Law Commons^™

Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The concepts of good faith and bad faith play a central role in many areas of private law and international law. Typically associated with honesty, loyalty, and fair dealing, good faith is said to supply the fundamental principle of every legal system, if not the foundation of all law. With limited exceptions, however, good faith and bad faith go unmentioned in constitutional cases brought by or against government institutions. This doctrinal deficit is especially striking given that the U.S. Constitution twice refers to faithfulness and that insinuations of bad faith pervade constitutional discourse.

This Article investigates these points and their …

Good Faith, Bad Faith And The Gulf Between: A Proposal For Consistent Terminology, Steve Coughlan

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

Since the earliest days of section 24(2) jurisprudence, the phrase “good faith” has been used. For nearly as long, it has been used inconsistently. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of the phrase “bad faith.” This article traces the confusion which arises in understanding and in reasoning from the failure to restrict these phrases to single meanings. The article then proposes particular meanings for each, which would limit their applicability to extreme situations at either end of the spectrum. It is proposed that the term “good faith” should only be used in circumstances where it settles that the …

Slides: Meaningful Engagement: The Public's Role In Resource Decisions, Mark Squillace

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

Presenter: Mark Squillace, Director, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado Law School

22 slides

Race, Angst And Capital Punishment: The Burger Court's Existential Struggle, Katherine R. Kruse

Scholarly Works

This article chronicles the Burger Court's inability to fashion a suitable remedy for racism in the discretionary system of capital sentencing. The article discusses the Court's initial response, “remedial paralysis,” which is evident, not only in McGautha v. California, where the Court refused to find that the Due Process Clause was violated by standardless death sentencing, but also in Furman v. Georgia, where the Court decided to abolish the death penalty. The article further explores the Court's reinstatement of the death penalty, and two of the Court's forays into “bad faith” denial that sustained the death penalty, particularly the Court's …