Law Commons^™

An Originalist Approach To Puerto Rico: Arguments Against The Status Quo, Micah Allred

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Few originalists have grappled with a fundamental question about Puerto Rico: whether the Constitution permits the United States to hold the island indefinitely as nonstate territory. There are reasons to doubt that it does. The main purpose of the Constitution’s territorial provisions was to allow Congress to transition the then West-ern Territory into states. And, as a structural matter, Congress’s direct authority over Puerto Ricans conflicts with important constitutional principles such as federalism. But for originalists, arguments from purpose and structure are helpful only insofar as they elucidate the original meaning of the Constitution’s text. This Article lays out two …

The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein

Georgia Law Review

Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …

The Mad Hatter’S Quip: Looking For Logic In The Independent State Legislature Theory, Nicholas Maggio, Foreword By Brendan Buschi

Touro Law Review

The Supreme Court is set to hear a case that threatens the bedrock of America’s democracy, and it is not clear how it will shake out. The cumbersomely named “Independent State Legislature Theory” is at the heart of the case Moore v. Harper, which is before the Supreme Court this term. The theory holds that state legislatures should be free from the ordinary bounds of state judicial review when engaged in matters that concern federal elections. Despite being defeated a myriad of times at the Supreme Court, the latest challenge stems from a legal battle over North Carolina’s redistricting maps. …

An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …

Serving Only To Oppress: An Intersectional And Critical Race Analysis Of Constitutional Originalism Inflicting Harm, Ethan Dawson

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

“[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.” - Justice Anthony Kennedy, Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

This Note will first focus on a historical analysis of originalist constitutional interpretation, drawing attention to initial disparities in the Constitution incompatible with our current social context. It will discuss modern originalism as a method of perpetuating systemic shortcomings, drawing specific attention to originalist interpretation as a method of oppression against white women and people of color, specifically Black women. In analyzing the harm originalism does to …

Book Review: Rearranging The Apple Cart: Good-Faith Originalism And The Fourteenth Amendment, Daniel Coble

ConLawNOW

This essay reviews the book by Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit (2021). Ask any constitutional law professor about how judges should or do interpret the Constitution, and you will likely hear an answer that ends in “ism.” In their latest book, Professors Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick discuss an “ism” that is found in our nation’s highest court, state courts, and academia: originalism. No matter which constitutional interpretation “ism” that one follows, this book provides an intimate and historical view of what two leading originalist scholars believe is the …

The Fourth Amendment In A Digital Age: Defining Boundaries In Law Enforcement Surveillance Of The Home, Josh Hoffman, Jared Xia

Brigham Young University Prelaw Review

As our country enters a new digital age, emerging technologies have increased the ability of law enforcement to monitor American citizens more closely. The tracking of suspects through thermal imaging, video monitoring, and cell phone GPSs are just a few examples of the unlocked potential now available to investigating authorities. When directed at the home, these technologies allow for unprecedented encroachment of our most intimate sphere of daily life. With this accelerating prevalence of technology in surveillance practices comes the need to reassess what boundaries the Fourth Amendment defines for our privacy. This paper explores the application of the Reasonable …

Is History Repeating Itself? The Role Of The Supreme Court In Protecting Minority Rights, Alyssa Fox, Annabelle Crawford

Brigham Young University Prelaw Review

Throughout history, the role of the Supreme Court has been debated. Some individuals argue for strict interpretation of the Constitution, while others argue that the ideals of the Constitution should be prioritized. Landmark cases decided by the Supreme Court demonstrate the shift between the protection of state sovereignty and minority rights. This article argues that the Supreme Court is responsible to intervene on behalf of minority and historically-disadvantaged groups when their rights are threatened or infringed upon by state and federal governments.

Constitutional Text, Founding Era History, And The Independent-State-Legislature Theory, Dan T. Coenen

Georgia Law Review

One question raised by proponents of the so-called independent-state-legislature theory concerns the extent to which state courts can apply state constitutional requirements to invalidate state laws that concern federal elections. According to one proposed application of the theory, state courts can never subject such laws to state-constitution-based judicial review. According to another application, federal courts can broadly, though not invariably, foreclose state courts from drawing on state constitutions to invalidate federal-election-related state legislation. This article evaluates whether either of these positions comports with the original meaning of the Constitution. Given the article’s focus on the originalist methodology, it directs attention …

What's Originalism After Transunion?: Picking An Originalist Approach That Gets Standing Back On Track, Julian Gregorio

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

This Note argues that not only is standing fascinating and contested, but it is so important that the Court should reconsider standing doctrine in appropriate future cases. While the TransUnion case came and went without much kerfuffle outside of legal circles, standing does not find itself sailing smoothly. As noted, perhaps the Court’s most reliable originalist just dissented from a case that largely restates the current law on standing. And Justice Kagan, perhaps the Court’s most influential liberal, wrote that after TransUnion, standing jurisprudence “needs a rewrite.” Given the current makeup of the Court, any reconsideration of standing doctrine …

No Sense Of Decency, Kathryn E. Miller

Washington Law Review

For nearly seventy years, the Court has assessed Eighth Amendment claims by evaluating “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” In this Article, I examine the evolving standards of decency test, which has long been a punching bag for critics on both the right and the left. Criticism of the doctrine has been fierce but largely academic until recent years. Some fault the test for being too majoritarian, while others argue that it provides few constraints on the Justices’ discretion, permitting their personal predilections to rule the day. For many, the test is seen …

Levels Of Generality & Originalism: Proposing A New Way Forward As Originalism Continues To Expand, Marquan Robertson

Mitchell Hamline Law Review

No abstract provided.

