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University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Empirical studies

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Opening Schumer’S Box: The Empirical Foundations Of Modern Consumer Finance Disclosure Law, Hosea H. Harvey Sep 2014

Opening Schumer’S Box: The Empirical Foundations Of Modern Consumer Finance Disclosure Law, Hosea H. Harvey

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article explores the fundamental failure of Congress’ twenty-five-year quest to utilize disclosure as the primary tool to both regulate credit card issuers and educate consumers. From inception until present, reforms to this disclosure regime, even when premised on judgment and decision-making behavioralism, were nomothetic in orientation and ignored clear differences in population behavior and the heterogeniety of consumers. Current law prohibits credit card issuers from acquiring consumer socio-demographic data and prevents issuers and regulators from using market and policy experimentation to enhance disclosure’s efficacy. To explain why this regime was structured this way and why it must change, this …


Arbitration Costs And Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, Christopher R. Drahozal Jul 2008

Arbitration Costs And Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, Christopher R. Drahozal

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In this Article, written for this symposium issue on "Empirical Studies of Mandatory Arbitration," I examine the available empirical evidence on these two questions. I take "mandatory arbitration" to refer to pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment (and maybe franchise) contracts. Accordingly, I limit my consideration of the empirical evidence to those types of contracts. I do not discuss empirical studies of international arbitrations, which almost always arise out of agreements between commercial entities. Nor do I discuss empirical studies of court-annexed arbitrations, which may not derive from party agreement and do not ordinarily proceed to a binding award.


Information Disclosure And Consumer Behavior: An Empirical Evaluation Of Truth-In-Lending, William K. Brandt, George S. Day Jan 1974

Information Disclosure And Consumer Behavior: An Empirical Evaluation Of Truth-In-Lending, William K. Brandt, George S. Day

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article offers some empirical insight into the debate over the efficacy of disclosure legislation. The primary concern is the effect of the Act on (1) the level of consumer knowledge of interest rates and finance charges; (2) the extent of comparison shopping; and (3) the decisions to postpone purchases, to use cash instead of credit, or to reduce the finance charges by increasing the downpayment or reducing the number of payments. The article also evaluates patterns of consumer behavior and credit-granting procedures which may constrain the long-run potential of TIL.