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Full-Text Articles in Law

Obergefell V. Hodges: How The Supreme Court Should Have Ruled, Adam Lamparello Aug 2015

Obergefell V. Hodges: How The Supreme Court Should Have Ruled, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

In Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion legalizing same-sex marriage was based on “the mystical aphorisms of a fortune cookie,” and “indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.” Kennedy’s opinion was comprised largely of philosophical ramblings about liberty that have neither a constitutional foundation nor any conceptual limitation. The fictional opinion below arrives at the same conclusion, but the reasoning is based on equal protection rather than due process principles. The majority opinion holds that same-sex marriage bans violate the Equal Protection Clause because they: (1) discriminate on the basis of gender; (2) promote gender-based stereotypes; and …


Justice Kennedy's Decision In Obergefell: A Sad Day For The Judiciary, Adam Lamparello Jul 2015

Justice Kennedy's Decision In Obergefell: A Sad Day For The Judiciary, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

Same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marriage under the Equal Protection Clause, not under Justice Kennedy’s self-serving and ever-changing definition of liberty. The long-term impact of Kennedy’s decision will be to the Court’s institutional legitimacy. Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the legitimacy of this Court ultimately rests “upon the respect accorded to its judgments,” which is based on the perception—and reality—that we exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases according to the Constitution and law.” Justice Kennedy’s decision eschewed these values, giving the Court the power to discover “new dimensions of freedom,” and to ensure that all citizens, through …


From Reynolds To Lawrence To Brown V. Buhman: Antipolygamy Statutes Sliding On The Slippery Slope Of Same-Sex Marriage, Stephen L. Baskind Apr 2015

From Reynolds To Lawrence To Brown V. Buhman: Antipolygamy Statutes Sliding On The Slippery Slope Of Same-Sex Marriage, Stephen L. Baskind

Stephen L Baskind

In 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas (striking Texas’ sodomy law), Justice Scalia predicted in his dissent the end of all morals legislation. If Justice Scalia is correct most, if not all, morals-based legislation may fall. For example, in recent years state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage have fallen to constitutional challenges. Ten years after Lawrence in 2013, a Utah Federal District Court in Brown v. Buhman, though feeling constrained by the 1878 Reynolds case (which rejected a First Amendment challenge to an antipolygamy law), nevertheless at the request of a polygamous family concluded that the cohabitation prong of Utah’s anti-bigamy …


Justice-As-Fairness As Judicial Guiding Principle: Remembering John Rawls And The Warren Court, Michael Anthony Lawrence Mar 2015

Justice-As-Fairness As Judicial Guiding Principle: Remembering John Rawls And The Warren Court, Michael Anthony Lawrence

Michael Anthony Lawrence

This Article looks back to the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence during the years 1953-1969 when Earl Warren served as Chief Justice, a period marked by numerous landmark rulings in the areas of racial justice, criminal procedure, reproductive autonomy, First Amendment freedom of speech, association and religion, voting rights, and more. The Article further discusses the constitutional bases for the Warren Court’s decisions, principally the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process clauses.

The Article explains that the Warren Court’s equity-based jurisprudence closely resembles, at its root, the “justice-as-fairness” approach promoted in John Rawls’s monumental 1971 work, A Theory of …


Unreasonable Doubt: Warren Hill, Aedpa, And The Unconstitutionality Of Georgia's Reasonable Doubt Standard, Adam Lamparello Jan 2015

Unreasonable Doubt: Warren Hill, Aedpa, And The Unconstitutionality Of Georgia's Reasonable Doubt Standard, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

Georgia’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for determining intellectual disability has led to an absurd—and arbitrary—result. A Georgia state court held that defendant Warren Hill was intellectually disabled, yet still sentenced Hill to death. Seven experts—and the court—deemed Hill disabled under a preponderance of the evidence standard. He remains on death row, however, because Georgia’s “preposterous burden of proof” requires that intellectual disability be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard experts have said is nearly impossible to satisfy. It “effectively limits the constitutional right protected in Atkins,” and creates a conditional, not categorical, ban.


Hall V. Florida: The Death Of Georgia's Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Standard, Adam Lamparello Sep 2014

Hall V. Florida: The Death Of Georgia's Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Standard, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

Welcome: We’re Glad Georgia is On Your Mind.

