Law Commons^™

The Right To A Well-Rested Jury, Caroline Howe

Michigan Law Review

The vast amount of control that state trial judges exercise over the dynamics of their courtrooms is well established. The length of trial days and jury deliberations, however, has received little scholarly attention. Longstanding research has conclusively established the disruptive effects of sleep deprivation on many of the mental facilities necessary for juries to competently fulfill their duties. By depriving juries of sleep, trial judges may be compromising the fair rights of criminal defendants for the sake of efficiency. This Note argues that trial judges must use their discretion to ensure juries are well-rested, keeping jurors’ needs in mind. Further, …

The New Impartial Jury Mandate, Richard Lorren Jolly

Michigan Law Review

Impartiality is the cornerstone of the Constitution’s jury trial protections. Courts have historically treated impartiality as procedural in nature, meaning that the Constitution requires certain prophylactic procedures that secure a jury that is more likely to reach verdicts impartially. But in Peña- Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), the Supreme Court recognized for the first time an enforceable, substantive component to the mandate. There, the Court held that criminal litigants have a Sixth Amendment right to jury decisions made without reliance on extreme bias, specifically on the basis of race or national origin. The Court did not …

"It's Not You, It's Your Caseload": Using Cronic To Solve Indigent Defense Underfunding, Samantha Jaffe

Michigan Law Review

In the United States, defendants in both federal and state prosecutions have the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. That right is in jeopardy. In the postconviction setting, the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is prohibitively high, and Congress has restricted federal habeas review. At trial, severe underfunding for state indigent defense systems has led to low pay, little support, and extreme caseloads—which combine to create conditions where lawyers simply cannot represent clients adequately. Overworked public defenders and contract attorneys represent 80 percent of state felony defendants annually. Three out of four countywide public defender systems and fifteen …

Face-To-Face With Facial Recognition Evidence: Admissibility Under The Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause, Joseph Clarke Celentino

Michigan Law Review

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court announced a major change in Confrontation Clause doctrine, abandoning a decades-old framework that focused on the common law principles of hearsay analysis: necessity and reliability. The new doctrine, grounded in an originalist interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, requires courts to determine whether a particular statement is testimonial. But the Court has struggled to present a coherent definition of the term testimonial. In its subsequent decisions, the Court illustrated that its new Confrontation Clause doctrine could be used to bar forensic evidence, including laboratory test results, if the government failed to produce the …

Speedy Trial As A Viable Challenge To Chronic Underfunding In Indigent-Defense Systems, Emily Rose

Michigan Law Review

Across the country, underresourced indigent-defense systems create delays in taking cases to trial at both the state and federal levels. Attempts to increase funding for indigent defense by bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been thwarted by high procedural and substantive hurdles, and consequently these attempts have failed to bring significant change. This Note argues that, because ineffective assistance of counsel litigation is most likely a dead end for system-wide reform, indigent defenders should challenge the constitutionality of underfunding based on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of speedy trial. Existing speedy trial jurisprudence suggests that the overworking and furloughing of …

Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, Richard A. Bierschbach, Stephanos Bibas

Michigan Law Review

Since the turn of the century, the Supreme Court has regulated noncapital sentencing under the Sixth Amendment in the Apprendi line of cases (requiring jury findings of fact to justify sentence enhancements) as well as under the Eighth Amendment in the Miller and Graham line of cases (forbidding mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile defendants). Although both lines of authority sound in individual rights, in fact they are fundamentally about the structures of criminal justice. These two seemingly disparate doctrines respond to structural imbalances in noncapital sentencing by promoting morally appropriate punishment judgments that are based on individualized input and that …

Can We Calculate Fairness And Reasonableness? Determining What Satisfies The Fair Cross-Section Requirement Of The Sixth Amendment, Colleen P. Fitzharris

Michigan Law Review

The Impartial Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires that the venire from which the state and the defendant draw a twelve-person petit jury be a fair cross-section of the community. The Supreme Court announced a three-prong test in Duren v. Missouri to help courts determine whether there has been a Sixth Amendment violation: (1) whether a distinctive group in the community was excluded; (2) whether the venire was not a fair and reasonable representation of the county population as a whole; and (3) whether that underrepresentation was the result of systematic exclusion. When evaluating the second prong, courts routinely …

Plea Bargaining And The Right To Counsel At Bail Hearings, Charlie Gerstein

Michigan Law Review

A couple million indigent defendants in this country face bail hearings each year and most of them do so without court-appointed lawyers. In two recent companion cases, Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court held that the loss of a favorable plea bargain can satisfy the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. If the Constitution requires effective assistance of counsel to protect plea bargains, it requires the presence of counsel at proceedings that have the capacity to prejudice those bargains. Pretrial detention has the capacity to prejudice a plea bargain because a defendant held …

Counsel's Control Over The Presentation Of Mitigating Evidence During Capital Sentencing, James Michael Blakemore

