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Bribes V. Bombs: A Study In Coasean Warfare, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman
Bribes V. Bombs: A Study In Coasean Warfare, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman
All Faculty Scholarship
The use of bribes to co-opt an enemy’s forces can be a more effective way to wage war than the conventional use of force: Relative to bombs, bribes can save lives and resources, and preserve civic institutions. This essay evaluates the efficacy and normative desirability of selectively substituting bribes for bombs as a means of warfare. We show how inter-country disparities in wealth, differences in military strength, the organization of the bribing and recipient forces, uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict, and communications technology can contribute to the efficacy of bribes. We discuss methods for enforcing bargains struck between …
Preface: Or: A Boilerplate Introduction, Omri Ben-Shahar
Preface: Or: A Boilerplate Introduction, Omri Ben-Shahar
Book Chapters
It is tempting to open this volume with yet another "boilerplate" salute to the challenge that standard-form contracts pose for contract law doctrine. You may have seen many tributes to this fundamental problem. Ifi were to offer my own variation on this familiar introduction, I would have perhaps tried to come up with an original spin to induce you to read forward another paragraph or two. I would probably have talked about a major divide within contract law between the "law of negotiations" and "product regulation." The former is the body of doctrines that determine the legal consequences of bargaining …
Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto-Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White
Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto-Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White
Book Chapters
This chapter examines the boilerplate contracts used by auto makers to procure parts from suppliers. It identifies drafting and negotiation techniques that are used to secure advantageous terms. It also explores some prominent specific arrangements as evidence that firms with bargaining power are exploiting their position to dictate self-serving but inefficient terms. Finally, it shows how standard contractual clauses solve the problem of ex-post hold-up by suppliers.