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Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Nonpublic Reasons And Political Paradigm Change, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2011

Nonpublic Reasons And Political Paradigm Change, Ian C. Bartrum

Scholarly Works

John Rawls famously argued that citizens in a just democracy have a moral duty to ensure that "the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason." This so-called "duty of civility" obligates us to cast our votes on "constitutional questions and matters of basic justice" for reasons that we can explain in terms of the public good and the "ideals and principles expressed by society's conception of political justice." Rawls contrasts these public reasons with "nonpublic reasons" - such as "comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines" - which he claims cannot …


Rethinking Self-Incrimination, Voluntariness, And Coercion, Through A Perspective Of Jewish Law And Legal Theory, Samuel J. Levine Jan 2011

Rethinking Self-Incrimination, Voluntariness, And Coercion, Through A Perspective Of Jewish Law And Legal Theory, Samuel J. Levine

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.


Two Kinds Of Plain Meaning, Victoria Nourse Jan 2011

Two Kinds Of Plain Meaning, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Is plain meaning so plain? This is not meant to be a philosophical question, but one deserving serious legal analysis. The plain-meaning rule claims to provide certainty and narrow statutes' domains. The author agrees with, as a relative claim, comparing plain meaning with purposivism. She does not agree that plain-meaning analysis is as easy as its proponents suggest. In this piece, the author teases out two very different ideas of plain meaning--ordinary/popular meaning and expansive/legalist meaning--suggesting that doctrinal analysis requires more than plain-meaning simpliciter. Perhaps more importantly, she argues that plain meaning, as legalist meaning, can quite …