Michigan Law Review

The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to control his defense and the right to a lawyer's assistance. A lawyer's assistance, however, sometimes interferes with a defendant's control over his case. As a result, the Supreme Court, over time, has had to delineate the spheres of authority that pertain to counsel and defendant respectively. The Court has not yet decisively assigned control over mitigating evidence to either counsel or defendant. This Note argues that counsel should control the presentation of mitigating evidence during capital sentencing. First, and most importantly, decisions concerning the presentation of mitigating evidence are best characterized …

Uncounseled Tribal Court Guilty Pleas In State And Federal Courts: Individual Rights Versus Tribal Self-Governance, Christiana M. Martenson

Michigan Law Review

Indian tribes in the United States are separate sovereigns with inherent self-governing authority. As a result, the Bill of Rights does not directly bind the tribes, and criminal defendants in tribal courts do not enjoy the protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In United States v. Ant, a defendant - without the legal assistance that a state or federal court would have provided - pled guilty to criminal charges in tribal court. Subsequently, the defendant faced federal charges arising out of the same events that led to the tribal prosecution. The Ninth Circuit in Ant barred the federal …

Don't Answer The Door: Montejo V. Louisiana Relaxes Police Restrictions For Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, Emily Bretz

Michigan Law Review

In 2009, the Supreme Court held in Montejo v. Louisiana that a defendant may validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during police interrogation, even if police initiate interrogation after the defendant's invocation of the right at the first formal proceeding. This Note asserts that Montejo significantly altered the Sixth Amendment protections available to represented defendants. By increasing defendants' exposure to law enforcement, the decision allows police to try to elicit incriminating statements and waivers of the right to counsel after the defendant has expressed a desire for counsel. In order to protect the defendant's constitutional guarantee of a …

American Indians, Crime, And The Law, Kevin K. Washburn

Michigan Law Review

This Article evaluates the federal Indian country criminal justice regime, not against norms of Indian law and policy, but against those of criminal law and policy. Specifically, this Article evaluates the federal constitutional norms that lie at the heart of American criminal justice and that are designed to ensure the legitimacy of federal criminal trials. Toward that end, Part I presents a critical description of key facets of the federal Indian country criminal justice system. Part II begins the critical evaluation by evaluating a key institutional player in the federal system, the federal prosecutor. It highlights the handicaps faced by …

Government Responsibility For The Acts Of Jailhouse Informants Under The Sixth Amendment, Maia Goodell

Michigan Law Review

Once a criminal investigation has identified a suspect, and adversarial proceedings have begun, the Sixth Amendment confers a right to be represented by counsel at the "critical stages" of the process. The Supreme Court has made clear that the government cannot circumvent this requirement merely by designating a civilian informant to engage in questioning on its behalf. Less clear is when the government is responsible for the actions of an informant; particularly in the case of jailhouse informants, incarcerated individuals who question fellow inmates, government responsibility is a difficult issue for which no clear legal standard has emerged. An examination …

Some Effects Of Identity-Based Social Movements On Constitutional Law In The Twentieth Century, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Michigan Law Review

What motivated big changes in constitutional law doctrine during the twentieth century? Rarely did important constitutional doctrine or theory change because of formal amendments to the document's text, and rarer still because scholars or judges "discovered" new information about the Constitution's original meaning. Precedent and common law reasoning were the mechanisms by which changes occurred rather than their driving force. My thesis is that most twentieth century changes in the constitutional protection of individual rights were driven by or in response to the great identity-based social movements ("IBSMs") of the twentieth century. Race, sex, and sexual orientation were markers of …

Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein

Michigan Law Review

The Miranda conundrum runs something like this. If the Miranda decision represents true constitutional interpretation, and all unwarned statements taken during custodial interrogation are "compelled" within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the impeachment and "fruits" exceptions to Miranda should fall. If it is not true constitutional interpretation, than the Court has no business reversing state criminal convictions for its violation. I offer here what I hope is a satisfying answer to this conundrum, on both descriptive and normative levels, that justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well. In Part …

Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda

Michigan Law Review

Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …

Petty Offenses, Serious Consequences: Multiple Petty Offenses And The Sixth Amendment Right To Jury Trial, Jeff E. Butler

Michigan Law Review

In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, the Supreme Court set forth the definitive standard for distinguishing petty offenses from serious crimes.7 The benchmark used by the Court is the maximum prison term assigned to each offense by the legislature. Where the penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment, the offense is serious enough to trigger the right to jury trial. Where the penalty is six months' imprisonment or less, there is a strong presumption that the offense is petty; therefore, a defendant accused of that offense has no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.

