Law Commons^™

The Neuroscience Of Qualified Immunity, Gary S. Gildin

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Qualified immunity not only absolves public officials from accountability for the damages caused when they deprive a citizen of their constitutional rights; by virtue of companion doctrines shielding governmental entities from liability, conferral of immunity leaves the victim to bear the loss. Therefore, it is essential that the contours of immunity be carefully calibrated to align with its intended purposes.

The United States Supreme Court has continuously expanded immunity to protect the exercise of discretion where, albeit acting in violation of constitutional norms, the official could have reasonably believed their conduct was constitutional. This Article exposes the implicit assumptions as …

The Demise Of The Bivens Remedy Is Rendering Enforcement Of Federal Constitutional Rights Inequitable But Congress Can Fix It, Henry Rose

Faculty Publications & Other Works

A federal statute, 42 U.S.C. 1983, allows a person whose federal constitutional rights are violated by state actors to sue them for damages to compensate for the harm caused by the constitutional violations. There is no analogous federal statute that allows a person whose federal constitutional rights have been violated by federal actors to sue them for damages to compensate for the harm caused by the constitutional violations. The United States Supreme Court allowed Webster Bivens, a man who sued federal law enforcement officials for falsely arresting and physically abusing him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, to sue …

Recovering The Tort Remedy For Federal Official Wrongdoing, Gregory Sisk

Notre Dame Law Review

As the Supreme Court weakens the Bivens constitutional tort cause of action and federal officers avoid liability for unlawful behavior through qualified immunity, we should recollect the merit of the common-law tort remedy for holding the federal government accountable for official wrongdoing. For more than a century after ratification of the Constitution, federal officers who trespassed on the rights of American citizens could be held personally liable under common-law tort theories, but then routinely were indemnified by the government.

The modern Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) roughly replicates the original regime for official wrongdoing by imposing liability directly on the …

The Inconsistent Originalism Of Judge-Made Remedies Against Federal Officers, Stephen I. Vladeck

Notre Dame Law Review

Professor Carlos V´azquez and I have explained in depth why the Supreme Court’s evisceration of damages remedies for constitutional violations by federal officers is analytically and historically incoherent. And I have written elsewhere about the extent to which modern constitutional remedies doctrine has turned a remarkably blind eye to foundational principles of federalism—paying little more than lip service to the robust availability of common-law damages (and habeas) remedies against federal officers in state courts from the Founding through the Civil War—and, at least for damages, well into the twentieth century. I don’t mean to rehash (or relitigate) either argument here. …

Lessons For Bivens And Qualified Immunity Debates From Nineteenth-Century Damages Litigation Against Federal Officers, Andrew Kent

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay was written for a symposium marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. As the current Court has turned against Bivens—seemingly confining it to three specific contexts created by Bivens and two follow-on decisions in 1979 and 1980—scholars and litigants have developed a set of claims to respond to the Court’s critique. The Court now views the judicially created Bivens cause of action and remedy as a separation-of-powers foul; Congress is said to be the institution which should weigh the costs and benefits …

Was Bivens Necessary?, Ann Woolhandler, Michael G. Collins

Notre Dame Law Review

Some federal common-law skeptics have provided criteria for keeping federal common law in check. Although not specifically addressing Bivensactions, Professor Nelson has argued that when engaged in federal common lawmaking, federal courts should see themselves as more tied to custom, general principles of the common law, and precedent, rather than seeing themselves as engaged in a freewheeling search for the best policy. This methodology makes federal common law less subject to criticism as usurping the lawmaking roles of other government actors. Professor Merrill has argued that federal common law needs to be specifically intended by the framers of a …

Bivens And The Ancien Régime, Carlos M. Vázquez

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay considers the relevance for Bivens claims of the Court’s shift to a nouveau régime to address the implication of private rights of action under statutes. Part I describes and assesses the Court’s reasons for shifting to the nouveau régime in the statutory context. Part II explains why the Court’s shift to a nouveau régime for implying damage remedies under federal statutes does not justify a similar shift with respect to constitutional remedies. The Constitution’s omission of specific remedies for violation of the Constitution’s substantive provisions does not reflect the Founders’ belief that such remedies are unnecessary to give …

Stare Decisis As Authority And Aspiration, Randy J. Kozel

Notre Dame Law Review

The doctrine of stare decisis remains a defining feature of American law despite challenges to its legitimacy and efficacy. Even so, there is space between the role that stare decisis currently plays and the potential that it offers. The gap is evident in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. Though the Justices continue to underscore the fundamental status of stare decisis, the Court’s opinions sometimes seem quick to depart from precedents whose reasoning has fallen out of favor.

