Introduction To Constraining The Executive, Tom Campbell
Dec 2017
Introduction To Constraining The Executive, Tom Campbell
Tom Campbell
The essays in this symposium illuminate aspects of the task of keeping the executive branch within its constitutionally appointed boundaries. The symposium was conceived before the 2016 elections, so its plan was not directed toward the current president. Nevertheless, it is inescapable that, writing after those elections, the authors took recent developments into account. The lessons to be learned from these essays, however, have more permanent application than simply for the immediate present. In this introduction, I review the articles of the symposium hoping to highlight the valuable contribution to separation of powers jurisprudence that each offers for the long …
Executive Action And Nonaction, Tom Campbell
Dec 2016
Executive Action And Nonaction, Tom Campbell
Tom Campbell
Action by the executive can be challenged by a party with standing, and there is usually no shortage of such parties. The executive’s failure to act, however, is much more difficult to submit to judicial scrutiny. I propose that standards for reviewing such nonaction are available under precedent of the Administrative Procedure Act, and under severability analysis. That is, a reviewing court can determine whether the executive’s failure to enforce part of a law leaves the rest of the law to operate meaningfully as Congress intended (akin to severability analysis), and APA precedent can guide courts to determine whether nonaction …
Severability Of Statutes, Tom Campbell
Dec 2010
Severability Of Statutes, Tom Campbell
Tom Campbell
Courts legislate when they engage in "severability analysis", allowing part of a law to continue in force, after having struck down other parts as unconstitutional. This is flawed for the same reason that the legislative veto and the executive line-item veto are flawed. All involve creating a legislative outcome without the joint approval of both houses and the executive. The practice derives from an analogy to contract enforcement, where a court will try to preserve part of a contract when the rest is unenforceable. However, the analogy is imperfect because Congress and the state legislature remain in a position to …
Term Limits And Party Loyalty, Tom Campbell, Cameron Doolittle
Apr 2007
Term Limits And Party Loyalty, Tom Campbell, Cameron Doolittle
Tom Campbell
No abstract provided.
