Law Commons^™

The Market As Negotiation, Rebecca E. Hollander-Blumoff, Matthew T. Bodie

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Our economic system counts on markets to allocate most of our societal resources. The law often treats markets as discrete entities, with a native intelligence and structure that provides clear answers to questions about prices and terms. In reality, of course, markets are much messier—they are agglomerations of negotiations by individual parties. Despite theoretical and empirical work on markets and on negotiation, legal scholars have largely overlooked the connection between the two areas in considering how markets are constructed and regulated.

This Article brings together scholarship in law, economics, sociology, and psychology to better understand the role that negotiation plays …

Baby M Turns 30: The Law And Policy Of Surrogate Motherhood, Eric A. Feldman

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This article marks the 30th anniversary of the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s Baby M decision by offering a critical analysis of surrogacy policy in the United States. Despite fundamental changes in both science and society since the case was decided, state courts and legislatures remain bitterly divided on the legality of surrogacy. In arguing for a more uniform, permissive legal posture toward surrogacy, the article addresses five central debates in the surrogacy literature.

First, should the legal system accommodate those seeking conception through surrogacy, or should it prohibit such arrangements? Second, if surrogacy is permitted, what steps can be …

Mandatory Rules And Default Rules In Insurance Contracts, Tom Baker, Kyle D. Logue

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The economic analysis of contract law can be organized around two general questions: (1) what are the efficient or welfare-maximizing substantive rules of contract law; and (2) once those rules have been identified, when if ever should they be made mandatory and when should they be merely “default rules” that the parties can contract around if they wish? Much of contract theory over the past twenty years has been devoted to developing answers to those two questions. The same two questions can be posed with respect to the rules of insurance law. Although previous scholars have examined particular substantive doctrines …

Whither Bespoke Procedure?, David A. Hoffman

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Increasingly we hear that civil procedure lurks in the shadow of private law. Scholars suggest that the civil rules are mere defaults, applying if the parties fail to contract around them. When judges confront terms modifying court procedures — a trend said to be explosive — they seem all-too-willing to surrender to the inevitable logic of private and efficient private ordering. * How concerned should we be? This Article casts a wide net to find examples of private contracts governing procedure, and finds a decided absence of evidence. I search a large database of agreements entered into by public firms, …

When Are Agreements Enforceable? Giving Consideration To Professor Barnett's Consent Theory Of Contract, James Maxeiner

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This address considers five points: (1) the place of theory in American contract law; (2) the basic elements of Professor Barnett's theory are; (3) how these elements are similar to Continental law; (4) what it says about the American legal world that Barnett's theory has been discussed without reference to Continental systems; and, finally, (5) why I believe the American model is not a good one for a future European Civil Code but also hope that such a Code will become law.

The Reunification Of Contract: The Objective Theory Of Consumer Form Contracts, Michael I. Meyerson

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Despite the ubiquitousness of standard form contracts in the world of consumer transactions, there is no consensus as to how these contracts ought to be constructed. Some courts continue to treat form contracts as if they were classically negotiated contracts. Others attempt in a variety of ways to factor in the reality that consumers entering into these contracts are not able to negotiate the terms and almost always sign these documents, which are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without reading them. This article posits that the cause of this continued confusion over form contracts is due to a basic failure …