Georgia is on many minds as Warren Hill prepares for a state court hearing to once again begin the process of trying to show that he is intellectually disabled. As Warren Hill continues to flirt with death, one must ask, is Georgia really going to execute someone that nine experts and a lower court twice found to be mentally retarded? The answer is yes, and the Georgia courts do not understand why we are scratching our heads. The answer is simple: executing an intellectually disabled man is akin to strapping a ten-year …


Immigrants Unshackled: The Unconstitutional Use Of Indiscriminate Restraints, Fatma E. Marouf Aug 2014

Immigrants Unshackled: The Unconstitutional Use Of Indiscriminate Restraints, Fatma E. Marouf

Fatma E Marouf

This Article challenges the constitutionality of indiscriminately restraining civil immigration detainees during removal proceedings. Not only are immigration detainees routinely placed in handcuffs, leg irons, and belly chains without any individualized determination of the need for restraints, but Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the prosecuting party, makes the decisions about the use of restraints, rather than the judge. After examining the rationale for the well-established prohibition against the indiscriminate use of restraints during criminal and civil jury trials, and discussing how some courts have extended this rationale to bench trials, this Article contends that ICE’s practice violates substantive and procedural …


Brief Of Amici Curiae -- Heien V. State Of North Carolina, Charles E. Maclean, Adam Lamparello Jun 2014

Brief Of Amici Curiae -- Heien V. State Of North Carolina, Charles E. Maclean, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

Reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity cannot be predicated on conduct that does not violate the law. Put differently, if reasonableness — or reasonable suspicion — is to mean anything, it means that apparent violations of the law must be based on actual violations of the law. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision sends a message to drivers throughout the country that they cannot be wrong about what the law requires, even where law enforcement is wrong — dead wrong — about what the law proscribes.


Homeschooling As A Constitutional Right: A Claim Under A Close Look At Meyer And Pierce And The Lochner-Based Assumptions They Made About State Regulatory Power, David M. Wagner Feb 2014

Homeschooling As A Constitutional Right: A Claim Under A Close Look At Meyer And Pierce And The Lochner-Based Assumptions They Made About State Regulatory Power, David M. Wagner

David N. Wagner

In 2012, a German family of would-be homeschoolers, the Romeikes, fled to the U.S. to escape fines and child removal for this practice, which has been illegal in Germany since 1938. The Sixth Circuit, in denying their asylum request, conspicuously did not slam the door on the possibility that if the Romeikes were U.S. citizens, they might have a right to homeschool. This article takes up that question, and argues that Meyer and Pierce, the classic cases constitutionalizing the right to use private schools, point beyond those holdings towards a right to homeschool; and that the permissible state regulations on …


Montes-Lopez V. Holder: Applying Eldridge To Ensure A Per Se Right To Counsel For Indigent Immigrants In Removal Proceedings, Soulmaz Taghavi Jan 2014

Montes-Lopez V. Holder: Applying Eldridge To Ensure A Per Se Right To Counsel For Indigent Immigrants In Removal Proceedings, Soulmaz Taghavi

Soulmaz Taghavi

Part I of this Comment reviews the historical and current state of procedural due process and its role in Immigration Law, specifically removal proceedings. Part II extends certain legal arguments in the opinion of Montes-Lopez v. Holder, which held among divided federal Circuit Courts that an immigrant in removal proceedings has a statutory and constitutional right to appointed counsel. Last, Part III demonstrates how a non-citizen in deportation hearing has a per se right to counsel outlined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and brought to life by the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.


Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium, Adam Lamparello Jan 2014

Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

In areas such as the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's lack of institutional restraint has affected citizens of every political persuasion. In Bush v. Gore, the Florida Supreme Court’s recount order was blocked. ‘Liberals,’ lost. In Roe v. Wade, the Court required state legislatures to allow most abortions in the first trimester. ‘Conservatives’ lost. In Clinton v. City of New York and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the coordinate branch’s attempt to ensure a more efficient and fairer government was thwarted. Average citizens lost. The problem is not a liberal or conservative one, whatever those words mean. It is …


The Risky Interplay Of Tort And Criminal Law: Punitive Damages, Daniel M. Braun Jan 2013

