Law Commons^™

Panelist, Best Practices In Consumer Disclosures

Patricia A. McCoy

No abstract provided.

Founding Principles Of The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Patricia A. McCoy

No abstract provided.

Saving For Homeownership

Patricia A. McCoy

No abstract provided.

A Tale Of Three Markets: The Law And Economics Of Predatory Lending, Kathleen Engel, Patricia Mccoy

Patricia A. McCoy

Predatory lending - the practice of making exploitative high-cost loans to naive borrowers - has spurred policy-makers, activists, lenders and scholars to debate whether intervention is warranted and, if so, what type of intervention is appropriate. The solution requires understanding the incentives in the home mortgage market that have fueled predatory lending. Recent changes in the credit market have created new possibilities for lenders to profit by exploiting information asymmetries to the detriment of unsophisticated borrowers. As a result, a new, predatory lending market has emerged alongside the legitimate prime and subprime home mortgage markets. Neither market forces nor existing …

The Cra Implications Of Predatory Lending, Kathleen Engel, Patricia Mccoy

Patricia A. McCoy

Traditionally, policymakers, communities, and industry have regarded the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") as a positive mandate for banks and thrifts to do good by increasing investment in low- and moderate-income ("LMI") neighborhoods. When Congress enacted CRA, it was inconceivable that LMI neighborhoods might eventually receive too much credit in the form of abusive mortgages. However, by the late 1990s, predatory mortgages- exploitative high-cost loans to gullible borrowers-were ravaging the inner cities. We address the question: given the surge in predatory lending, how should CRA respond? CRA and federal subsidies to regulated lenders can create perverse incentives for lenders to engage …

Predatory Lending: What’S Wall Street Got To Do With It?,

Patricia A. McCoy

In this article, we examine the contention that the secondary market will exert sufficient market discipline to drive predatory home loan lenders from the subprime marketplace. Using a so‐called lemons model, we identify the potential risks that investors encounter if they buy securities backed by predatory home loans. We then explain how structured finance, deal provisions, pricing mechanisms, and legal protections shield investors from much of the risk that those loans entail.

While the secondary market does impose some discipline on the subprime home loan market, it is not enough to bring predatory lending to a halt. We provide rationales …