Law Commons^™

The New Maternity, Courtney Megan Cahill

Scholarly Publications

Constitutional law has long assumed that mothers andfathers are fundamentally different. Maternity, that law posits, is certain, obvious, and monolithic - consolidated in an easily identifiable person who is at once a biological, social, and legal parent. Paternity, in contrast, is construed as uncertain, nonobvious, relative, and often unclear. Over time, constitutional law has grown more insistent about the obviousness of motherhood. It also has cemented its idea of maternity into a fundamental principle of sex equality law that applies in settings - like transgender rights - that have nothing to do with certain mothers and uncertain fathers.

Constitutional law's …

Prophylactic Redistricting? Congress's Section 5 Power And The New Equal Protection Right To Vote, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

The Disparate Impact Canon, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

The New Elections Clause, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Contingent Constitutionality, Legislative Facts, And Campaign Finance Law, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

Many of the Supreme Court's important holdings concerning campaign finance law are not pure matters of constitutional interpretation. Rather, they are "contingent" constitution- al determinations: the Court's conclusions rest in substantial part on legislative facts about the world that the Court finds, intuits, or assumes to be true. While earlier commentators have recognized the need to improve legislative factfinding by the Supreme Court, other aspects of its treatment of legislative facts-particularly in the realm of campaign finance- require reform as well. Stare decisis purportedly insulates the Court's purely legal holdings and interpretations from future challenge. Factually contingent constitutional rulings should, …

Reverse Nullification And Executive Discretion, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

The President has broad discretion to refrain from enforcing many civil and criminal laws, either in general or under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court has not only affirmed the constitutionality of such under-enforcement, but extolled its virtues. Most recently, in Arizona v. United States, it deployed the judicially created doctrines of obstacle and field preemption to invalidate state restrictions on illegal immigrants that mirrored federal law, in large part to ensure that states do not undermine the effects of the President’s decision to refrain from fully enforcing federal immigration provisions.

Such a broad application of obstacle and field preemption is …

The Intratextual Independent "Legislature" And The Elections Clause, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

Many states have delegated substantial authority to regulate federal elections to entities other than their institutional legislatures, such as independent redistricting commissions empowered to determine the boundaries of congressional districts. Article I’s Elections Clause and Article II’s Presidential Electors Clause, however, confer authority to regulate federal elections specifically upon State “legislatures,” rather than granting it to States as a whole. An intratextual analysis of the Constitution reveals that the term “legislature” is best understood as referring solely to the entity within each state comprised of representatives that has the general authority to pass laws. Thus, state constitutional provisions or laws …

Public Law At The Cathedral: Enjoining The Government, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

Conventional wisdom provides that injunctive relief in public law cases is generally unnecessary, because a declaratory judgment and the threat of damages are enough to induce the government to comply with a court’s ruling (except, perhaps, in the institutional reform context). Consistent with this prevailing understanding, most scholars to apply Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral framework to public law have concluded that nearly all constitutional rights are protected by property rules, regardless of whether a rightholder actually is protected by an injunction, or instead merely has a substantial likelihood of obtaining one if she goes to court.

This Article challenges this …

Rethinking The Right To Vote Under State Constitutions, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

The Law Of Nations And The Offenses Clause Of The Constitution: A Defense Of Federalism, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.