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Constitutional Law

Notre Dame Law School

Statutory interpretation

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Revisiting The Fried Chicken Recipe, Zachary B. Pohlman Dec 2022

Revisiting The Fried Chicken Recipe, Zachary B. Pohlman

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Twenty-five years ago, Gary Lawson introduced us to legal theory’s tastiest analogy. He told us about a late-eighteenth-century recipe for making fried chicken and how we ought to interpret it. Lawson’s pithy essay has much to be praised. Yet, even twenty-five years later, there remains more to be said about legal theory’s most famous recipe. In particular, there remains much more to be said about the recipe’s author, a person (or, perhaps, group of people) whom Lawson does not discuss. Lawson’s analysis of the recipe leads him to an “obvious” conclusion: the recipe’s meaning is its original public meaning. If …


Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia May 2017

Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia

Journal Articles

In the realm of Federal Courts, the question of “implied rights of action” asks when, if ever, may a plaintiff bring a federal right of action for the violation of a federal statute that does not expressly create one. Justice Scalia argued that a court should not entertain an action for damages for the violation of a federal statute unless the text of the statute demonstrates that Congress meant to create a right of action. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority. Certain judges and scholars have argued …


On Viewing The Courts As Junior Partners Of Congress In Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating The Scholarship Of Daniel J. Meltzer, Richard H. Fallon Jr Oct 2016

On Viewing The Courts As Junior Partners Of Congress In Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating The Scholarship Of Daniel J. Meltzer, Richard H. Fallon Jr

Notre Dame Law Review

In this Essay, written in tribute to Dan Meltzer, I shall attempt to explicate his views regarding statutory interpretation in general, thematic terms. In doing so, I shall register my agreement with virtually all of Dan’s conclusions and frequently echo his practically minded arguments in support of them. But I shall also advance arguments—with which I cannot be entirely sure he would have agreed—that seek to show that his position reflected theoretical insights about how language works, not only in law, but also more generally in life. By seeking simultaneously to defend Dan’s views and to build on them, this …


Foreign Relations As A Matter Of Interpretation: The Use And Abuse Of Charming Betsy, Roger P. Alford Jan 2006

Foreign Relations As A Matter Of Interpretation: The Use And Abuse Of Charming Betsy, Roger P. Alford

Journal Articles

Charming Betsy is a canon of construction that construes legislative enactments consistent with the law of nations. This canon promotes the passive virtue of avoiding constitutional problems by eschewing potential international law violations through statutory interpretation, thereby enhancing the United States' performance in foreign affairs. As a rule of separation of powers, Charming Betsy helps explain how foreign relations concerns clarify the scope of legislative, executive, and judicial authority. But when advocates contend that the Constitution likewise should be read through the lens of Charming Betsy, they abuse the doctrine by ignoring its purpose. While structural guarantees that relate to …


Direct Democracy And Hastily Enacted Statutes, John C. Nagle Jan 1996

Direct Democracy And Hastily Enacted Statutes, John C. Nagle

Journal Articles

Phil Frickey qualifies as the leading explorer of the borderline between statutory interpretation and constitutional law. Frickey explores ways to mediate the borderline between statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication in the context of direct democracy. His is an enormously helpful attempt to reconcile the constitutional issues discussed by Julian Eule and the statutory interpretation issues discussed by Jane Schacter. I agree with many of Frickey's suggestions. Indeed, I will suggest some additional devices that can perform the same role. But I wonder whether Frickey has proved more than he set out to accomplish. The problems of direct democracy are special, …