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Full-Text Articles in Law
Many-To-Many Contracts, Heidi S. Bond
Many-To-Many Contracts, Heidi S. Bond
Faculty Articles
In classical contract law the concept of one-to-one negotiations is familiar: contracts where one party negotiates with the other and, eventually, terms are offered and then accepted. More modern times have made us comfortable with the notion of one-to-many contracts: contracts typically drafted by large corporations and then distributed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the masses. This Article discusses a third kind of contract: a many-to-many contract which may look like the standard one-to-many contract in that it is composed of nonnegotiable language. But when the arrangements between the parties are further considered we will see that the point of …
Powerful Buyers And Merger Enforcement, John B. Kirkwood
Powerful Buyers And Merger Enforcement, John B. Kirkwood
Faculty Articles
Although large buyers like Walmart and Tyson Foods occupy important positions in the American economy, antitrust law remains focused on the conduct of sellers. Moreover, when mergers of buyers have been challenged, the cases have been based on a single theory – that the merger would create a dominant buyer (or group of buyers) that would exploit small, powerless suppliers. Most powerful buyers, however, face suppliers with power of their own, and in such cases, the buyers exert “countervailing power,” which can also be anticompetitive. Yet buyer mergers that reduce competition through the exercise of countervailing power are not addressed …
Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About The New Formalism (With Particular Attention To Promissory Estoppel), Sidney Delong
Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About The New Formalism (With Particular Attention To Promissory Estoppel), Sidney Delong
Faculty Articles
This Article examines the recent doctrinal shift from realist jurisprudence to the “new formalism” as it arises in the creation of contract obligation. Many recent decisions involving promissory estoppel appear to display a trend away from reliance protection in the commercial world. While these decisions are formalist insofar as they favor textual forms over contextual forms, the Author argues that this trend is more properly characterized as a realist effort. This Article examines promissory estoppel in the commercial world and suggests that the “new formalism”, driven by the most “realist” of motives, will expunge liability for promissory estoppel in the …
The New Requirement Of Enforcement Reliance In Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 As Catch-22, Sidney Delong
The New Requirement Of Enforcement Reliance In Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 As Catch-22, Sidney Delong
Faculty Articles
Any comprehensive examination of recent appellate court decisions will disclose that the legal doctrine of promissory estoppel has not become a significant source of commercial contractual obligation. Although commercial promissory estoppel claims are often made, plaintiff victories are very rare. These results are difficult to reconcile with frequent scholarly contentions to the effect that contemporary courts have become more receptive to claims of promissory estoppel and have liberalized its doctrinal requirements. More important, the promisor behavior that is incidentally disclosed in reported opinions also undermines academic arguments that rules providing for promissory estoppel have commercial utility. The decisions suggest that …
Opting In And Out Of Fiduciary Duties In Cooperative Ventures: Refining The So-Called Coasean Contract Theory, Charles O'Kelley
Opting In And Out Of Fiduciary Duties In Cooperative Ventures: Refining The So-Called Coasean Contract Theory, Charles O'Kelley
Faculty Articles
Professor O’Kelley comments on a familiar problem in the law of closely held business associations - the alleged exploitation of weaker or minority investors by stronger or majority participants. The fact pattern is simple. At the outset of the cooperative venture, a stronger participant assumes the role of proprietor, partner, or majority shareholder, while the weaker participant assumes the role of agent, partner, or minority shareholder. For whatever reason, the venturers do not explicitly guarantee or protect the weaker participant’s right to income or continued participation in the venture. Consequently, at some later date the stronger participant reduces or eliminates …