Law Commons^™

The Compensation Constraint And The Scope Of The Takings Clause, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The idea I wish to explore in this Essay is whether the established methods for determining just compensation can shed light on the meaning of other issues that arise in litigation under the Takings Clause. Specifically, is it possible to “reverse engineer” the Takings Clause by reasoning from settled understandings about how to determine just compensation in order to reach certain conclusions about when the Clause applies, what interests in private property are covered by the Clause, and what does it mean to take such property?

The proposed exercise is positive or descriptive in nature rather than normative. The hypothesis …

Abolishing The Time Tax On Voting, Elora Mukherjee

Faculty Scholarship

A “time tax” is a government policy or practice that forces one citizen to pay more in time to vote compared with her fellow citizens. While few have noticed the scope of the problem, data indicate that, due primarily to long lines, hundreds of thousands if not millions of voters are routinely unable to vote in national elections as a result of the time tax, and that the problem disproportionately affects minority voters and voters in the South. This Article documents the problem and offers a roadmap for legal and political strategies for solving it. The Article uses as a …

Hands Off: When And About What, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

I was very pleased to have the chance to comment on these four thoughtful and challenging papers when they were delivered orally at the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Convention in January, and I am glad to have the opportunity to share some of my unsystematic thoughts about their published versions. I begin with two general observations before addressing the individual essays in turn.

When I came up with the phrase "Hands Off' to liven the title of my article on judicial resolutions of property disputes generated by splits in religious groups, I had not reflected on the wide …

The Perils Of Theory, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

As I recall, Professor Clark had more sense than to be my student at Columbia, but I heard a lot about him from admiring colleagues. Clearly he has fulfilled the promise they saw, and this remarkable Symposium is only one indicator of that. The article to which our attention is properly drawn, more than two and a quarter centuries into our nation's history, has an originalist base, tightly and persuasively focused on original understandings of the Supremacy Clause. Professor Clark lays out a cogent account of the Clause's politics and the centrality of its language to the most fundamental of …

Diverse Perspectives And The Religion Clauses: An Examination Of Justifications And Qualifying Beliefs, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Some of the most complex questions about constitutional provisions governing religion concern the status of various kinds of convictions. Put most simply, how do undoubted religious convictions compare with convictions that appear to have little to do with religion, with convictions that derive from negative answers to religious questions, and with convictions that seem to be on some borderline of what may count as religion? In this Essay, I focus on two kinds of questions about this range of convictions.

Part I of the Essay explores justifications underlying the religion clauses of federal and state constitutions. It asks how explicitly …

Reading Holmes Through The Lens Of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, Vincent A. Blasi

Faculty Scholarship

Even the best scholars rarely persuade. Mostly, they illuminate. They make us more discerning readers and interlocutors.

Here I want to illustrate how Frederick Schauer's work on the law of free speech can help us to read what may be the single most influential judicial opinion ever written on that subject, Justice Holmes's famous dissent in Abrams v. United States. So far as I am aware, Schauer has not produced anything like a line-by-line parsing of the Holmes opinion. I claim nevertheless that a reader familiar with Schauer's ideas is far better prepared on that account to understand what Holmes …

Trivial Rights, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

In the summer of 1789, when the House of Representatives was formulating the amendments that became the Bill of Rights, Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued against enumerating the right of assembly. The House, he urged, "might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they might have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased, that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper ... [Was] it necessary to list these trifles in a declaration of rights, under a Government where none of them were …