The Risky Interplay Of Tort And Criminal Law: Punitive Damages, Daniel M. Braun

Daniel M Braun

The rise of modern mass tort litigation in the U.S. has transformed punitive damages into something of a “hot button” issue. Since the size of punitive damage awards grew so dramatically in the past half century, this private law remedy has begun to involve issues of constitutional rights that traditionally pertained to criminal proceedings. This has created a risky interplay between tort and criminal law, and courts have thus been trying to find ways to properly manage punitive damage awards. The once rapidly expanding universe of punitive damages is therefore beginning to contract. There remain, however, very serious difficulties. Despite …


Amicus Brief: State V. Glover (Maine Supreme Judicial Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean Jan 2013

Amicus Brief: State V. Glover (Maine Supreme Judicial Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean

Adam Lamparello

When law enforcement seeks to obtain a warrantless, pre-arrest DNA sample from an individual, that individual has the right to say “No.” If silence is to become a “badge of guilt,” then the right to silence—under the United States and Maine Constitutions—might become a thing of the past. Allowing jurors to infer consciousness of guilt from a pre-arrest DNA sample violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States and Maine Constitutions.


Defenseless Self-Defense: An Essay On Goldberg And Zipursky's Civil Recourse Defended, Alan Calnan Jan 2013

Defenseless Self-Defense: An Essay On Goldberg And Zipursky's Civil Recourse Defended, Alan Calnan

Alan Calnan

In a recent symposium published by the Indiana Law Journal, Professors John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky offer a spirited defense of their theory of civil recourse, which sees the tort system exclusively as a means of empowering victims of wrongs. This essay assails that defense, finding it curiously defenseless in three related respects. First, civil recourse’s key tenets are particularly vulnerable to criticism because they are quietly reductive, inscrutably vague, and highly unstable. Second, even in its most coherent form, civil recourse theory literally lacks any meaningful explanation of the defensive rights at play within the tort system. …


Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right To Appointed Counsel For Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, Mark Noferi Jan 2012

Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right To Appointed Counsel For Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, Mark Noferi

Mark L Noferi

When a Department of Homeland Security officer mandatorily detains a green card holder without bail pending his removal proceedings, for a minor crime committed perhaps long ago, the immigrant’s life takes a drastic turn. If he contests his case, he likely will remain incarcerated in substandard conditions for months or years, often longer than for his original crime, and be unable to acquire a lawyer, access family whom might assist, or access key evidence or witnesses. In these circumstances, it is all but certain he will lose his deportation case, sometimes wrongfully, and be banished abroad from work, family, and …


Back To The Future: Discovery Cost Allocation And Modern Procedural Theory, Martin H. Redish, Colleen Mcnamara Jan 2010

Back To The Future: Discovery Cost Allocation And Modern Procedural Theory, Martin H. Redish, Colleen Mcnamara

Martin H Redish

It has long been established that as a general rule, discovery costs are to remain with the party from whom discovery has been sought. While courts have authority to "shift" costs in an individual instance, the presumption against such an alteration in traditional practice is quite strong. Yet at no point did the drafters of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ever make an explicit decision to allocate discovery costs in this manner. Nor, apparently, did they (or anyone since) ever explain why such an allocation choice is to be made in the first place. As a result, our …


The Little Word "Due", Andrew T. Hyman Jan 2005

The Little Word "Due", Andrew T. Hyman

Andrew T. Hyman

The meaning of the Due Process Clause is investigated, with special emphasis on the little word "due." The author concludes that the text and structure of the Constitution --- as well as the intentions of the framers --- strongly support the view of the late Justice Hugo Black regarding the meaning of this Clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In the Constitution, due process means process due according to the law of the land, and a statute is part of the law of the land if it does not violate or undermine any other provision of the Constitution. Thus, …


In Search Of Clemency Procedures We Can Live With: What Process Is Due In Capital Clemency Proceedings After Ohio Adult Parole Authority V. Woodard?, Brian S. Clarke Jan 1998

In Search Of Clemency Procedures We Can Live With: What Process Is Due In Capital Clemency Proceedings After Ohio Adult Parole Authority V. Woodard?, Brian S. Clarke

Brian S. Clarke

The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari for the final time. All state and federal appeals have been exhausted. The execution date has been set. There is only one thing that can save the death row inmate from the ultimate punishment: the proverbial call from the governor and a grant of executive clemency.

This scene, although a veritable Hollywood cliche, is being played out in prisons across America with increasing frequency. As of July 1, 1998, there were 3,474 men and women on death row in America. In 1996, with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty …