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Articles 1 - 19 of 19

Full-Text Articles in Law

Trust And Retaliation: The First Amendment And Trump’S Taxes, Timothy Zick Jul 2019

Trust And Retaliation: The First Amendment And Trump’S Taxes, Timothy Zick

Popular Media

No abstract provided.


Section 2: Congress & The Obama White House, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School Sep 2014

Section 2: Congress & The Obama White House, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.


Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins Mar 2014

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …


The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash Apr 2012

The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash

Faculty Publications

Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …


The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara Leigh Grove Mar 2012

The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between Congress and the federal judiciary. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and surprising) role that the executive branch has played in these jurisdictional struggles. This Article seeks to fill that void. Drawing on two strands of social science research, the Article argues that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use its constitutional authority over the enactment and enforcement of federal law to oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures. Notably, this structural argument has considerable historical support. The executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress. That has been true even …


Presidential Unilateralism And Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress Lacks The Will And The Way To Stop Presidential Initiatives, Neal Devins Apr 2009

Presidential Unilateralism And Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress Lacks The Will And The Way To Stop Presidential Initiatives, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Politics And Principle: An Alternative Take On Seth P. Waxman's Defending Congress, Neal Devins Jan 2003

Politics And Principle: An Alternative Take On Seth P. Waxman's Defending Congress, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


In Search Of The Lost Chord: Reflections On The 1996 Item Veto Act, Neal Devins Jul 1997

In Search Of The Lost Chord: Reflections On The 1996 Item Veto Act, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins Jan 1994

Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand, Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice before the Supreme Court, and provides the Court with a trustworthy litigator to explicate the government's position. On the other hand, such control may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decision making. In this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency litigation in the …


A Proposal To Resolve Interbranch Disputes On The Practice Field, Paul R. Verkuil Jul 1991

A Proposal To Resolve Interbranch Disputes On The Practice Field, Paul R. Verkuil

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The President's Powers As Commander-In-Chief Versus Congress' War Power And Appropriations Power, Charles W. Bennett, Arthur B. Culvahouse, Geoffrey P. Miller, William Bradford Reynolds, William W. Van Alstyne Jan 1988

The President's Powers As Commander-In-Chief Versus Congress' War Power And Appropriations Power, Charles W. Bennett, Arthur B. Culvahouse, Geoffrey P. Miller, William Bradford Reynolds, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

This joint work explores a variety of viewpoints all centered around the War Powers Resolution and its application to the situation in the Persian Gulf.


Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins Jan 1987

Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


How Successfully Can The States' Item Veto Be Transferred To The President?, Louis Fisher, Neal Devins Jan 1986

How Successfully Can The States' Item Veto Be Transferred To The President?, Louis Fisher, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The Constitution After Watergate, William F. Swindler Jul 1975

The Constitution After Watergate, William F. Swindler

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Allocation Of The War Powers Between The President And Congress: 1787-88, W. Taylor Reveley Iii Oct 1974

Constitutional Allocation Of The War Powers Between The President And Congress: 1787-88, W. Taylor Reveley Iii

Faculty Publications

For some time the international community has been keenly interested in the foreign uses to which America puts its military. The nature of these uses has traditionally been affected by the manner in which the Constitution divides the war powers between the President and Congress. This allocation of war-peace authority, in tum, is the product of a number of influences, among them the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers for the text which they drafted and approved. Their war-power debates, as we shall see, have heavy international overtones.These debates have not been neglected, especially during America's recent involvement in Indochina. …


President Nixon: Toughing It Out With The Law, William W. Van Alstyne Dec 1973

President Nixon: Toughing It Out With The Law, William W. Van Alstyne

Popular Media

No abstract provided.


Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative Or Usurpation?, W. Taylor Reveley Iii Jan 1969

Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative Or Usurpation?, W. Taylor Reveley Iii

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Of Executive And Judicial Powers Under The Constitutions Of Argentina And The United States, Alexander W. Weddell Jun 1937

A Comparison Of Executive And Judicial Powers Under The Constitutions Of Argentina And The United States, Alexander W. Weddell

James Goold Cutler Lecture

No abstract provided.


The Appointing And Removal Powers Of The President Under The Constitution Of The United States, Guy Despard Goff Nov 1931

The Appointing And Removal Powers Of The President Under The Constitution Of The United States, Guy Despard Goff

James Goold Cutler Lecture

No abstract provided.