Law Commons^™

Government Nonedorsement, Nelson Tebbe

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Inclusiveness Of The New Originalism, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In tracing the arc of originalism from the old originalism to the new, I observe a shift from an exclusionary outlook to an inclusionary outlook, reflected in new originalists’ proclamations that “we are all originalists now.” As my title suggests, I am going to bring out the inclusiveness of the new originalism and ponder its implications. The new originalists have emphasized two developments: (1) the movement from a focus on “intention of the framers” to “original public meaning” and (2) the articulation of and emphasis on the distinction between interpretation and construction. My main points are two. First, the inclusiveness …

The New Constitution Of The United States: Do We Need One And How Would We Get One?, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Government in the United States has some serious problems. At the federal level, is the problem of gridlock. The United States Congress seems unable or unwilling to do anything about anything (although it must have done something to run up more than $16 trillion in debts). Forget about addressing problems such as global warming, income inequality, failing schools, economic stimulus or you name it. How bad is it, really? Has the United States become ungovernable, and is the Constitution to blame? In my view, it’s a mixed bag. Some aspects of the United States government work very well, others are …

Constructing Constitutional Politics: The Reconstruction Strategy For Protecting Rights, Mark A. Graber

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Fiduciary Foundations Of Federal Equal Protection, Gary S. Lawson, Guy Seidman, Robert Natelson

Faculty Scholarship

In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court invalidated school segregation in the District of Columbia by inferring a broad “federal equal protection” principle from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is often assumed that this principle is inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and with “originalist” interpretation.

This Article demonstrates, however, that a federal equal protection principle is not only consistent with the Constitution’s original meaning, but inherent in it. The Constitution was crafted as a fiduciary document of the kind that, under contemporaneous law, imposed on agents acting for more than one beneficiary – and on …

Nearing Thirty Years: The Burger Court, Strickland V. Washington, And The Parameters Of The Right To Counsel, Joshua E. Kastenberg

Faculty Scholarship

In Strickland v. Washington, the Court issued a standard for determining when defense counsel's ineffective performance, through no direct fault of the prosecution, law enforcement, public, or judiciary, undermined the fairness of a trial such that a conviction or sentence had to be rendered as a violation of due process. The article's conclusion presents a model for applying the legal history underlying Strickland to ineffective assistance cases.

Originalism Without Obligation, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

I am truly delighted that Boston University School of Law is hosting a conference on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation1 and Michael Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience. 2 Both books launch powerful and much-needed broadsides against the idea of a political obligation to obey the U.S. Constitution, and more generally (whether or not the authors embrace these implications) against the very idea of a political obligation to obey state authorities. I fully agree with both authors that the arguments normally made in favor of a duty of obedience to the Constitution, and by extension to state authorities of any kind, are remarkably …

Against Agnosticism: Why The Liberal State Isn't Just One (Authority) Among The Many, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This article takes up the gauntlet thrown down by Professor Abner Greene’s recent book, Against Obligation: The Multiple Sources of Authority in a Liberal Democracy, to those scholars, politicians, and activists who believe that realizing the ideal of e pluribus unum (out of many, one) as well as constitutional principles of liberty and equality require a robust role for government. Government, Greene argues, is just one source of authority among many others, and citizens – or even public officials – have no general moral duty to obey the law. The political and constitutional order of the United States, he contends, …

Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

With this event – a Symposium on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation2 and Michael Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience3 – we continue our Boston University Law Review series of symposia on significant recent books in law. The distinctive format is to pick two books that join issue on an important topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty members to write an essay on one or both books.

Ordered Liberty: Response To Michael Dorf, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

We appreciate Michael Dorf’s serious engagement with our book and his conclusion that “it responds effectively to the charge that liberalism focuses on rights to the exclusion of responsibilities.”1 He charges us, however, with an “errant theodicy” – with making the “claim that we have . . . the freedoms we have in virtue of a freestanding principle that respectful treatment of persons requires granting them autonomy as responsibility.”2 He also criticizes us for deriving basic liberties from a “freestanding interest in autonomy.”3 In this response we aim to clarify our argument concerning responsibility as autonomy and to reject the …

Critical Reflections On Seidman's On Constitutional Disobedience, Hugh Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium contribution critically examines Louis Seidman’s book "Constitutional Disobedience" (2012). Seidman questions whether American constitutionalism really has the positive values commonly attributed to it. He suggests that citizens and legislators should shift away from claims that the Constitution requires or forbids certain governmental choices and toward more straightforward, “all-things-considered” political debate about “how to solve real, modern problems” and “about what will produce the best country.” I argue against Seidman's view that straightforward political talk will be less polarizing and divisive than constitution-invoking discussion. Seidman, I think, might romanticize ordinary political discussion in somewhat the same way that orthodox …

Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, some have asked: “Are we all originalists now?” My response is: “I hope not!” In the Article, I explain why. But first, I show that there is a trick in the question: Even to pose the question “Are we all originalists now?” suggests that one is presupposing what I shall call “the originalist premise.” To answer the question affirmatively certainly shows that one is presupposing it. The originalist premise is the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is the assumption that …

Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium N Eminent Domain, Brian A. Lee

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The New Originalist Manifesto, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Lawrence B. Solum and Robert W. Bennett's excellent book, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, calls to mind a famous book in political philosophy, J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against.' Both works pair two spirited yet fair-minded scholars in a constructive debate between two competing views prevalent in their fields. Originalism has a reasonable, programmatic, and inclusive proponent in Solum, and living constitutionalism has a capable, pragmatic, and effective champion in Bennett.

Foreground Principles, Timothy M. Mulvaney

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared for decades that, for Takings Clause purposes, property interests are not created by the Constitution but rather are determined by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” However, the Court has exhibited a strong normative preference for a certain type of independent source — “background principles” of the common law — over others, namely state statutory and administrative law. This Article calls this preference into question.

The Article develops a model to demonstrate the four basic categories, or quadrants, of takings decisions that extensive reliance on the …

Religions As Sovereigns: Why Religion Is "Special", Elizabeth Clark

Faculty Scholarship

Commentators increasingly challenge religion’s privileged legal status, arguing that it is not “special” or distinct from other associations or philosophical or conscientious claims. I propose that religion is “special” because it functions metaphorically as a legal sovereign, asserting supreme authority over a realm of human life. Under a religion-as-sovereign theory, religious freedom can be understood as at least partial deference to a religious sovereign in a system of shared or overlapping sovereignty. This Article suggests that federalism, which also involves shared sovereignty, can provide a useful heuristic device for examining religious freedom. Specifically, the Article examines a range of federalism …

A Constitutional Theory Of Habeas Power, Lee B. Kovarsky

Faculty Scholarship

Modern habeas corpus law generally favors an idiom of individual rights, but the Great Writ’s central feature is judicial power. Throughout the seventeenth-century English Civil Wars, the Glorious Revolution, and the war in the American colonies, the habeas writ was a means by which judges consolidated authority over the question of what counted as 'lawful' custody. Of course, the American Framers did not simply copy the English writ—they embedded it in a Constitutional system of separated powers and dual sovereignty. 'A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power' is an inquiry into the newly minted principle that the federal Constitution guarantees some …

Neurotechnologies At The Intersection Of Criminal Procedure And Constitutional Law, Amanda C. Pustilnik

Faculty Scholarship

The rapid development of neurotechnologies poses novel constitutional issues for criminal law and criminal procedure. These technologies can identify directly from brain waves whether a person is familiar with a stimulus like a face or a weapon, can model blood flow in the brain to indicate whether a person is lying, and can even interfere with brain processes themselves via high-powered magnets to cause a person to be less likely to lie to an investigator. These technologies implicate the constitutional privilege against compelled, self-incriminating speech under the Fifth Amendment and the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure …

The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion, Polarization, And The Direction Of Judicial Decision Making, Mark A. Graber

Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers a more sophisticated account of elite theory that incorporates the crucial insights underlying claims that Justices with life tenure will protect minority rights and claims that the Supreme Court follows the election returns. Put simply, the direction of judicial decision making at a given time reflects the views of the most affluent and highly educated members of the dominant national coalition. The values that animate the elite members of the dominant national coalition help explain the direction of judicial decision making for the last eighty years. During the mid-twentieth century, most Republican and Democratic elites held more …

A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls And Potential Of The Mosaic Theory Of Fourth Amendment Privacy, David C. Gray, Danielle Keats Citron

Faculty Scholarship

On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a landmark non-decision in United States v. Jones. In that case, officers used a GPS-enabled device to track a suspect’s public movements for four weeks, amassing a considerable amount of data in the process. Although ultimately resolved on narrow grounds, five Justices joined concurring opinions in Jones expressing sympathy for some version of the “mosaic theory” of Fourth Amendment privacy. This theory holds that we maintain reasonable expectations of privacy in certain quantities of information even if we do not have such expectations in the constituent parts. This Article examines and …

The Supreme Court, Cafa, And Parens Patriae Actions: Will It Be Principles Or Biases?, Donald G. Gifford, William L. Reynolds

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court will hear a case during its 2013-2014 term that will test the principles of both its conservative and liberal wings. In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., Justices from each wing of the Court will be forced to choose between the modes of statutory interpretation they usually have favored in the past and their previously displayed pro-business or anti-business predispositions. The issue is whether the defendant-manufacturers can remove an action brought by a state attorney general suing as parens patriae to federal court. Beginning with their actions against tobacco manufacturers in the mid-1990s, state …

