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When The Classroom Is Not In The Schoolhouse: Applying Tinker To Student Speech At Online Schools, Brett T. Macintyre
When The Classroom Is Not In The Schoolhouse: Applying Tinker To Student Speech At Online Schools, Brett T. Macintyre
Seattle University Law Review
Despite the overwhelming increase in students’ Internet use and the growing popularity of online public schools, the United States Supreme Court has never addressed how, or if, schools can discipline students for disruptive online speech without violating the students’ First Amendment rights. What the Supreme Court has addressed is how school administrators can constitutionally discipline students within traditional schools. In a landmark decision, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court announced the now famous principle that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Still, the Court …
Section 501(C)(4) Advocacy Organizations: Political Candidate-Related And Other Partisan Activities In Furtherance Of The Social Welfare, Terence Dougherty
Section 501(C)(4) Advocacy Organizations: Political Candidate-Related And Other Partisan Activities In Furtherance Of The Social Welfare, Terence Dougherty
Seattle University Law Review
In the wake of the 2012 presidential election, tax and political law lawyers are left with a number of unanswered questions concerning the political activities of tax-exempt organizations. Despite the importance of these questions, there are striking gaps in the authority of federal tax law governing the conduct of political candidate and other partisan-related activities by tax-exempt organizations. Assuming activities in furtherance of partisan interests are activities that support private interests, I consider what this authority may tell us about the permissibility of Section 501(c)(4) organizations engaging in partisan political activities and having as a constitutive purpose a partisan political …
Speech, Intent, And The Chilling Effect, Leslie Kendrick
Speech, Intent, And The Chilling Effect, Leslie Kendrick
William & Mary Law Review
Speaker’s intent requirements are a common but unremarked feature of First Amendment law. From the “actual malice” standard for defamation to the specific-intent requirement for incitement, many types of expression are protected or unprotected depending on the state of mind with which they are said. To the extent that courts and commentators have considered why speaker’s intent should determine First Amendment protection, they have relied upon the chilling effect. On this view, imposing strict liability for harmful speech, such as defamatory statements, would overdeter, or chill, valuable speech, such as true political information. Intent requirements are necessary prophylactically to provide …