Akhil Amar’S Unusable Past, Gregory Ablavsky

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Words That Made Us: America’s Constitutional Conversation, 1760–1840. By Akhil Reed Amar.

The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

Notre Dame Law Review

The current debate over constitutional interpretation often proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not provide rules for its own interpretation. Accordingly, several scholars have attempted to identify applicable rules by consulting external sources that governed analogous legal texts (such as statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.). The distinctive function of the Constitution—often forgotten or overlooked—renders these analogies largely unnecessary. The Constitution was an instrument used by the people of the several States to transfer a fixed set of sovereign rights and powers from one group of sovereigns (the States) to another sovereign (the federal government), while maintaining the “States” as …

Holmes V. Walton And Its Enduring Lessons For Originalism, Justin W. Aimonetti

Marquette Law Review

Originalism is nothing new. And the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1780 decision in Holmes v. Walton shows it. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court disallowed a state law as repugnant to the state constitution because the law permitted a jury of only six to render a judgment. To reach that result, the court looked to the fixed, original meaning of the jury trial guarantee embedded in the state constitution, and it then constrained its interpretive latitude in conformity with that fixed meaning. Holmes thus cuts against the common misconception that originalism as an interpretive methodology is a modern …

Original(Ism) Sin, G. Alex Sinha

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

During President Trump’s term in office, the Senate confirmed nearly 250 of his federal judicial nominees, including 3 to the Supreme Court of the United States. That number amounts to nearly a third of the federal judiciary’s roughly 800 active members. By and large, the judges nominated by President Trump purport to apply some form of originalist constitutional interpretation or construction, though the subject of originalism featured perhaps most prominently at the confirmation hearings for Amy Coney Barrett, whom President Trump nominated in October of 2020 to replace Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Whatever one thinks of the vast literature …

Disentangling Textualism And Originalism, Katie Eyer

ConLawNOW

Textualism and originalism are not the same interpretive theory. Textualism commands adherence to the text. Originalism, in contrast, commands adherence to history. It should be self-evident that these are not—put simply—the same thing. While textualism and originalism may in some circumstances be harnessed to work in tandem—or may in some circumstances lead to the same result—they are different inquiries, and command fidelity to different ultimate guiding principles.

In this Essay, I argue that disentangling textualism and originalism is critical to the future vibrancy and legitimacy of textualism as an interpretive methodology. When conflated with originalism, textualism holds almost endless opportunities …

Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt

Arkansas Law Review

In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War, Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus” on slavery. According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery within the states. Legal scholars who support the modern reach of federal powers have thus conventionally argued …

Muskrat Textualism, Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Northwestern University Law Review

The Supreme Court decision McGirt v. Oklahoma, confirming the boundaries of the Creek Reservation in Oklahoma, was a truly rare case in which the Court turned back arguments by federal and state governments in favor of American Indian and tribal interests. For more than a century, Oklahomans had assumed that the reservation had been terminated and acted accordingly. But only Congress can terminate an Indian reservation, and it simply had never done so in the case of the Creek Reservation. Both the majority and dissenting opinions attempted to claim the mantle of textualism, but their respective analyses led to …

The Other Ordinary Persons, Fred O. Smith, Jr.

Washington and Lee Law Review

If originalism aims to center the original public meaning of text, who constitutes “the public”? Are we doing enough to capture historically excluded voices: impoverished white planters; dispossessed Natives; silenced women; and the enslaved? If not, what more is required? And for those who are not originalists, how do we ensure that, as American law consults the wisdom of the ages, we do not sever entire sources of wisdom?