Using Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents as a case study, this Article explains how the Court can invigorate the doctrine …

A Scapegoat Theory Of Bivens, Katherine M. Crocker

Notre Dame Law Review

Some scapegoats are innocent. Some warrant blame, but not the amount they are made to bear. Either way, scapegoating can allow in-groups to sidestep social problems by casting blame onto out-groups instead of confronting such problems—and the in-groups’ complicity in perpetuating them—directly.

This Essay suggests that it may be productive to view the Bivens regime’s rise as countering various exercises in scapegoating and its retrenchment as constituting an exercise in scapegoating. The earlier cases can be seen as responding to social structures that have scapegoated racial, economic, and other groups through overaggressive policing, mass incarceration, and inequitable government conduct more …

Going Rogue: The Supreme Court's Newfound Hostility To Policy-Based Bivens Claims, Joanna C. Schwartz, Alexander Reinert, James E. Pfander

Notre Dame Law Review

In Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), the Supreme Court held that a proposed Bivens remedy was subject to an exacting special factors analysis when the claim arises in a “new context.” In Ziglar itself, the Court found the context of the plaintiffs’ claims to be “new” because, in the Court’s view, they challenged “large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners.” Bivens claims for damages caused by unconstitutional policies, the Court suggested, were inappropriate.

This Essay critically examines the Ziglar Court’s newfound hostility to policy-based Bivens claims. We show that an …

Equity In American And Jewish Law, Itzchak E. Kornfeld , Ph.D.

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Title Ix And Title Vii: Parallel Remedies In Combatting Sex Discrimination In Educational Employment, Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt

Marquette Law Review

The federal circuit courts of appeals are divided over the proper relationship between Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments Act of 1972 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the federal courts disagree over whether an employee of an educational institution may sue her employer for employment discrimination under either Title IX or Title VII. Some courts have concluded that these employees may not bring employment discrimination claims under Title IX, holding that Title VII provides the sole avenue for obtaining monetary relief for employment discrimination against educational institutions. Other courts have reached the opposite …

Who Determines What Is Egregious? Judge Or Jury: Enhanced Damages After Halo V. Pulse, Brandon M. Reed

Georgia State University Law Review

Enhanced damages in patent law are a type of punitive damage that can be awarded in the case of “egregious misconduct” during the course of patent infringement. Authorization for enhanced damages comes from 35 U.S.C. § 284, which allows the district court to increase total damages up to three times the amount of actual damages found by the jury. It is well understood that, since enhanced damages are punitive in nature, enhancement should only be considered for cases of “wanton” or “deliberate” infringement. However, determining what constitutes this “egregious” misconduct has vastly transformed over time to include a negligence standard, …

Qualified Immunity After Ziglar V. Abbasi: The Case For A Categorical Approach, Michael Wells

Scholarly Works

Qualified immunity protects officers from liability for damages unless they have violated clearly established rights, on the ground that it would be unfair and counterproductive to impose liability without notice of wrongdoing. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly applied the doctrine to cases in which it serves little or no legitimate purpose. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, for example, the rights were clearly established but the Court held that the officers were immune due to lack of clarity on other issues in the case. Because holdings like Ziglar undermine the vindication of constitutional rights and the deterrence of …

Suing The President For First Amendment Violations, Sonja R. West

Scholarly Works

On any given day, it seems, President Donald Trump can be found attacking, threatening, or punishing the press and other individuals whose speech he dislikes. His actions, moreover, inevitably raise the question: Do any of these individuals or organizations (or any future ones) have a viable claim against the President for violating their First Amendment rights?

One might think that the ability to sue the President for violation of the First Amendment would be relatively settled. The answer, however, is not quite that straightforward. Due to several unique qualities about the First Amendment and the presidency, it is not entirely …

Rwu First Amendment Blog: David Logan's Blog: Moguls And The Media 1-2-2017, David A. Logan, Roger Williams University

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Freedom Of Speech And The Criminal Law, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

Because the Free Speech Clause limits government power to enact penal statutes, it has a close relationship to American criminal law. This Article explores that relationship at a time when a fast-growing “decriminalization movement” has taken hold across the nation. At the heart of the Article is the idea that free speech law has developed in ways that have positioned the Supreme Court to use that law to impose significant new limits on the criminalization of speech. More particularly, this article claims that the Court has developed three distinct decision-making strategies for decriminalizing speech based on constitutional principles. The first …

It Is Time For Washington State To Take A Stand Against Holmes's Bad Man: The Value Of Punitive Damages In Deterring Big Business And International Tortfeasors, Jackson Pahlke

