Law Commons^™

How To Think About The Federal Commerce Power And Incidentally Rewrite United States V. Lopez, Donald H. Regan

Articles

Almost sixty years after the "revolution" of 1937, we still do not have an adequate theory of the commerce power. The Court was right to abandon the theory of dual federalism epitomized by Carter v. Carter Coal Co.;' and it has got the right results in the major cases decided since then. But our post-1937 theory, whether before or after Lopez, is a mess. On the one hand, we have a collection of doctrinal rules that, if we take them seriously, allow Congress to do anything it wants under the commerce power. On the other hand, we continue to pay …

With Malice Toward Some: United States V. Kirby, Malicious Prosecution, And The Fourteenth Amendment, David J. Achtenberg

Faculty Works

In 1869, the Supreme Court treated United States v. Kirby as a simple case. In 1994, it treated Albright v. Oliver as a case divorced from history. Understanding the factual complexity of Kirby provides the historical framework missing from Albright and casts new light on the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids malicious prosecution.

United States v. Kirby appeared straightforward. John W. Kirby was indicted for interferring with the United States mail by detaining a mail agent, Dr. Cyrus W. Farris, and a mail steamer. John Kirby's defense was simple. He was the sheriff of Gallatin County, Kentucky. The …

That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

International Trade Relations And The Separation Of Powers Under The United States Constitution, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Taking Liberties With The First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, And The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Jay S. Bybee

Scholarly Works

In 1993 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which provided that government, including the United States and the states, “shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” except where the government can demonstrate that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and is “the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.”

Unfortunately, whatever consistency RFRA might bring to the substance of church-state relations comes at the expense of clarity in federal-state relations. This is unfortunate because the First Amendment does not address church-state relations; it concerns …