating a forum remote to the other party, where any dispute …