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Consumer Protection Law

University of Michigan Law School

Incentives

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue Nov 2012

Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue

Michigan Law Review

This Article explores the potential value of insurance as a substitute for government regulation of safety. Successful regulation of behavior requires information in setting standards, licensing conduct, verifying outcomes, and assessing remedies. In various areas, the private insurance sector has technological advantages in collecting and administering the information relevant to setting standards and could outperform the government in creating incentives for optimal behavior. We explore several areas that are regulated more by private insurance than by government. In those areas, the role of the law diminishes to the administration of simple rules of absolute liability or no liability, and affected …


Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation, Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir Jan 2008

Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation, Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir

Other Publications

Financial services decisions can have enourmous consequences for household well-being. Households need a range of financial services - to conduct basic transactions, such as receiving their income, storing it, and paying bills; to save for emergency needs and long-term goals; to access credit; and to insure against life's key risks. But the financial services system is exceedingly complicated and often not well-designed to optimize house-hold behavior. In response to the complexity of out financial system, there has been a long running debate about the appropriate role and form of regulation. Regulation is largely stuck in two competing models - disclosure, …


The (Legal) Pains Of Vioxx: Why Product Liability Can Make Products More Dangerous, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2006

The (Legal) Pains Of Vioxx: Why Product Liability Can Make Products More Dangerous, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

Comparing the experience of Vioxx and Celebrex leads Omri Ben-Shahar to think that stiff product liability has the perverse effect of inducing manufacturers of defective products to leave these products on the market, rather than withdraw them.