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Constitutional Law

University of Washington School of Law

1986

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Compelling Testimony In Alaska: The Coming Rejection Of Use And Derivative Use Immunity, Jeff M. Feldman Jan 1986

Compelling Testimony In Alaska: The Coming Rejection Of Use And Derivative Use Immunity, Jeff M. Feldman

Articles

Until 1972, when the Supreme Court upheld a federal use andderivative use immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States, virtually every court that considered the issue of the compulsion of testimony favored transactional immunity. It appears that most courts interpreted the Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock as finding only transactional immunity constitutional. Since Kastigar, the Alaska Supreme Court has had several opportunities totake sides in the debate over the grant of immunity constitutionally required to compel testimony. On each such occasion, the court has expressed a preference for transactional immunity, but has carefullyavoided resolving the …


State Lending Of Credit—New Analysis Of State Constitutional Prohibitions—Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority V. Gardner, 103 Wn. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240 (1985), Carol Sue Hunting Jan 1986

State Lending Of Credit—New Analysis Of State Constitutional Prohibitions—Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority V. Gardner, 103 Wn. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240 (1985), Carol Sue Hunting

Washington Law Review

In Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority (WHEFA) v. Gardner, the Washington Supreme Court held that the issuance of nonrecourse bonds by WHEFA to finance building construction at private higher education institutions was permissible under article 8, section 5 of the Washington Constitution. The opinion rectifies earlier contrary decisions by making clear that the issuance of nonrecourse bonds is not constitutionally prohibited. The court, however, in reaching this conclusion, adopted a new literal interpretation of the constitutional language, which may restrict the court's future analysis of lending of credit issues by unnecessarily precluding policy considerations. Although the court's analysis adequately supported …