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Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn
Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn
Publications
Several administrative programs contain provisions allowing Congress to veto agency rules, and there is now a bill before Congress to extend this veto power to all agency rulemaking. In this Article, Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn analyze the histories of five federal programs subject to the legislative veto to determine the effect of the veto on the rulemaking process and on the relationships between the branches of government. Extrapolating from this practical experience, they suggest that a general legislative veto is unlikely to increase the overall efficiency of the administrative process, may impede the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking based on …
Congressional Power Under The Appointments Clause After Buckley V. Valeo, Michigan Law Review
Congressional Power Under The Appointments Clause After Buckley V. Valeo, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note examines the constitutional power of Congress to control the selection of government officers. It first discusses the article II grant itself and concludes that the Court in Buckley correctly interpreted that provision to prohibit direct appointment by Congress of officers who are found to possess "significant authority." The Note then explores possible means not explicitly foreclosed in Buckley by which Congress might influence such appointments and argues that these alternatives are restricted by the same constitutional principles that prohibit direct congressional appointments.