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In Washington State, tortfeasors get a break when they commit intentional torts. Instead of receiving more punishment for their planned bad act, intentional tortfeasors are punished as if they committed a mere accident. The trend does not stop in Washington State—nationwide, punitive damage legislation inadequately deters intentional wrongdoers through caps and outright bans on punitive damages. Despite Washington State’s one hundred and twenty-five year ban on punitive damages, it is in a unique and powerful position to change the way courts across the country deal with intentional tortfeasors. Since Washington has never had a comprehensive punitive damages framework, and has …

Brief Of Restitution And Remedies Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent: Spokeo V. Robins, Doug Rendleman, Douglas Laycock, Mark P. Gergen

Mark P. Gergen

Both consumer protection and restitution may be casualties in a collision with the constitutional law of standing. Spokeo collects information from the internet and publishes it; however, Spokeo neither verifies the facts nor confirms which same-named person it refers to. Robins alleges that Spokeo violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by disseminating false information about him. He seeks class certification and up to $1,000 in statutory minimum damages instead of compensatory damages. Spokeo argues that Robins lacks standing because he suffered no “injury in fact,” no “concrete harm.” Statutory minimum recoveries for defendants’ violations of plaintiffs’ individual rights without proof …

Brief Of Restitution And Remedies Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent: Spokeo V. Robins, Doug Rendleman, Douglas Laycock, Mark P. Gergen

Doug Rendleman

Both consumer protection and restitution may be casualties in a collision with the constitutional law of standing. Spokeo collects information from the internet and publishes it; however, Spokeo neither verifies the facts nor confirms which same-named person it refers to. Robins alleges that Spokeo violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by disseminating false information about him. He seeks class certification and up to $1,000 in statutory minimum damages instead of compensatory damages. Spokeo argues that Robins lacks standing because he suffered no “injury in fact,” no “concrete harm.” Statutory minimum recoveries for defendants’ violations of plaintiffs’ individual rights without proof …

Brief Of Restitution And Remedies Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent: Spokeo V. Robins, Doug Rendleman, Douglas Laycock, Mark P. Gergen

Scholarly Articles

Both consumer protection and restitution may be casualties in a collision with the constitutional law of standing.

Spokeo collects information from the internet and publishes it; however, Spokeo neither verifies the facts nor confirms which same-named person it refers to. Robins alleges that Spokeo violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by disseminating false information about him. He seeks class certification and up to $1,000 in statutory minimum damages instead of compensatory damages. Spokeo argues that Robins lacks standing because he suffered no “injury in fact,” no “concrete harm.”

Statutory minimum recoveries for defendants’ violations of plaintiffs’ individual rights without proof …

Appellate Division, Second Department, Langan V. St. Vincent's Hospital Of New York, Christin Harris

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation From The October 2006 Term, Martin Schwartz

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.

Punitive Damages: An Exception To The Right Of Privacy? Coy V. Superior Court, Richard S. Fields

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

La Interseccion De La Responsabilidad Extracontractual Y El Derecho Constitucional Y Los Derechos Humanos, George C. Christie

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Brief Of Reporter And Advisers To Restatement (Third) Restitution And Unjust Enrichment, As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent, Doug Rendleman, Douglas Laycock

Doug Rendleman

Restitution may be a casualty in a collision with the constitutional law of standing. Article III is traditionally said to require an “injury in fact” for standing to be a plaintiff in federal court. Edwards, who alleges that First American paid a bribe or kickback in violation of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, seeks to recover the statutory penalty. Defendant argues that even if it violated the Act, Edwards suffered no “injury in fact.” Our amicus brief in support of Edwards alerts the Supreme Court to the many restitutionary claims either for a wrongdoer’s profits or to set …

Rethinking Principals Of Comparative Fault In Light Of California's Proposition 51, James A. Gash

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Brief Of Reporter And Advisers To Restatement (Third) Restitution And Unjust Enrichment, As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent, Doug Rendleman, Douglas Laycock

Scholarly Articles

Restitution may be a casualty in a collision with the constitutional law of standing. Article III is traditionally said to require an “injury in fact” for standing to be a plaintiff in federal court. Edwards, who alleges that First American paid a bribe or kickback in violation of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, seeks to recover the statutory penalty. Defendant argues that even if it violated the Act, Edwards suffered no “injury in fact.” Our amicus brief in support of Edwards alerts the Supreme Court to the many restitutionary claims either for a wrongdoer’s profits or to set …

Wrongful Conviction Claims Under Section 1983, Martin A. Schwartz, Robert W. Pratt Honorable

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Wrongful Conviction Claims Under Section 1983, Martin A. Schwartz, Robert W. Pratt

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.