This brief symposium Article engages these themes, offering two modest, interrelated claims. The first is that important informational, ethical, and democratic benefits accrue when American legal doctrine includes the voices and …

Greenbacks, Consent, And Unwritten Amendments, John M. Bickers

Arkansas Law Review

I remember a German farmer expressing as much in a few words as the whole subject requires: “money is money, and paper is paper.”—All the invention of man cannot make them otherwise. The alchymist may cease his labours, and the hunter after the philosopher’s stone go to rest, if paper cannot be metamorphosed into gold and silver, or made to answer the same purpose in all cases. Every day Americans spend paper money, using it as legal tender. Yet the Constitution makes no mention of this phenomenon. Indeed, it clearly prevents the states from having the authority to make paper …

Finding Original Public Meaning, James Macleod

Georgia Law Review

Textualists seek to interpret statutes consistent with their “original public meaning” (OPM). To find it, they ask an avowedly empirical question: how would ordinary readers have understood the statute’s terms at the time of their enactment? But as the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County highlights, merely asking an empirical question doesn’t preclude interpretive controversy. In considering how Title VII applies to LGBT people, the Bostock majority and dissents vehemently disagreed over the statute’s bar on discrimination “because of sex”—each side claiming that OPM clearly supported its interpretation. So who, if anyone, was right? And how can textualists’ …

Keeping Up: Walking With Justice Douglas, Charles A. Reich

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Twenty-First Century Formalism, Thomas B. Nachbar

University of Miami Law Review

Formalism is one of the most widely applied but misunderstood features of law. Embroiled in a series of conflicts over the course of the twentieth century, formalism’s meaning has become confused as formalism has been enlisted by both proponents and opponents of specific legal methodologies. For some, formalism has simply become an epithet used to describe virtually anything they dislike in legal thinking. Used often and inconsistently as a stand-in (and frequently a strawman), formalism’s distinct identity has been lost, its meaning merged with whatever methodology it is being used to support or attack.

This Article seeks to separate formalism …

Foreign-Born Children Of Disloyal Parents: Adam Muthana, Mary Arcedeckne, And The Natural-Born, John Vlahoplus

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Can Adam Muthana, the foreign-born child of an alien Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) combatant and a New Jersey-born ISIS adherent, grow up to be president of the United States? He can if he attains the age of thirty-five, resides in the United States for fourteen years, and is a natural-born citizen. He has a facial claim to statutory derivative citizenship at birth through his mother, and some scholars argue that anyone who is a citizen at birth is a natural-born citizen. Nevertheless, there are significant disputes over whether he will be allowed to reside here, whether …

Evaluating Originalism: Commerce And Emoluments, John Vlahoplus

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Article suggests that originalist theories share a core focus that meaningfully competes with pluralist theories. The contest is real and appears in centuries of debates within Anglo-American and civil law. The Article locates the Anglo-American origins of originalism in a novel seventeenth-century method of legal interpretation used to achieve a specific political end: to stifle opposition to the union of Scottish and English subjects of King James after his accession to the English crown in 1603. It details the novel method and the competing traditional method of English legal interpretation. It then evaluates originalist interpretations of the Commerce …

Popular Constitutional Argument, Tom Donnelly

Vanderbilt Law Review

Critics have long attacked popular constitutionalists for offering few clues about how their theory might work in practice—-especially inside the courts. These critics are right. Popular constitutionalism—as a matter of both theory and practice—remains a work in progress. In this Article, I take up the challenge of developing an account of (what I call) popular constitutional argument. Briefly stated, popular constitutional argument is a form of argument that draws on the American people’s considered judgments as a source of constitutional authority—akin to traditional sources like text, history, structure, and doctrine. Turning to constitutional theory, I situate popular constitutional argument within …

From Language To Law: Interpretation And Construction In Early American Judicial Practice, Hillary Chutter-Ames

Northwestern University Law Review

This Note surveys evidence concerning how early American Supreme Court Justices approached interpretation and construction based on an analysis of Supreme Court opinions from 1795 to 1805. An evaluation of this evidence indicates two main trends. First, the Justices engaged in interpretation and construction as a single process, alternating between textual and normative reasoning to determine the intent of the Framers or of Congress. In some cases, textual reasoning seemed determinative; in others, normative reasoning was decisive. This finding illustrates some tension between the idea of limiting judicial discretion in construction and applying methods of interpretation and construction that would …

Originalism And Second-Order Ipse Dixit Reasoning In Chisholm V. Georgia, D.A. Jeremy Telman

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article presents a new perspective on the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence during the Early Republic. It focuses on what I am calling second-order ipse dixit reasoning, which occurs when Justices have to decide between two incommensurable interpretive modalities. If first-order ipse dixit is unreasoned decision-making, second-order ipse dixit involves an unreasoned choice between or among two or more equally valid interpretive options. The early Court often had recourse to second-order ipse dixit because methodological eclecticism characterized its constitutional jurisprudence, and the early Court established no fixed hierarchy among interpretive modalities.

Chisholm, the pre-Marshall Court’s most important constitutional decision, illustrates …

Prosecutors At The Periphery, Peter M. Shane

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Contrary to so-called unitary executive theory, Article II does not guarantee presidents the power to control federal criminal prosecution, a supervisory role Congress has placed by statute with the Attorney General. Nor is Congress without authority to protect federal prosecutors from policy-based dismissals. Rule-of-law values embodied in our system of checks and balances could alone justify these conclusions. But the same conclusions follow also from close attention to the entirety of the relevant constitutional text and from an understanding of how the Founding generation would have understood the relationship between executive power and criminal prosecution. In contemplating the newly proposed …