Law Commons^™

Rules And Standards In Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, Robert M. Bloom, Eliza S. Walker

University of Richmond Law Review

When looking at Justice Scalia’s approach to the Fourth Amendment, most would say he was an originalist and a textualist. Justice Scalia himself would like to explain, “I’m an originalist and a textualist, not a nut.” Although originalism and textualism were often prevalent in his Fourth Amendment decisions, even more important to his decision-making was his disdain for judicial activism. To limit judicial discretion, Justice Scalia frequently opted to impose bright-line rules rather than vague standards. This is apparent not only within his jurisprudence as a whole, but also specifically in his Fourth Amendment decisions.

This Article examines Justice Scalia’s …

Religious Exemptions As Rational Social Policy, Justin W. Aimonetti, M. Christian Talley

University of Richmond Law Review

In its 1963 decision Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to permit religious exemptions from general laws that incidentally burdened religious practice. Sherbert, in theory, provided stringent protections for religious freedom. But those protections came at a price. Religious adherents could secure exemptions even if they had no evidence the laws they challenged unfairly targeted their religious conduct. And they could thereby undermine the policy objectives those laws sought to achieve. Because of such policy concerns, the Court progressively restricted the availability of religious exemptions. In its 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith …

Proving The Constitution: Burdens Of Proof And The Confrontation Clause, Enrique Schaerer

University of Richmond Law Review

In law, we never prove anything to 100% certainty. For factual propositions, the proponent has the burden of proving them to the satisfaction of a standard: a preponderance of the evidence at the low end; clear and convincing evidence in the middle; proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the high end. The standards are often explicit. Yet, for legal propositions, standards are often implicit or lacking altogether. This Article argues that, to decide legal issues, courts may look to similar burdens of proof that they use to decide factual issues. They should do so informally, using burdens of proof just …

The Bivens "Special Factors" And Qualified Immunity: Duplicative Barriers To The Vindication Of Constitutional Rights, Amelia G. Collins

University of Richmond Law Review

Part I of this note traces the history of the Bivens cause of action and analyzes the original “special factors” that concerned the Supreme Court. Part I also outlines the purpose behind implying a Bivens cause of action for plaintiffs bringing constitutional claims. Part II includes the same analysis of the qualified immunity defense, both to its history and purpose. Part III demonstrates how the Supreme Court has incorporated the concerns addressed by qualified immunity into the “special factors” analysis, rather than acknowledging the mitigating nature of immunity defenses when examining if any “special factors” exist. Finally, Part IV argues …