This Note argues that a criminal …

The Breath Of The Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations And Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Capital Litigation, Albert L. Vreeland Ii

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that fee limitations deprive indigent defendants of their right to effective assistance of counsel. Part I of this Note reviews state court decisions that address Sixth Amendment challenges to fee limitations, yet fail to address the broader concerns about the appointed counsel system. Part II considers the inherent disincentives and burdens fee limitations impose on attorneys and suggests that the limits threaten the indigent accused's right to effective assistance of counsel. A comparison of the fee limitations and the time required to prepare and try a capital case reveals the gross inadequacy of statutory fee provisions. In …

Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy

Michigan Law Review

The article will consider four different types of police-obtained evidence: evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation, confessions and lineup identifications obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and coerced confessions. My conclusions are that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded because of the police misconduct by which it was obtained. On the other hand, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation is (or ought to be) excluded because use of that evidence compromises the defendant's procedural right not to be compelled to be a witness against …

Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and Innis, too many others are not. In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way to …

Expert Services And The Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Madate Of Ake V. Oklahoma, John M. West

Michigan Law Review

This Note attempts to define the boundaries of the indigent criminal defendant's constitutional right to expert assistance, in the light of Ake v. Oklahoma. Part I briefly reviews the Ake decision and examines its constitutional background. Part II inquires into Ake's implications for experts other than psychiatrists and in contexts other than the insanity defense, arguing that the principles that guided the Ake decision have validity well beyond the facts of that case. Part III asks whether the Ake doctrine should be limited to capital cases. Rejecting such a limitation, it concludes that the right to expert assistance …

Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices In Capital Cases: An Empirical Study And A Constitutional Analysis, Bruce J. Winick

Michigan Law Review

As presently construed, the Constitution does not prohibit the death penalty. The states and the federal government may punish the commission of certain crimes with death, so long as the extreme penalty is not imposed on a mandatory basis and so long as the procedures used in imposing a death sentence meet constitutional scrutiny.

A demonstration that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenge in the manner described in a single case probably would be insufficient to support a constitutional challenge in the federal courts and in the vast majority of state courts. In these courts a prosecutor's use of the …

Prosecutorial Vindictiveness In The Criminal Appellate Process: Due Process Protection After United States V. Goodwin, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note reformulates the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness in light of the distinction drawn in Goodwin between pretrial and posttrial charging decisions. Part I recounts the development of the vindictiveness concept, and argues that in extending the doctrine beyond the factual settings which moved the Supreme Court to fashion its original prophylactic rule, the circuit courts have seriously eroded an essential due process safeguard. Part II critically examines the distinction between pretrial and posttrial charging decisions relied upon in Goodwin. Developing the logical corollary of the Goodwin holding, this Part argues that just as the pretrial situation does not …

Stone V. Powell And The Effective Assistance Of Counsel, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Part I briefly identifies the considerations underlying the Stone Court's decision to limit habeas corpus review of fourth amendment claims. Part II then argues against applying Stone to the sixth amendment claim. After establishing the analytic difference between the two constitutional claims and examining Stone's "opportunity for full and fair litigation" standard, it concludes that Stone is fully consistent with free review of habeas corpus petitions alleging incompetent handling of fourth amendment questions. Finally, responding to a popular interpretation of Stone, Part II demonstrates that the possibility that ineffectiveness claims may not further the determination of a defendant's …

The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found …

Due Process And Parole Revocation, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

In Morrissey, the Court set the level of due process needed in parole revocations. Specifically, it held that the parolee facing •revocation has a right (a) to receive written notice of the claimed parole violations; (b) to hear the evidence against him; (c) to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation); (e) to have a neutral and detached hearing body, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) to be given …

Compulsory Process Ii, Peter Westen

Michigan Law Review

This Article examines the validity of the conventional wisdom. It draws support for its analysis from the constitutional principles of compulsory process, and, in their absence, from related doctrine in the areas of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and his right to a fair trial. Part I of the article defines the constitutional standard that governs the simple case of a nonindigent defendant who makes a timely application to produce a witness from within the territory of the jurisdiction. Parts II through IV, in turn, examine that standard in the light of complicating factors such as the …

Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note, first, examines the Davis methodology for determining whether a foreclosed line of cross-examination warrants protection by the confrontation clause, and suggests a test employable by reviewing courts for making that determination. Then, the Note sketches the contours of the clash, prefigured by Davis, between the right of confrontation and the limitations on cross-examination that result from both the assertion of testimonial privileges and trial court relevance rulings.

A Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel Under Article 15 Of The Uniform Code Of Military Justice, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) enables a commanding officer to sentence a service member who has committed a minor infraction to thirty days of correctional custody. The article 15 proceeding offers few procedural safeguards; among the protections lacking is the right to counsel. This Note will consider whether the failure of the military to provide counsel at an article 15 proceeding is consistent with the sixth amendment, which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The Note first will discuss …

Kirby, Biggers, And Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against The Danger Of Convicting The Innocent?, Joseph D. Grano

Michigan Law Review

Even recognizing the danger of misidentification, procedural safeguards, especially constitutional ones, are not readily apparent. Some judges, such as Justice Stewart, find less need for counsel at photographic displays than at lineups; others find an equivalent or even greater need for counsel. Some judges, in approving on-the-scene identifications without counsel, find a guarantee of accuracy in the short interval between the crime and the identification; other judges decry such procedures and find them inherently suggestive. The problem stems directly from the lack of scientific knowledge and inquiry. Therefore, in analyzing the recent identification cases, this Article will draw upon experimental …