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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
A Parent's Choice V. Governmental Regulations: A Bioethical Analysis In An Era Of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, Michael Gortakowski
A Parent's Choice V. Governmental Regulations: A Bioethical Analysis In An Era Of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, Michael Gortakowski
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Why Federalism And Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix, James A. Gardner
Why Federalism And Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix, James A. Gardner
Contributions to Books
Published as Chapter 4 in New Frontiers of State Constitutional Law: Dual Enforcement of Norms, James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, eds.
This chapter places the book's approach in its interpretational context by linking the federal structure of constitutional norm production to the ever-present problem of interpretational methodology. It begins by arguing that previous approaches to the interpretation of subnational constitutions have failed because they improperly attempted to apply the dominant jurisprudence of national constitutional interpretation—constitutional positivism—to the constitutions of the states. Yet constitutional positivism as a technique only makes sense where subnational units are autonomous, as independent nations are. …
The Dignity Of Voters—A Dissent, James A. Gardner
The Dignity Of Voters—A Dissent, James A. Gardner
Journal Articles
Since the waning days of the Burger Court, the federal judiciary has developed a generally well-deserved reputation for hostility to constitutional claims of individual right. In the field of democratic process, however, the Supreme Court has not only affirmed and expanded the applications of previously recognized rights, but has also regularly recognized new individual rights and deployed them with considerable vigor. The latest manifestation of this trend appears to be the emergence of a new species of vote dilution claim that recognizes a constitutionally grounded right against having one’s vote “cancelled out” by fraud or error in the casting and …
Beyond Torture: The Nemo Tenetur Principle In Borderline Cases, Luis E. Chiesa
Beyond Torture: The Nemo Tenetur Principle In Borderline Cases, Luis E. Chiesa
Journal Articles
In this article I examine three borderline cases in which it is not clear whether a confession had been obtained in violation of the nemo tenetur principle (i.e. the rights against self-incrimination and forced inculpation). The case of the false confession presents a situation in which a person made a voluntary confession but the overwhelming evidence pointed to the falsity of the statements. In contrast, the confession obtained in the case of the truth serum is of high probative value. However, it could be argued that the suspect did not voluntarily decide to incriminate himself, given that he confessed when …
Anti-Regulatory Absolutism In The Campaign Arena: Citizens United And The Implied Slippery Slope, James A. Gardner
Anti-Regulatory Absolutism In The Campaign Arena: Citizens United And The Implied Slippery Slope, James A. Gardner
Journal Articles
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Supreme Court’s constitutional campaign jurisprudence is its longstanding, profound hostility to virtually any government regulation whatsoever of campaign speech and spending. Such an approach is highly unusual in constitutional law, which typically tolerates at least some level of regulatory intervention even with respect to strongly protected rights. The Court’s behavior in this respect is consistent with – and, I argue, is best understood as – the kind of behavior in which a court engages when it fears a slide down a slippery slope. But what lies at the bottom of the slope? And …