Private-Rights Litigation And The Normative Foundations Of Durable Constitutional Precedent, Maxwell L. Stearns

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter advances a simple thesis that runs counter to much public-law scholarship. Holding all else constant, the more difficult, or costly, constitutional rulings are to obtain, the more durable the resulting precedent; conversely, the easier, or cheaper, such rulings are to obtain, the less durable the resulting precedent. Most public-law scholarship implicitly rests on the opposite premise that the relative ease or difficulty of obtaining constitutional rulings should correlate positively, not negatively, with the relative importance or unimportance of the asserted right. Within a public-rights adjudicatory model, important constitutional rights justify relaxing traditional constraints on constitutional decisionmaking, including ripeness, …

Grains Of Sand Or Butterfly Effect: Standing, The Legitimacy Of Precedent, And Reflections On Hollingsworth And Windsor, Maxwell L. Stearns

Faculty Scholarship

One test of whether a scholarly work has achieved canonical status is to ask respected scholars in the field which works, setting aside their own, are essential reads. William Fletcher’s article, The Structure of Standing, now in its twenty-fifth year, would almost certainly emerge at the top of any such lists among standing scholars. And yet, while many at this conference have built upon Fletcher’s insights, there remains notable disagreement concerning standing doctrine’s normative foundations. The central dispute concerns whether standing doctrine should be celebrated as furthering a “private-rights,” or instead, condemned as thwarting a “public-rights,” adjudicatory model.

In a …

Stop Terry : Reasonable Suspicion, Race, And A Proposal To Limit Terry Stops, Renée M. Hutchins

Faculty Scholarship

The Terry doctrine, which grants a police officer the authority to stop and frisk based on his or her reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, was created by the Supreme Court at a time when the nation con- fronted a particular moment of violent racial strife. Since Terry was decided, the Supreme Court has continued to expand the reach of the doctrine—which opened the door for potential abuse. Existing data is increasingly proving that the loosening of constitutional standards is causing substantial harms to people of color nationwide. This article joins the existing scholarly discussion surrounding this decision to suggest …

Gideon’S Amici, Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend The Rights Of The Accused?, Bruce A. Green

Faculty Scholarship

In Gideon v. Wainwright, twenty-three state attorneys general, led by Walter F. Mondale and Edward McCormack, joined an amicus brief on the side of the criminal accused, urging the Supreme Court to recognize indigent defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in felony cases. This was a unique occurrence. Although amicus filings by public entities have increased significantly since then, including in criminal cases, government lawyers rarely submit amicus briefs in the Supreme Court supporting criminal defendants’ procedural rights, and never en masse as in Gideon. The states’ public support for Gideon’s position points up the special nature of the …

What Is Constitutional Obligation?, Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Mike Seidman’s book, On Constitutional Disobedience, offers an impressive challenge to constitutional fidelity. With much of it, my book Against Obligation is on all fours – we both share the view that our Constitution’s meaning should not be bound by past sources. Seidman seems to go further, though, and reject the bindingness of the Constitution as a text. What does it mean to ask whether the Constitution itself obligates? Most of the Constitution doesn’t set rules for citizens; rather, it establishes powers, and what we might consider conditional obligations, for officials. All government officials in the United States swear an …

Firearms Policy And The Black Community: An Assessment Of The Modern Orthodoxy, Nicholas J. Johnson

Faculty Scholarship

The heroes of the modern civil rights movement were more than just stoic victims of racist violence. Their history was one of defiance and fighting long before news cameras showed them attacked by dogs and fire hoses. When Fannie Lou Hamer revealed she kept a shotgun in every corner of her bedroom, she was channeling a century old practice. And when delta share cropper Hartman Turnbow, after a shootout with the Klan, said “I don’t figure I was being non-nonviolent, (yes non-nonviolent) I was just protecting my family”, he was invoking an evolved tradition that embraced self-defense and disdained political …

Freedom From Ignorance: The International Duty To Provide Public Education, Areto A. Imoukhuede

Faculty Scholarship

This paper argues that public education is an international human right that the U.S. ought to recognise and protect. Recognising a right to public education would correct a major inconsistency in U.S. law by bringing education rights docrtine more in line with international human rights law. This piece discusses how current U.S. education rights doctrine is inconsistent with U.S. tradition and legal precedent. It then demonstrates how international law recognises public education as a fundamental duty of government before arguing for why the U.S. is obligated to follow international law regarding the right to public education.

Between Seminole Rock And A Hard Place: A New Approach To Agency Deference, Kevin O. Leske

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

What's Religion Got To Do With It? Virtually Nothing: Hosanna-Tabor And The Unbridled Power Of The Ministerial Exemption, Marsha B. Freeman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.