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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Voice Of Reason—Why Recent Judicial Interpretations Of The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act’S Restrictions On Habeas Corpus Are Wrong, Judith L. Ritter
The Voice Of Reason—Why Recent Judicial Interpretations Of The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act’S Restrictions On Habeas Corpus Are Wrong, Judith L. Ritter
Judith L Ritter
By filing a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, a prisoner initiates a legal proceeding collateral to the direct appeals process. Federal statutes set forth the procedure and parameters of habeas corpus review. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) first signed into law by President Clinton in 1996, included significant cut-backs in the availability of federal writs of habeas corpus. This was by congressional design. Yet, despite the dire predictions, for most of the first decade of AEDPA’s reign, the door to habeas relief remained open. More recently, however, the Supreme Court reinterpreted a key portion …
Beyond Breard, Erik G. Luna, Douglas J. Sylvester
Partially Concurrent Sentences, Statutory Interpretation, And Legislative Intent: Amicus Brief Filed In State V. Bryant Wilson (Indiana Supreme Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean
Partially Concurrent Sentences, Statutory Interpretation, And Legislative Intent: Amicus Brief Filed In State V. Bryant Wilson (Indiana Supreme Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean
Adam Lamparello
Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2 states that terms of imprisonment “shall be served concurrently or consecutively.” The Code’s plain language does not authorize courts to impose partially consecutive, blended, or “split sentences. Partially consecutive sentences would impermissibly read into the Code a third sentencing option, thus contradicting Indiana’s well-settled jurisprudence and undermining the goal of reasonable uniformity in sentencing. The decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals should therefore be reversed.
Amicus Brief: State V. Glover (Maine Supreme Judicial Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean
Amicus Brief: State V. Glover (Maine Supreme Judicial Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean
Adam Lamparello
When law enforcement seeks to obtain a warrantless, pre-arrest DNA sample from an individual, that individual has the right to say “No.” If silence is to become a “badge of guilt,” then the right to silence—under the United States and Maine Constitutions—might become a thing of the past. Allowing jurors to infer consciousness of guilt from a pre-arrest DNA sample violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States and Maine Constitutions.
The Right To Quantitative Privacy, David C. Gray, Danielle Keats Citron
The Right To Quantitative Privacy, David C. Gray, Danielle Keats Citron
Danielle Keats Citron
We are at the cusp of a historic shift in our conceptions of the Fourth Amendment driven by dramatic advances in surveillance technology. Governments and their private sector agents continue to invest billions of dollars in massive data-mining projects, advanced analytics, fusion centers, and aerial drones, all without serious consideration of the constitutional issues that these technologies raise. In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court signaled an end to its silent acquiescence in this expanding surveillance state. In that case, five justices signed concurring opinions defending a revolutionary proposition: that citizens have Fourth Amendment interests in substantial quantities of …